Language Peace

In Belgium and the European Union

Russell Blair

All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced, stored or transmitted by any means – whether auditory, graphic, mechanical, or electronic – without written permission from the author, except in the case of brief excerpts used in articles and reviews. Unauthorized reproduction of any part of this work is illegal and punishable by law.

ISBN: 978-1-7328306-3-9 (paperback)
ISBN: 978-1-7328306-0-8 (ebook)

Copyright © 2018 by Russell Blair
except as indicated below:

Chapters 1 and 2. Copyright © 2016 by Russell Blair
Chapter 3. Copyright © 2012 by Russell Blair
Sec. 4.2. *Preserving Diversity*. Copyright © 2012 by Russell Blair
Sec. 4.2. *Increasing Access to Diversity*. Copyright © 2010 by Russell Blair
Sec. 4.3. *The Value of a Superordinate Goal*. Copyright © 2012 by Russell Blair
Sec. 6.2.1. *Outcome Legitimacy (Growth)*. Copyright © 2010 by Russell Blair
Sec. 6.2.2. *Process Legitimacy (Democratic Legitimacy)*. Copyright © 2013 by Russell Blair
Sec. 6.2.3. *The Belgian Solution* © 2013 by Russell Blair

This essay is dedicated to
Choi Hung and Lai Hung

Contents

Introduction: The Simplest Reason 1

Part I. Europe's Monolingual Congruence

Chapter 1. Monolingual Congruence: Creating Europe's Nation-States 7
- 1.1 State-First Congruence: Revolutionary France 8
- 1.2 Nation-First Congruence: Kleindeutschland 10
- 1.3 The Take-Away: Achieving Congruence 14

Chapter 2. European Congruence: A Closer Look 15
- 2.1 The Unexceptional Exceptions 15
  - 2.1.1 Luxembourg: Congruence With Equal Sets 16
  - 2.1.2 Switzerland: Monolingual Below the Surface 18
- 2.2 Belgium: The Personality Principle Creates Conflict 19
- 2.3 The Take-Away: The Personality Principle Problem 26

Part II. Bilingual Congruence in Belgium and the EU

Chapter 3. The Two Functions of Language 29
- 3.1 The Communication Function: Bridge Languages 29
  - 3.1.1 Pidgins and *Lingua Franca* 29
  - 3.1.2 English as the Global *Lingua Franca* 31
- 3.2 The Identity Function: Bonding Languages 33
  - 3.2.1 Adding the Identity Function: From Pidgin to Creole 33
  - 3.2.2 Identity by Convergence: Hebrew in Palestine 34
  - 3.2.3 Identity by Divergence: Yugoslavia Shatters 35
- 3.3 The Take-Away: More Than Communication 37

Chapter 4. Congruence With Complementary Bilingualism 38
4.1 Complementary Bilingualism Dissected 39
4.1.1 Identity Bilingualism 40
4.1.2 Communication Bilingualism 44
4.1.3 Equal Sets Bilingualism 44
4.2 Preserving Diversity and Increasing Access to Diversity 46
4.3 The Value of a Superordinate Goal 49
4.4 The Take-Away: Efficient Multilingualism 50
Chapter 5. Communication and Identity in Belgium 51
5.1 The Swiss Model: Territorial Congruence 52
5.1.1 Eliminating the Six BCR Rim Facilities 52
5.1.2 Eliminating Border Facilities Between Flanders and Wallonia 54
5.1.3 Eliminating Border Facilities in German Wallonia 58
5.2 Bilingual Congruence in Belgium: Three Options 60
5.2.1 Maximum Belgian Identity (Equal Sets) 62
5.2.2 Maximum Global Communication (English Bridge) 63
5.2.3 Maximum Individual Choice 64
5.3 The Return of National Political Parties 65
5.4 The Take-Away: Everyone Wins 65
Chapter 6. Efficient Multilingualism for the EU 68
6.1 *Laissez Faire* Multilingualism in the EU 68
6.1.1 The Multilingual Chimera 69
6.1.2 Europeans Have Spoken 70
6.2 The Benefits of Complementary Bilingualism for the EU 71
6.2.1 Outcome Legitimacy (Growth) 71
6.2.2 Process Legitimacy (Democracy) 72
6.2.3 Affective Legitimacy (Patriotism) 74
6.3 The Take-Away: Efficient Multilingualism 76

Chapter 7. Conclusion: Ending Monolingual Division 78
7.1 Bilingual Congruence 79
7.1.1 Belgium 79
7.1.2 The EU 80
7.2 Preserving Diversity and Maximizing Human Potential 80

Bibliography 85

> As man advances in civilization, and small tribes are united into larger communities, *the simplest reason* would tell each individual that he ought to extend his social instincts and sympathies to all the members of the same nation, though personally unknown to him. This point being once reached, there is only an artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies extending to all men of all nations and races.
>
> Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man* (1871)

Introduction:

The Simplest Reason

Darwin was correct, and language barriers are among the most significant of the artificial barriers that prevent us from fully extending our "social instincts and sympathy." Language barriers in Belgium are egregious and unnecessary. The same is true in the European Union (EU), with its 24 official languages. Belgium can address its language problem and, in doing so, show the EU how to harmonize its own linguistic diversity. What will work for Belgium will work for Europe, and, in due course, Belgium and Europe will show the world how to apply *the simplest reason*.

The fundamental idea that will unite the respective efforts in Belgium and the EU is a language rationalization policy called *complementary bilingualism.* Complementary bilingualism combines each individual's language preference with a complementary second language. The result is efficient multilingualism and linguistic congruence between citizens and the institutions of their governance. In addition, complementary bilingualism preserves the existing diversity and increases access to that diversity.

The 2019 Federal Elections in Belgium. The current hiatus in Belgium's

language troubles is due to the inclusion of Mouvement Réformateur in the governing coalition. After the 2019 federal elections, there could easily be a return to the stalemate conditions of 2007–2011. While the changes discussed in this essay, as deemed appropriate and modified by Belgians, cannot be completed before the 2019 federal elections, the opening of a dialogue will make a post-election bilingual coalition easier to establish and begin the reconciliation process.

The 2019 Parliamentary Elections in the EU. Belgium will show the EU how to replace the incoherence of its 24 official languages with efficient multilingualism. Complementary bilingualism can enhance European solidarity, strengthen the European identity, achieve continental congruence and preserve linguistic diversity.

Embracing complementary bilingualism can help the 2019 European Parliament elections become more than the aggregation of disconnected national elections. As a policy proposal, complementary bilingualism can provide an optimistic narrative of the future of the EU. The 2019 EU parliamentary elections need an injection of optimism about the EU's future and a discussion of the potential benefits of complementary bilingualism can provide that optimism.

Complementary Bilingualism: Six Key Words and Phrases


(1) Congruence: the alignment of a linguistic community with the institutions of governance. French citizens speak French. German citizens speak German. Spanish citizens speak Spanish. However, with complementary bilingualism, achieving congruence does not suppress diversity.

(2) Complementary Bilingualism: a language rationalization policy for both achieving congruence in multilingual jurisdictions and sheltering linguistic diversity. It combines each individual's birth language, thus preserving the linguistic diversity, with a common language for broader congruence. The incomplete form of complementary bilingualism is *elite*

bilingualism and results in *elite closure*, which uses the privileged language as a barrier to upward mobility, securing and preserving class privileges. Elite bilingualism is all too common but can be converted to complementary bilingualism.

(3) Identity Bilingualism: identities are not like hats; you can wear more than one at the same time. If the complementary language of wider communication invokes an additional identity, then the language rationalization policy is the identity bilingualism form of complementary bilingualism.

(4) Communication Bilingualism: if the complementary language does not invoke an additional identity, then the policy is the communication form of complementary bilingualism. *Generally* it will be the use of a large *lingua franca*, such as English or French, that produces the communication form.



(5) Efficient Multilingual Congruence: complementary bilingualism produces both efficient multilingualism and congruence. It results in multilingualism because it retains and protects the underlying linguistic diversity. It is efficient because any number of diverse language communities can share a language of wider communication. It achieves congruence because the wider language aligns a unified community of communication with the institutions of governance.

(6) Equal Sets Identity Bilingualism: if two or more languages are jointly used to produce a single identity, this is not complementary bilingualism (or is a very distinct manifestation of complementary bilingualism), because it does not permit individual choice and, therefore, does not

shelter linguistic diversity. Equal sets bilingualism does, however, achieve congruence and should be considered when that is the sole objective. Two examples of this phenomenon, Luxembourg and Paraguay, are discussed in this essay.

Part I

Europe's Monolingual Congruence

> The strong European states that emerged in the nineteenth century were built around a national principle that made language and ethnicity the core of national identity.
>
> Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay* (2014)

Chapter 1

Monolingual Congruence: Creating Europe's Nation-States

Europe's nation-states established monolingual congruence between citizens and the institutions of their governance. The ideal form of a European nation-state is "one nation, one state, one language."

There were two pathways to achieving monolingual congruence in Europe: (1) *state first*, which started with an existing state and established congruence by enforcing a language shift to a privileged dialect of a single language; and (2) *nation first*, which drew the state's boundary around an ethnolinguistic nation, real or imagined, and unified the institutions of governance. In the second case, the circumscribed territory was either monolingual or part of a language continuum. Where oral diversity persisted among dialects, as in Germany, there was uniformity in the written language.

In both cases, monolingual congruence aligned a language community with the institutions of its governance. Congruence was essential for the establishment of democracy, as democracy requires both horizontal communication among fellow citizens and vertical communication between all citizens and their representative government.

1.1 State-First Congruence: Revolutionary France

State-first congruence began with an existing monarchial boundary. The boundary reflected the monarch's ability to project military power and hold territory acquired by inheritance, conquest or dowry. If natural barriers were significant, the state's borders would generally conform. Using natural boundaries often disregarded the distribution of ethnolinguistic communities. Thus, because both the Catalan and Basque language communities span the Pyrenees, each was divided between France and Spain.

In monarchies, language use was of concern only to the elite, and language rationalization generally began as a project of the literate minority to standardize a written form. For example, the Académie française began as a group of distinguished French citizens who were interested in establishing standards for literary French. In 1634, it was coopted by Cardinal Richelieu, First Minister of King Louis XIII, and tasked with creating a dictionary and a grammar of standard French. Cardinal Richelieu's objective was to consolidate the king's power by establishing a bureaucratic administration that used a standardized vernacular. A bureaucracy of commoners that used a vernacular language diminished the power of both the nobility and the clergy.

Revolutionary France. The revolution of 1789 changed France dramatically. The adoption of a policy of territorial monolingualism was one of the most radical changes. A common language was deemed essential to consolidating and sustaining the revolution, because the revolutionary government needed to communicate its authority and political message to every citizen. For the first time, the language of the average person was important to the government.

A post-revolution census found that only a minority spoke French. Three million used it as their primary language, and another three million had some ability in French. Nineteen million spoke little or no French. Minority language communities were more rural, religious and

politically conservative. These qualities made them susceptible to counter-revolutionary efforts, so the continued use of a regional language or dialect became a marker for failing to fully embrace the revolutionary order.

> The French Revolution had, moreover, unleashed not just demands for popular political participation but also a new form of identity by which a shared language and culture would be the central source of unity for the new democratic public.
>
> Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay* (2014)

On June 6, 1794, an important document was submitted to the revolutionary government by the Abbé Grégoire, who had been in charge of the census. Its descriptive title was "On the Need and Means for Eliminating Dialects and Universalizing the Use of the French Language." The most radical faction of the Jacobins, the Montagnards, believed that a highly centralized government and territorial monolingualism were essential to the success of the revolution. A second faction, the Girondins, were more open to federalism and more accepting of linguistic diversity. The totality of their disagreements, including the issues of centralization and monolingualism, were settled with the guillotine. While many Montagnards would later share the Girondins' fate, their policies of state centralization and territorial monolingualism prevailed.

Napoleonic France. The territorial monolingualism that the revolution established in principle, but lacked the time and resources to fully implement, was subsequently advanced by Napoleon's military adventures. The Napoleonic Wars showed that a monolingual army performed better in combat. Speaking a common language avoided misunderstanding orders. Patriotism, based on a common ethnolinguistic identity, also improved military performance. While Napoleon's army units were initially made up of soldiers from a single area and some units even used a regional language or a non-standard dialect, replacements were assigned as needed. As the

campaigns consumed soldiers, units became increasingly diverse and reliant on standard French.

Modern France. From the 1880s, France mandated primary school education in standard French. The effects of revolution, conscription, the printing press, universal education and the need for literate industrial workers combined to complete the transition from the *laissez faire* multilingualism of a largely illiterate feudal society to the territorial monolingualism of the modern French nation-state.

Precisely how long it took for France to become monolingual is hard to determine. After the sobering revelation of the 1790 census, questions on language usage were not included in subsequent surveys. However long it took, the results are clear. The French have great affection for their language. For example, to blunt the impact of the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, in 1992 France amended Article 2 of its constitution to specify that "The language of the Republic is French." Not that there was any doubt, but the constitutionalization of the obvious impeded efforts to support minority languages.

1.2 Nation-First Congruence: Kleindeutschland

The second path to creating a nation-state drew a new state boundary around a real or imagined nation that was identified by a common language or mutually comprehensible dialects. Language was key, because it is the means for a culture's expression and the primary tool for its maintenance and transmission. The nation-first model is exemplified by Germany.

Speakers of German dialects were the core of the Holy Roman Empire (HRE), but the HRE also included substantial populations that spoke dialects of Czech, Slovene, Dutch, Polish, Italian and French. In an empire composed of hundreds of mini-states, great change would be needed to establish a monolingual German nation-state.

In the century after the Reformation of 1517, Lutheranism became the official religion in many of the northern pieces of the HRE. Roman Catholicism still dominated in the south, so religious fault lines emerged. Eventually, a combination of religious intolerance and political opportunism led to the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) and the death of at least one-third of the HRE's German-speaking population. When the slaughter ended, in 1648, the Peace of Westphalia expanded religious liberty and established Westphalian Sovereignty, the equality of states under international law and exclusive sovereignty within a defined border.

Among its effects, the Peace of Westphalia loosened Austrian control of the HRE. This allowed Brandenburg-Prussia to emerge as a rival for the leadership of the German-speaking people. The years between the Peace of Westphalia and the French Revolution saw Prussia assert itself in military conflicts against Austria. Notably, these included the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) and the Seven Years' War (1756–1763). In both cases, Prussia was on the winning side.

Napoleonic Consolidation. Fighting first to defend its revolution and later for the glory of Napoleon's empire, France laid waste to Westphalian Sovereignty. The poorly organized HRE was a primary victim. In 1805, at the Battle of Austerlitz, Napoleon's forces (including some allied German states) defeated the HRE. The following year, Emperor Francis II abdicated. With the HRE gone, Napoleon created the Confederacy of the Rhine. He consolidated governance by reducing the number of states from more than 300 in the HRE to just three dozen in the new confederacy.

The Confederacy of the Rhine lasted just nine years, ending with Napoleon's defeat in Russia and the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815). The victorious coalition did not want to reunify the HRE, as German speakers were showing unmistakable signs of their potential power. Instead, the Vienna Treaties established the German Confederation, which was composed of 39 sovereign states and included only portions of the former Austrian and Prussian territories. The intent was a balance of European

countries such that none was large enough or powerful enough to act unilaterally.

Kleindeutschland. Could the speakers of different German dialects, divided among dozens of sovereign governments, forge a single nation-state? One proponent of an affirmative answer was the German philosopher Johann Fichte (1762–1814), who championed the idea that states must be ethnolinguistic communities. His belief in the imperative of a German-speaking nation-state was ardently expressed in an influential 1808 book, *Address to the German Nation* (*Reden an die deutsche Nation*):

> Those who speak the same language are joined to each other by a multitude of invisible bonds ... they understand each other and have the power of continuing to make themselves understood more and more clearly; they belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable whole.

Unifying Germany required a resolution of the rivalry between Prussia and Austria. In 1834, most of the German Confederation formed a customs union (Zollverein). To strengthen its position relative to Austria, Prussia made sure that Austria was not included. Prussia also championed the idea of a Kleindeutschland (Lesser Germany) that excluded multilingual Austria.

In 1848, liberal revolutions occurred in many parts of Europe, including the German Confederation. In the confederation, the revolution stressed both nationalism and opposition to autocratic rule. The middle class demanded political rights without significant property qualifications, liberal policies, German unity and a constitutional monarchy. The working class demanded better working conditions and radical democracy.

The combined strength of the middle class and the working class cowed the aristocracy and succeeded in replacing the Bundestag with a parliament that met in Frankfurt. At Frankfurt, after 230 sessions, a compromise was reached, but it was between the conservatives and the middle class. It excluded the goals of the working class, which was feared

by both the aristocracy and the middle class. The compromise was expressed in the Imperial Constitution of 1849, which provided for a bicameral parliament, adopted the lesser Germany model and established a constitutional monarchy. A Provisional Power replaced the German Confederation, and the crown of the constitutional monarchy was offered to Frederich Wilhelm IV of Prussia. It was anticipated that he would accept because the constitution decided the competition with Austria in favor of Prussia.

Frederich Wilhelm IV declined the crown because of the constitutional limits on his power. This sent a clear signal to the conservatives that their coalition with the middle class should be abrogated. The earlier split when the middle class abandoned the working class now showed its significance. Division in the opposition permitted the Prussian military to act. The Frankfurt Parliament was dissolved and the German Confederation reestablished.

Bismarck's Germany. In the decade after becoming Minister President and Foreign Minister of Prussia, Otto von Bismarck engineered and won three wars that united 25 of the German-speaking states. The first war, in 1864, was against Denmark over control of Schleswig-Holstein. Bismarck's larger objective was to unite northern Germans behind Prussian leadership. The second war, in 1866, was with Austria. It established Prussia as the leader of the German-speaking people. In 1867, the German Confederation was replaced by the Northern German Confederation, under Prussian leadership.

The third and final war of German unification (1870–1871) was with France, to draw the southern states of Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and Hesse-Darmstadt into the Prussian fold. During the shelling of Paris, with victory imminent, King Wilhelm I of Prussia (brother of Frederick Wilhelm IV) was crowned Emperor of Germany. The unification of Germany, on the lesser Germany model that excluded multilingual Austria, established an ethnolinguistic nation-state using the nation-first model.

1.3 The Take-Away: Achieving Congruence

The importance of monolingual congruence in the governance of Europe's nation-states is underappreciated. Monolingual congruence was achieved either state first, which required a linguistically diverse community to converge on a single official language, or nation first, which required a new state to circumscribe a linguistically unified territory. In state-first formation, monolingual congruence was established without regard to minority language communities and involved a significant degree of coercion.

> Switzerland may be quadrilingual, but to all intents and purposes each point of its territory can be viewed as unilingual.
>
> François Grin, *Multilingualism and Government* (2000)

Chapter 2

European Congruence: A Closer Look

Achieving congruence was the imperative that drove European monolingualism, but not all of Europe's nation-states achieved the ideal of one nation, one state and one language. However, even the exceptions achieved substantial congruence between linguistic communities and the principal institutions of their governance. Achieving congruence makes the exceptions unexceptional. Europe's unexceptional exceptions include Switzerland, Luxembourg and Belgium.

All three are exceptions because they are multilingual. Luxembourg is an unexceptional exception because it has linguistic unity, and therefore congruence, with a trio of languages. Switzerland is an unexceptional exception because, while it does not have congruence at the federal level, it has territorial monolingualism below the surface and that is where most Swiss governance occurs. Belgium is both unexceptional and exceptional, depending on where in Belgium one looks. It has substantial but not complete congruence.

2.1 The Unexceptional Exceptions

It is not a coincidence that the unexceptional exceptions, Switzerland, Luxembourg and Belgium, are near neighbors along the fault line

between the Germanic and Romance language families. The gap between Luxembourg and Switzerland is filled by Alsace-Lorraine, which has been an arena of periodic conflict between France and Germany.[1] Organizing a successful democratic government on a linguistic fault line requires an extra measure of imagination and pragmatism.

2.1.1 Luxembourg: Congruence With Equal Sets. Luxembourg, with a population of about 600,000 and an area of 2,600 square kilometers, is a case of linguistic congruence in which three languages define a unified language community. In mathematical terms, Luxembourg's three language communities are *equal sets*.[2] This achieves congruence between the unitary (trilingual) language community and the institutions of governance.

Luxembourg is instructive because it demonstrates that a country can achieve congruence with bilingualism or even trilingualism. Here is some of the relevant background:

(1) Until 1984, both German and French were used as official languages, pursuant to decrees that were issued between 1830 and 1834. In 1984, the constitution was revised to permit the legislature to regulate language use. Luxembourgish was then added as the sole national language and, along with French and German, as one of three administrative languages.

(2) Luxembourgish is primarily an oral language. A written form became official only in 1975. Luxembourgish, as the national language,

1 Add the former Duchy of Savoy, long disputed between France and the Holy Roman Empire, and this fault line extends from the North Sea to the Mediterranean.

2 Equal sets have the same elements, but not in the same order. Luxembourg's citizens are trilingual in the same three languages: Luxembourgish 90% (77% native, 13% second language), German 92% (4% native and 88% second language) and French 96% (6% native, 90% second language).

invokes the Luxembourg identity. This reflects a desire to be distinguished from neighboring France and Germany.

(3) French is the most prestigious language and also occupies certain functional domains. For example, French is the language of the legal system. This reflects Luxembourg's adoption of the Napoleonic Code. Court rulings are almost always in French. However, police reports are generally in German, and parties to judicial proceedings may use any of the three administrative languages. In resolving ambiguities among the three administrative languages, the French version is controlling.

(4) Newspapers are predominantly in German, but often with French interspersed. French is common in advertisements for luxury goods, in announcements and in stories with a European or cultural focus. It is assumed that readers understand all three administrative languages.

(5) The broadcast media predominantly uses Luxembourgish, but news is often presented in German or a mix of German and Luxembourgish.

(6) Government primarily writes in French or German, only occasionally in Luxembourgish. However, the use of Luxembourgish is always accommodated.

(7) Luxembourgish dominates in oral communication. For example, federal legislative debates are generally in Luxembourgish. However, when the legislative branch submits questions to the executive branch, French is used. Municipal meetings are conducted in Luxembourgish, but council members may use any of the three administrative languages. Requests for the translation of documents or the use of interpreters are not permitted.

(8) The key to successful unitary trilingualism is Luxembourg's school system. Teachers must be proficient in all three languages. Students are taught all three languages and classes are taught *in* all three languages. German was traditionally used in primary schools and French in secondary schools. In 1912, Luxembourgish was introduced into primary schools.

(9) Preschool and early elementary education is now generally in Luxembourgish. From late primary until the ninth grade, classes transition to German. As necessary, assistance and explanations are in

Luxembourgish. Students who are tracked to vocational education generally continue in German. Math and science are often taught in French. In grades 10 through 13, humanities instruction also shifts to French.

The crucial point is that Luxembourg achieves congruence with territorial uniformity of language use, though not with monolingualism. If unitary trilingualism can work in Luxembourg, then other countries will be able to implement a much less ambitious policy of either equal sets bilingualism or complementary bilingualism, as will be explained in Part II.

2.1.2 Switzerland: Monolingual Below the Surface. Switzerland is the country most often cited as an exception to Europe's monolingual model. While the country lacks congruence at the federal level, the Swiss live in territorially monolingual communities at or below the canton level. This is where the Swiss have invested most political authority and responsibility. If you move to a different part of Switzerland, you must use its sole official language when dealing with the government. Switzerland is linguistically segregated, with monolingual congruence below a surface of superficial multilingualism.

Most Swiss are either German speakers (70%) or French speakers (20%). Less than 10% are native speakers of Italian (8.4%) and Romansch (0.7%). Of Switzerland's 26 cantons, 22 have one official language (17 German, 4 French and 1 Italian). Four use more than one language. Most functions of government are performed by monolingual cantons or, in the four multilingual cantons, by monolingual districts and municipalities.

Of the four multilingual cantons, three are bilingual in German and French: Berne (Bern), Fribourg (Freiburg) and Valais (Wallis). Crossing all three is a single and continuous Alemani-Burgundian divide, known as the Röstigraben ("Rösti rift"). Congruence is achieved with monolingual districts and municipalities. In Valais (Wallis) there are six French-speaking districts (Lower Valais) and eight German-speaking districts (Upper Wallis). In Fribourg (Freiburg), the French districts are in the west and the German districts are in the east. In Berne (Bern), the French

districts are in the north and the German districts are in the south. Graubünden, the fourth multilingual canton, with three official languages, is more complex but achieves similar territorial monolingualism.

2.2 Belgium: The Personality Principle Creates Conflict

Belgium is broadly similar to Switzerland. Below the federal level it is *largely* governed using territorial monolingualism. The language of governance is Dutch[3] in the north (Flanders) and French in the south (Wallonia).[4] However, there are two exceptions where a choice (the personality principle) is permitted: in the 19 municipalities of the bilingual Brussels Capital Region (BCR) and in 27 other municipalities that provide facilities for citizens who speak the municipalities second language.

Historical Perspective. The BCR is an enclave inside of Dutch-speaking Flanders but is very close to the border with French-speaking Wallonia. The BCR uses the personality principle: its residents can deal with the BCR government in either French or Dutch. Confusing first-time visitors, street in Brussels have both a French name and a Dutch name. Until the 1950s, the majority in Brussels spoke Dutch. That changed rapidly in the ensuing decades and, today, the ratio of Francophones to Dutch speakers is about 4:1. About one-third of the residents of the BCR have a first language that is neither Dutch nor French. This large cohort, however, generally adopts French as its second language.

Francophones want the BCR to become physically connected to Wallonia, through the southern suburb of Sint-Genesius-Rode. This goal exacerbates friction between French speakers and Dutch speakers in six

3 My apologies to those who prefer to refer to it as "Flemish." Both terms are accurate.

4 There is a small area in the southeast where less than 1% of the population belongs to a German community. The area was added to Belgium after the First World War.

rim municipalities adjacent to the BCR, where Francophones are now the majority but in which Dutch is still the official language. The offended sensibilities and frustrated aspirations of Francophones and the corresponding defensiveness of Dutch speakers provide abundant fuel for political fires that periodically erupt in the BCR and its suburbs and then inflame the entire country.

Although it is a source of language conflict, the BCR and its suburbs is probably the primary internal[5] reason Belgium has not split into two monolingual countries. In order to split, Belgium would need to decide what to do with the BCR and its suburbs. Deciding what to do is *perceived* to be such an intractable problem that it seems necessary to muddle from crisis to crisis.

Some history is necessary to understand Belgium's split personality and why the politics of language usage is always center stage, periodically threatening to cause Belgium to come apart at its linguistic seams. The historical background cannot be fully described in a short space, but this is an introduction. Some additional detail will be provided in Chapter 5.

(1) The first Belgian census, in 1846, asked about language use. The response was 40% French and 60% Dutch. French was the elite language and the *sole* language of government, even though Dutch speakers were the majority. The elite's preference for French was a factor in the 1830 war for Belgium's independence from the Netherlands, and it was not until seven decades after independence, with the passage of the 1898 Equality Act, that Dutch became Belgium's second official language.

(2) In 1921, Belgium chose territorial language rights, rather than the personality principle, for Wallonia and Flanders. Francophone Walloons supported territorial monolingualism because they were concerned that

5 The external reason is the adamant opposition of the EU to any nonconsensual division of an EU member state. Spain is particularly sensitive to regionalism, owing to strong independence sentiment in Catalonia, the Basque region and, to a lesser degree, Galicia.

allowing citizens a choice would require bilingualism for all government jobs. This would favor the Flemish, who were far more likely to know the elite French language than were the Walloons to know the Dutch language. Government became French speaking in the south (Wallonia) and Dutch speaking in the north (Flanders).[6] The capital, Brussels, became bilingual.

(3) In 1932, Parliament passed a law requiring language use in municipalities to be determined by the citizens' preference, as periodically determined by the census. If a minority language community reached a 30% threshold, the municipal government was required to provide "facilities" to assist speakers of the second most common language. Facilities interjected the personality principle. It is not clear whether the facilities were intended to be a transitional accommodation, until the minority language community learned the majority's language, or a permanent accommodation that would allow a minority language community to sustain itself and, perhaps, eventually become the majority, with its language becoming the official language. The Flemish believe the former, which meant that the official languages were permanent, and the Walloons believe the latter.

(4) The next census was not conducted, because of the German invasion in 1940. The results of the next completed census, in 1947, were suppressed because of the political problems that using them would have created. When the census numbers were finally released, in 1954, they were disregarded.[7] Instead, an *ad hoc* compromise moved three municipalities (Evere, Ganshoren and Sint-Agatha-Berchem) from Flanders into the bilingual BCR. French-language facilities were added in four rim municipalities (Kraainem, Linkebeek, Drogenbos and Wemmel) in the BCR suburbs.

---

6 The German-speaking East Cantons were added in 1920, but were still administered by the military in 1921.

7 There was a widespread belief among the Flemish that the 1947 census had been manipulated to overestimate the number of Francophones. Given the dramatic and unanticipated results, this was an inevitable reaction.

(5) Because of the demographic shift in favor of Francophones in the BCR and its suburbs and suspicion about the 1947 census, many Flemish boycotted the language questions on the 1961 census and joined mass street demonstrations that demanded permanent language borders and a limit of 19 municipalities in the bilingual BCR. In 1963, the BCR was limited to 19 municipalities and permanent language borders were established. The census data was again disregarded and, in another *ad hoc* compromise, facilities for Francophones were added to two more BCR rim municipalities (Wezembeek-Oppem and Sint-Genesius-Rode). However, French facilities were denied in six municipalities (Alsemberg, Beersel, Sint-Pieters-Loew, Dilbeek, Strombeek-Bever and Sint-Steven-Woluve), which may have passed the 30% threshold after the 1947 census. Changing official municipal languages on the basis of census data proved to be politically impossible to implement.

(6) In 1964, the earlier success of the Flemish boycott of the census and Flemish street protests led to the formation of the Democratic Front of Francophones. The party opposed fixed language borders and the limiting of the number of municipalities in the BCR to 19. It saw that the Francophone trend would result in the eventual connection of the BCR, via the southern suburb of Sint-Genesius-Rode, to Wallonia. Achieving that connection became an important political objective for many Walloons, and preventing it an equally important objective for many Flemish.

(7) Increasing support for language-based political parties, resulting from the linguistic conflict, caused the traditional parties to split and form linguistically segregated pairs. In 1968, the Christian Democrats split into a Dutch-speaking party and a French-speaking counterpart. In 1972, the Liberals also divided into two language-specific parties. In 1978, the Socialist Party split into the French Socialist Party and the Dutch Socialist Party.

(8) First State Reform. In 1970, declaring that the "the unitary state, its structure and functioning as laid down by law has become obsolete" and reflecting the increased importance of language in politics, three new units

of governance were written into the constitution. They were (language) *community* governments: French, Dutch and German. These communities were given responsibility for cultural matters, including broadcasting and language use.

(9) Second State Reform. In 1980 a constitutional amendment established two *region* governments: a Flemish region government in the north and a Walloon region government in the south. In addition, the three communities (French, Dutch and German) that had been created in the First State Reform were given authority and responsibility for matters relating to youth and health programs. The Flemish merged their region and community governments. The Walloons did not, because the German community government did not have a corresponding region government; majority German-speaking municipalities were part of the French region.

(10) Third State Reform. In 1988–1989, the BCR was established as the third region. Education was transferred to the community governments.

(11) Fourth State Reform. In 1993, previous reforms were consolidated in order to clarify the change from a unitary to a federal system. Direct election of region and community parliaments was also established. The remit of the region governments was expanded, as fiscal responsibilities were transferred.

(12) Fifth State Reform. In 2001, additional authority and responsibility (competencies) was transferred to the region governments: agriculture and fisheries, electoral expense financing, trade and cooperative development. Regions were given a dozen taxes to administer and authority over municipal and provincial governments (Lambermont Accord). Also, the Flemish were given a guaranteed minimum representation in the BCR, irrespective of their population (Lombard Accord).

(13) Sixth State Reform. In 2011, the arrondissement[8] of

8 An arrondissement is an administrative division – as if things were not already complicated enough. The BHV arrondissement was tasked with both electoral and judicial administration.

Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (BHV) was split, resolving a debilitating constitutional dispute that will be discussed below. Additional competencies were transferred to the region (employment and economy) and community (family policy) governments.

With this background, we can better appreciate the BHV dispute that twice immobilized Belgium's federal government, for a total of nearly two years between 2007 and 2011. Although the BHV dispute was resolved in 2011 and linguistic conflict was temporarily muted in 2014 by the formation of a coalition federal government that includes one French-language party, linguistic conflict could easily result in another crisis after the 2019 federal elections.

Belgium's Existential Crisis, 2007–2011. After the 2003 federal elections, Belgium's Constitutional Court declared an election arrondissement that combined the bilingual BCR with parts of Flemish Brabant (Halle and Vilvoorde) to be unconstitutional. The decision was based on unequal voting rights. Francophones in Dutch speaking Halle and Vilvoorde were permitted to vote for French language parties but Dutch-speakers living in French-speaking Wallon Brabant were not permitted to vote for Dutch-language parties. The Constitutional Court allowed the 2003 election results to stand – to let the political process fix the problem. This turned out to be wildly optimistic. Following the 2007 federal election, Belgium was unable to form a federal government for more than six months. The BHV issue was the most prominent cause.

A poll on August 24, 2007 found that 45.8% of the Flemish wanted Flanders to declare its independence. On September 1, 2007, the Flemish-language newspaper *De Standard* devoted an entire issue to the question of how Flanders would fare as a separate country. By November, things were so bad that the Flemish members of the federal legislature's subject matter committee decided to act unilaterally. This resulted in a walkout by the Walloon members and the invocation of a rule that deferred the matter. This allowed the formation of a caretaker government.

In 2010, the government dissolved, largely over the still unresolved

BHV issue, and new elections were held. The Flemish separatist party, New Flemish Alliance (NVA), won in Flanders. The anti-separatist French Socialist Party won in Wallonia. The regional success of diametrically opposed platforms made the formation of a coalition government very difficult. No combination of parties succeeded in forming a government and Belgium had no functioning federal government for a year and a half. On October 11, 2011, an agreement was reached by Flemish (CD&V, Open VDL, sp.a., and Groen!) and Walloon (PS, MR, CDH and Ecolo) political parties. It included the constitutional amendments of the Sixth State Reform, mentioned above, and resolved the constitutional issue by splitting BHV.

While the immediate crisis was resolved, Belgium had set a new world record for post-election delay in the formation of a government. As French speakers in some of the BCR suburbs continue to increase in both absolute and relative terms, the official status of Dutch is increasingly perceived as oppressive by Francophones, some of whom openly resent the use of Dutch. Dutch speakers reciprocate.

Political differences based on language were muted in 2014 when the NVA and its Dutch-speaking allies formed a coalition government that included one Francophone party, but this hiatus is nearing its end. The 2019 federal elections may be as divisive as any in the past, and post-election government formation correspondingly difficult.

Demographic reality already connects the BCR, *de facto* but not *de jure,* to Wallonia via the majority Francophone municipality of Sint-Genesius-Rode. The neighboring municipalities of Drogenbos and Linkebeek, which are also majority Francophone, would widen the connection. If nothing changes, feelings of frustration will increase.

Further devolution, building on the prior state reforms, may pave the way for a future attempt at dissolution into the monolingual nation-states of Wallonia and Flanders. If so, the lack of congruence in the BCR and some of its suburbs will have been a precipitating cause. The municipal exceptions that employ the personality principle are a fortuitous natural

experiment that shows that the stability of the European nation-state model is based on congruence between language communities and government institutions.

2.3 The Take-Away: The Personality Principle Problem

The primary objective of European monolingualism was not monolingualism *per se* but congruence between linguistic communities and the corresponding institutions of their governance, which monolingualism necessarily creates. Where "one nation, one state, one language" was not achieved, congruence was still possible. Luxembourg has congruence because the trinity of German, French and Luxembourgish creates a single language community. In Switzerland, congruence is not achieved at the federal level, but this is largely mitigated by the fact that the most important competencies are allocated to the canton level and below. Congruence is achieved with territorial monolingualism at these lower levels of governance.

Belgium, through sequential state reform amendments to the constitution, is becoming more like Switzerland, as authority and responsibilities devolve. However, unlike Switzerland, Belgium retains a modified form of the personality principle in the BCR, in 6 BCR rim municipalities with facilities and in 21 border municipalities with facilities. Instructively, in Belgium it is precisely where the personality principle prevents congruence that serious conflict arises.

Before turning to the discussion of complementary bilingualism (Chapter 4), its application to Belgium (Chapter 5) and in the EU (Chapter 6), the following chapter will explore the dual nature of languages as instruments of communication and identity formation.

Part II

Bilingual Congruence in Belgium and the EU

> … because of differences of language, all the similarity of their common human nature is of no avail to unite them in fellowship. So true is this that a man would be more cheerful with his dog for company than with a foreigner.
>
> St. Augustine (354–430) *The City of God*

Chapter 3

The Two Functions of Language

This chapter distinguishes the ability of languages to create and maintain identities from their more obvious communication function. For people from different language communities to communicate, a bridge language is needed, but a bridge language does not invoke a common identity.

3.1 The Communication Function: Bridge Languages

Bridge languages come in two flavors: pidgins and *lingua francas*. This section looks at bridge languages in general and then discusses the case of English as a *lingua franca*, to explain its extraordinary and durable success.

3.1.1 Pidgins and *Lingua Francas*. A pidgin is a hybrid of two or more languages that is negotiated by speakers from different language communities. In contrast, a *lingua franca* is any preexisting language that can be used as a communication bridge. Today, because *lingua francas* are almost always available, pidgins are rarely created.

Pidgins. A pidgin is created when there is sustained contact between

different language communities and no *lingua franca* is available. A pidgin develops only to the extent necessary for specific objectives, such as trade. There are no native speakers of a pidgin. True pidgins are now rare, but some languages that began as pidgins are still called "Pidgin." This reflects their origin, but they have become complete creole languages. Unless it becomes a creole language, a pidgin will last no longer that the circumstances that motivated its creation.

If a pidgin is their primary means of communication, as children grow up they elaborate it to meet all of their needs. It eventually becomes a complete language. This new language is called a creole. Locally, it can partially or completely displace one or more of its source languages. This is common when all of the multiple language communities are diasporas, as was the case in the creation of many plantation creoles. A creole is a normal language that unites the communication and identity functions for its native speakers. Like any language, a creole can be used as a *lingua franca.*

Lingua francas. The proper name *Lingua Franca* means "Language of the Franks" and refers to a pidgin that was used in Mediterranean trade for centuries. The generic term, *lingua franca,* came into use much later and refers to any language that is used as a communication bridge. It can be the first language of some of the people using it or a second language for all. If the *lingua franca* is the first language of any of the users, they have a major advantage.

Although only a few languages are widely used as *lingua francas*, learning any language makes it available as a *lingua franca* bridge for communication with its native speakers. People generally choose to learn a second language that is the language of a large, proximate or prestigious community. The larger and more powerful a language community, the greater is the utility of using its language as a *lingua franca*. In a world with thousands of languages, knowing a major *lingua franca* is very useful, especially for people from small language communities.

The following have been important *lingua francas* in Europe and the Mediterranean Basin:

(1) Aramaic. After the conquest of Mesopotamia by Darius I, Aramaic became the *lingua franca* of the Persian Empire. It was probably the language in which the Talmud and the Old Testament were first written. Jesus probably preached in an Aramaic dialect. Its use has been documented as far as China. Though now endangered, Aramaic dialects are still used by dispersed communities in the Middle East.

(2) Greek. Greek was standardized for military and general government use. It displaced *lingua franca* Aramaic in the Hellenized regions of the Mediterranean Basin and was the original language of the New Testament. The Romans accorded Greek great value as a storehouse of knowledge and used it in some academic writing.

(3) Latin. Latin's use as a *lingua franca* flourished with the Roman Empire. It survived the fall of Rome because it was the language of the Roman Catholic Church – whose clergy were the literate class in feudal Europe. As late as the closing decades of the eighteenth century, a majority of the books published in Europe were in Latin.

(4) French. Power, both soft and hard, made French the most important *lingua franca* in the courts of Europe and in diplomacy, from the seventeenth century until the Second World War. It was then eclipsed by English. The number of French speakers continues to increase, principally in Africa, and French remains an important *lingua franca* in both Europe and Africa.

3.1.2 English as the Global *Lingua Franca*. English is now the most widely used *lingua franca.* That the language of an average-sized country situated off of the west coast of Europe became the world's dominant bridge language is not due to any characteristics that make English particularly suited for the role. Rather, it is because the British successfully established settlement colonies that displaced the indigenous populations in the vast spaces of North America and Australia.

After Europe was decimated by two Eurasian wars in the first half of the twentieth century, economic and military leadership shifted to Britain's former settlement colonies, which had escaped destruction because of their

geographic isolation. At the end of the Second World War, the United States produced a majority of the world's manufactured goods. Even with the inevitable decline in the percentage of the world's GDP produced by Anglophones, as the world recovered, there was no decline in the use of English as a *lingua franca*. Improvements in communication and transportation technology increased the utility of *lingua francas* in general and English in particular.

There are four reasons to expect the continued dominance of *lingua franca* English:

(1) Network Externalities. When having more users increases the utility of a network, people choose a larger network over a smaller one. People join Facebook because there are already hundreds of millions of users. Positive network externalities create a "bandwagon" effect. *Lingua franca* English has very positive network externalities.

(2) Path Dependence. Once a practice is established, it is easier to conform than to change the standard. A classic example is the QWERTY layout of the English-language keyboard. The arrangement of the keys looks oddly random, but the layout was actually designed to make it hard to type fast. At a time when manual typewriters were prone to physical jamming, speed was not an unmitigated virtue. Now, even though manual typewriters are obsolete and physical jamming is not a problem with keyboards, the QWERTY array is still the standard. After many millions of keyboard users internalized the QWERTY arrangement, the cost of retraining is not justified by a small gain in typing speed.

(3) Probability Sensitivity. People will not learn a new language unless there is a good chance that its subsequent use will justify the effort. Without such a probability, there is insufficient motivation to learn a new language. Globally, people expect to be able to use English more frequently and more widely than any other language. So, probability sensitivity encourages learning English as a foreign language and using it as a *lingua franca*. There are more Mandarin speakers than English speakers, but because Mandarin speakers are geographically concentrated,

lower probability sensitivity inhibits the use of Mandarin as a global *lingua franca*.

(4) Maximin Communication. Members of a linguistically heterogeneous group want to maximize the base level of collective understanding. The simplest example is when two people from different language communities can speak each other's language. Either language could be used, but communication is maximized by using the first language of the person whose second language skill is inferior. The desire for "maximin" communication often results in the use of English in linguistically diverse groups, even if nobody in the group is a native English speaker.

3.2 The Identity Function: Bonding Languages

In pluralistic societies, when religion, history and culture are variables, a common language which encodes an identity may be the primary basis for cohesion. There are at least three ways for an identity to attach to a language: (1) a pidgin can become a creole; (2) a heterogeneous group can converge on a single language choice, in order to become an identifiable and unified community; and (3) a community can differentiate its language use, in order to create a distinct identity.

3.2.1 Adding the Identity Function: From Pidgin to Creole. The capacity to create a pidgin and elaborate it into a creole was documented at two government schools in Nicaragua that taught deaf students. Until the late 1970s, the deaf in Nicaragua had no community. They used gestures that were created independently by each family. In 1977, a program for deaf children of elementary school age was established in Managua. In 1980, a vocational school for deaf adolescents was added.

The schools had modest success in their explicit goals of teaching written Spanish and lip reading. Spontaneously, in the schoolyard and when going to and from school, the children taught themselves to communicate

with gestures. It was a signing pidgin, a hybrid negotiated from their diverse family signs.

Unable to understand the students' signing, the faculty asked for help and the Ministry of Education contacted the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). A graduate student from MIT documented the students' signing and discovered that the *younger* students had a larger vocabulary and used a more complex grammar than the older students. Students who started school as adolescents usually stopped progressing once they acquired the pidgin. Younger students, exposed to the pidgin during the years when children learn a first language, playfully experimented and expanded the pidgin into a creole. They became a normal language community. The pidgin of the older students was given the name Lenguaje de Signos Nicaragüense (LSN). The creole created by the younger students was named Idioma de Señas de Nicaragua (ISN).

3.2.2 Identity by Convergence: Hebrew in Palestine. When a linguistically diverse group wants to become a unified community with a distinct identity, they can converge on a common language or dialect. An interesting example of such a convergence is the modern history of Hebrew.

The revival of written Hebrew, for publishing, was a project of the literary elite in Europe's Jewish diaspora. The subsequent addition of an identity function occurred in Palestine, where the Hebrew language moved from print into the streets. The revival of Hebrew in Palestine is conventionally divided into three periods: the First (Farmers) Aliyah, the Second Aliyah and the British Mandate. In some of the agricultural settlements of the First Aliyah, notably in Rishon LeZion circa 1886, schools taught Hebrew and used Hebrew as the language of instruction for some classes. Problematically, both Ashkenazi and Sephardic dialects were used without standardization. To address this problem, in 1890 the Hebrew Language Committee (Va‘ ad ha-lashon ha-‘ Ivrit) was established to standardize spoken Hebrew.

In the Second Aliyah, there was a strong desire to show commitment

to Eretz Israel by consciously separating one's identity from the earlier life in the diaspora. This encouraged the use of Hebrew, and its use expanded into public spaces, especially for gatherings that drew from multiple language communities. In 1909, Tel Aviv was established on the outskirts of Jaffa as a Hebrew-speaking city. In 1913, when the Company for the Aid of German Jews specified German as the language of instruction at the science and engineering school they established in Tel Aviv, a backlash forced them to accept the use of Hebrew.

The third period of Hebrew's revival is marked by the fall of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War. In the Tel Aviv of the British Protectorate, the Legion of the Defenders of the Language used social pressure to get immigrants to learn Hebrew. Speaking any other language in public, even if merely overheard, could be met with the remonstration *Ivri, daber ivrit* ("Hebrews speak Hebrew"). Thus, decades before Israel was established in 1948, the groundwork was laid for Hebrew to be its identity language.

3.2.3 Identity by Divergence: Yugoslavia Shatters. When people who share a language want to create a separate community with a district identity, divergence in language use can accomplish the objective. My favorite example of identity by divergence involves the intentional creation of a new dialect in Papua New Guinea. A group within the Buin language community created the Uisai dialect by switching the markers for words in different grammatical gender categories. This simple change was startling to speakers of standard Buin and, consequently, created a distinct identity for its users.

Standardization Before Divergence. Identity by divergence is currently occurring in the Balkans, in the aftermath of the breakup of Yugoslavia. Change began in the nineteenth century, with a standardization that broke the Slavic language continuum. In the late twentieth century, convergence was reversed in order to create distinct identities.

Standardization, in the nineteenth century, was led by the literate elite.

Serbian and Croatian writers and academics chose to codify a literary standard based on the Slavic dialect spoken in Zagreb. Standardization would facilitate the printing and sale of books. The proposed standard was published as the *Vienna Literary Agreement* in 1850 and unified a written language.

After the First World War, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, renamed Yugoslavia in 1929, used the standard of the *Vienna Literary Agreement* as its written language. For the average and generally illiterate Yugoslavian, the Slavic continuum was still their linguistic environment.

In 1941, Yugoslavia was occupied by Germany. The anti-Nazi resistance ignored the elite written standard, as partisans came primarily from the less literate agricultural communities. After the Second World War, the newly established Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia initially recognized multiple variations, rather than privilege one of them.

In 1954, Yugoslavia's writers and academics renewed the call for standardization. In a declaration called the *Novi Sad Agreement*, they insisted on a single language called Serbo-Croatian, with two dialects, Western (Zagreb) and Eastern (Belgrade). It could be written in either the Latin or the Cyrillic script. The *Novi Sad* and *Vienna Literary Agreement* proposals were adopted by the communist government because language rationalization was now appreciated as useful for increasing both literacy (communication) and Yugoslavian solidarity (identity).

Subsequent Divergence. In March of 1967, 130 influential Croatian writers and academics, promoting an ethnolinguistic identity, published the *Declaration on the Status and Name of the Croatian Literary Language*. Unlike the authors of the *Vienna Literary Agreement* and the *Novi Sad Agreement*, they advocated for a distinct Croatian language. Many were Croatian nationalists who were upset that Croatian was treated as a provincial dialect. They wanted a Croatian identity language.

Tito employed the necessary force to suppress the nationalism, but he could not extinguish the ethnolinguistic aspirations in Yugoslavia.

To defuse tension, a new constitution in 1974 dramatically decentralized Yugoslavia's government. Sovereignty was significantly transferred to the regions, with the federal government retaining limited powers. This greatly increased the congruence between regional language communities and regional institutions of governance.

The 1974 devolution facilitated the dissolution of Yugoslavia after the breakup of the Warsaw Pact that occurred a generation later. Skipping the bloody details, the result is four official languages: Croatian, Bosnian, Serbian and Montenegrin. Since the written form of all four languages is based on the Serbo-Croatian of the *Novi Sad Agreement* and the *Vienna Literary Agreement*, all four can be seen as variants of a poly-centric language. That is not, however, how their users perceive them. The languages are becoming identity languages for distinct communities, especially as variations continually accrete and make each of them increasingly distinct.

3.3 The Take-Away: More Than Communication

The use of language is the quintessential characteristic of *Homo sapiens*. It is not surprising, then, that language use is a powerful marker for defining "us" and differentiating "them." This division reflects the identity function of language. Shared identities bond and different identities separate. In contrast, the communication function generally increases understanding and empathy by increasing contact between "us" and "them." However, identity is stronger than bridge communication.

> In short, bonding and bridging are not "either-or" categories into which social networks can be neatly divided, but "more or less" dimensions along which we can compare different forms of social capital.
>
> Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone* (2001)

Chapter 4

Congruence With Complementary Bilingualism

The term *complementary bilingualism* is a neologism, but the phenomenon is not new. In this chapter we will look at complementary bilingualism conceptually and also at two examples, one from East Africa and the other from South East Asia. Then, Chapter 5 will discuss its potential in Belgium and Chapter 6 will expand the discussion to the EU.


Complementary bilingualism is a language rationalization policy that both achieves congruence and maintains diversity. It pairs each citizen's respective birth language with a common language that creates a broader community of communication and, in some cases, an additional identity. Because the combination preserves the existing linguistic diversity, it is called *complementary* bilingualism. The common language of the bilingual pair provides the congruence. The result is effective and efficient multilingualism.

Bilingualism has only infrequently been consciously employed to rationalize language use, and only at the country level. At the level of regional governance, such as the EU, complementary bilingualism will make it possible to achieve the same legitimacy that is now enjoyed by nation-states.

4.1 Complementary Bilingualism Dissected

Complementary bilingualism can be differentiated according to the two functions of language discussed in the previous chapter: *identity* bilingualism and *communication* bilingualism. In both cases there is the pairing of languages –- one is the individual's native language and the second is a common language for the jurisdiction where congruence is desired. It is the nature of the second language that determines whether it is predominantly identity bilingualism or predominantly communication bilingualism. If the second language invokes a second identity, it is identity bilingualism. If not, it is the communication bilingualism variant of complementary bilingualism.

The two types of complementary bilingualism can be viewed as lying on a continuum. If two people invent a private language for their own use, the identity function is maximized and the communication function is minimized. It would fall on the left end of the continuum depicted below. Using a very large and widely dispersed *lingua franca*, such as English, would favor the communication function, and this type of complementary bilingualism would appear on the right side of the continuum. In either case, it is the presence or absence of an identity function associated with the large language that determines whether the policy is primarily identity bilingualism or primarily communication bilingualism. The choice of the larger language will generally depend on whether an additional identity is needed or desired for the broader community.



Identity bilingualism
(fewer speakers and less dispersed;
it invokes the identity function)

Communication bilingualism
(more speakers and more dispersed;
it does not invoke an identity)

A large *lingua franca* can have local and regional dialects, and these dialects can have a much stronger identity function than the standard or formal form of the language. In the case of English, there is no academy to establish a standard or correct English. All Englishes are created equal. Generic English (*Oxford English Dictionary*) can be used for communication bilingualism and a regional English dialect can create an identity.

4.1.1 Identity Bilingualism. The predominantly identity form of complementary bilingualism can occur at any of three levels: individual identity bilingualism, community identity bilingualism or identity bilingualism as a governmental policy.

Individual Identity Bilingualism. One of my brothers moved to Japan to teach English. He married a Japanese woman and they have two children. The children grew up speaking English with their father and Japanese with their mother. They attended primary schools in both Japan and Hawaii. The son attended high school at a boarding school in Indiana and took college courses in Hawaii, before graduating from Sophia University in Tokyo. The daughter studied English Literature at Doshisha University in Kyoto. She works as a translator. Both are comfortable in either a Japanese- or an English-speaking community. Transitioning easily between two very different languages and cultures, they are examples of identity bilingualism at the individual level.

There is a crucial difference between my niece and nephew's identity bilingualism and someone learning a foreign language. Learning a foreign language builds a *lingua franca* communication bridge, but the learner is not a member of both communities.

Community Identity Bilingualism. Before long-distance airline service was available, pineapple and sugarcane plantations were the foundation of Hawaii's economy. Plantations sourced their labor from several different countries and housed workers in ethnically segregated camps, in an ultimately unsuccessful effort to inhibit collective labor action. The primary labor sources were China, Japan, the Philippines, Portugal and Puerto

Rico. The inevitable interaction of these language communities, with each other and with both English speakers and Hawaiian speakers, created a new pidgin that was built onto an older English-Hawaiian pidgin. When the new pidgin was used by plantation-born children as their primary language, it developed into a creole. Though still called "Pidgin," it is a complete language that linguists call Hawaii English Creole (HEC).

The identity function of HEC persisted even with the decline of the plantation economy. Plantation field workers had limited contact with native English speakers, but tourism changed that. With millions of English-speaking tourists from Canada and the mainland United States arriving every year, as well as thousands of in-migrants from the other 49 states, the plantation creole could easily have been overwhelmed. HEC avoided linguistic death precisely because it expressed a "local" identity in a language that could not be fully acquired, even after a long residence, unless exposure began as a child.

Hawaii's state government does not support HEC. The Department of Education is hostile, in the belief that any use of HEC at school undermines the student's acquisition of standard English. Although discouraged in the classroom, HEC rules the hallways and lunchroom. Beyond school, it has primacy in informal discourse among those born and raised in the islands. It is the language of courtship and gossip, to mention just two of its identity-affirming domains.

The "local" population, born in the islands, is bilingual in English and HEC.[9] English and HEC each encode an identity, like the identity bilingualism of my brother's children. Standard English encodes a national (US) identity and is used in formal domains. HEC encodes a local (Hawaii) identity. There is also the indigenous Hawaiian language. Hawaiians[10] are

9 In rural and low-income communities, standard English is less common. In higher-income areas, there is a degree of decreolization, in which standard English has diluted aspects of HEC.

10 "Hawaiian" refers to an ethnic group; it is not a citizenship designation like the word "Californian."

the quintessential locals, and Hawaiians who know their indigenous language along with HEC and English are examples of identity trilingualism.

> A common language connects the members of a community into an information sharing network with formidable collective powers.
>
> Stephen Pinker, *The Language Instinct* (1994)

Identity Bilingualism as a Government Policy. A few governments have adopted language rationalization policies that are *de facto* complementary bilingualism, although they do not use the term. I'll briefly discuss three non-European cases: Indonesia, Tanzania and, later, Paraguay. In Indonesia and Tanzania, the complementary bilingualism is the identity bilingualism variety. Paraguay, like Luxembourg, is actually an example of equal sets bilingualism rather than complementary bilingualism.

Indonesia: Bahasa Indonesia. Indonesia's national motto is *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*. It means "Different, but the same kind." The phrase comes from a fourteenth-century poem celebrating tolerance between Buddhists and Muslims. With thousands of islands, hundreds of languages and a multitude of ethnic, racial and religious communities, Indonesia is exceptionally diverse in both geography and population. To overcome these obstacles to unity, newly independent Indonesia used a very powerful tool for identity formation – a common language. It did not, however, make any attempt to reduce linguistic diversity. It wanted congruence without the territorial monolingualism of the European nation-states.

"Bahasa" means language. "Bahasa Indonesia" means the language of Indonesia. Riau Malay, a regional trade language, was chosen to be the Bahasa Indonesia of the newly independent nation. It was the first language of only 10% of Indonesia's population. As with all trading languages, Riau Malay had been shorn of much of the unnecessary complexity, irregularity and adornment that attach to languages. This made Bahasa Indonesia easier to learn, a crucial advantage.

When it came to implementing the decision to adopt Bahasa Indonesia, the government faced additional obstacles: (1) low literacy levels, (2) poor schools in many areas, (3) poor infrastructure for transportation and communication and (4) little common history except for Dutch colonialism and Japanese occupation. Bahasa Indonesia overcame all obstacles. The superordinate goal of learning Bahasa Indonesia created solidarity and demonstrated the cohesive effect of working toward a common goal.

Designating Riau Malay as the Bahasa Indonesia was a government policy of identity bilingualism, in which the national identity is expressed in Bahasa Indonesia and each citizen's local identity is expressed when they use their birth language. Bahasa Indonesia allows Indonesians to travel anywhere in their country and communicate as fellow citizens. Crucially, it also preserves diversity by reducing the pressure for language shift from smaller to larger languages.

> Tanzania is often castigated for the failure of its socialist experiment, but it is seldom given credit for success in national integration on the mainland. KiSwahili is part and parcel of that integrative triumph.
>
> Ali A. Mazrai and Alamin M. Mazrai, *The Power of Babel: Language and Governance in the African Experience* (1998)

Tanzania: KiSwahili. Indonesia is not the only country that has achieved congruence with a policy of identity bilingualism. Tanzania did the same with KiSwahili. The prefix "Ki" is the functional equivalent of "Bahasa." Like Riau Malay, KiSwahili was a trading language and the first language of only about 10% of the country's population. Tanzania's population of 35 million uses 125 languages.

In 1962, KiSwahili was adopted as the national language, but the government had neither the desire nor the resources to achieve territorial monolingualism. In 1967, KiSwahili became the sole official language of government. In 1968, it became the language of instruction in primary schools. English was pragmatically retained for secondary education and

university study. In 1984, KiSwahili was designated as the language of the social and political sphere, as well as for adult education. In February of 2015, the Tanzania Ministry of Education and Vocational Training announced that, as part of an overhaul of the school system, KiSwahili would replace English at all levels.

KiSwahili is particularly important in the fast-growing cities, where the speakers of regional languages come together socially and economically using KiSwahili. Tanzania's desire for congruence without monolingualism, like Indonesia's, led to a policy of identity bilingualism.

> At the same time, as inhabitants of a world that technology is making smaller and population growth is making more crowded, we must acknowledge the need for direct communication.
>
> Humphrey Tonkin (ed.), *Language Problems and Language Planning* (2001)

4.1.2 Communication Bilingualism. When complementary bilingualism does not support a common identity, it is communication bilingualism. The language policies of former colonies that retained the colonial language, in order to avoid privileging any of the indigenous languages and their associated communities, are examples of communication bilingualism.

If the acquisition of the common language is substantially incomplete, then it is elite bilingualism. Elite bilingualism is inchoate complementary bilingualism and can be problematic – especially in countries that are striving to become democracies. Elite bilingualism often results in elite closure and a linguistically defined caste system. It can, however, become communication bilingualism if sufficient resources are allocated to overcome elite closure.

4.1.3 Equal Sets Bilingualism. Achieving congruence is a crucial benefit of complementary bilingualism, but it is not the only benefit. Complementary bilingualism has the additional benefit of preserving the underlying linguistic diversity. The equal sets form of bilingualism is

distinct from complementary bilingualism in that, while it does provide congruence, it does not shelter an underlying diversity. To make the distinction clearer, we can look at two examples of the equal sets phenomenon: Luxembourg and Paraguay.

Luxembourg. Luxembourg has large Italian- and Portuguese-speaking communities. However, as these are exogenous languages with their own monolingual nation-states, there is no reason for Luxembourg to be concerned with their preservation. Luxembourg does not have a policy that shelters any underlying diversity, because it provides no role for any language beyond the three administrative languages. In fact, it is hard to imagine adding a fourth language to an individual's repertoire, except superficially or in very rare cases of individuals dedicated to language learning from a very young age.

Paraguay. Paraguay also achieves congruence with equal sets identity bilingualism, using Spanish and Guarani. Of the population, 90% speaks Guarani and 87% speaks Spanish. This translates to 78.3% of the population speaking both languages and any random pair of Paraguayans having a 98.7% chance of sharing at least one language. Bilingualism in Paraguay does not shelter the country's underlying linguistic diversity. Its two-language system is unitary, just as a monolingual nation-state is unitary.

Depending on how one distinguishes between languages and dialects, Paraguay has about 14 indigenous languages. About 5% of Paraguay's population is ethnically Guarani, but the Guarani language is spoken by about 90% of the population. This situation is unique, at least in the Americas. Language shift to the colonial language (Spanish) by mestizos, the upwardly mobile indigenous population and the elite in general is the norm in Latin America. The choice of a pair of languages, one indigenous and one exogenous, does not shelter the other indigenous languages. Schools teach both Spanish and Guarani, but not the other indigenous languages.

The use of equal sets bilingualism reflects Paraguay's peculiar history and a perceived need for a strong identity to distinguish itself from its massive neighbors, Brazil and Argentina. (The parallel circumstance of

neighboring Germany and France in the case of Luxembourg is probably not a coincidence.)

Paraguay has been described as "an island surrounded by land" because of its fraught relationship with its neighbors. In the Triple Alliance War, from 1864 to 1870, Paraguay fought Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay over longstanding territorial disputes. It is estimated that the combined effects of combat and disease reduced the population of Paraguay by at least 60% and, after the conflict, the ratio of females to males was 4:1. In addition, Paraguay lost 156,415 square kilometers of territory. Paraguay's economy was destroyed, and the war debts continued to burden Paraguay until 1943. External pressure increased the need for internal cohesion and precipitated equal sets bilingualism.

In the cases of Luxembourg and Paraguay, the unity of equal sets operates in much the same manner as monolingualism. It does not shelter an underlying diversity. In fact, the cognitive burden of multiple languages makes it more difficult for Paraguayans to learn and maintain a third language or for Luxembourg's citizens to learn and maintain an additional language. In contrast, in the cases of Tanzania and Indonesia, with a single broad language for congruence and communication across the larger jurisdiction, the diversity of indigenous languages is sheltered because the speakers of these sheltered languages gain access to a larger forum without the need for a language shift. Thus, complementary bilingualism is not just about congruence; it is also about the preservation of diversity and two-way access across each small language community's boundary.

4.2 Preserving Diversity and Increasing Access to Diversity

Preserving Diversity. The sixteenth edition of *Ethnologue* lists 6,909 languages: 2,110 in Africa, 2,322 in Asia, 1,250 in the Pacific, 993 in the Western Hemisphere and 234 in Europe. At least 500 face a serious risk of extinction and a similar number are safe. That leaves almost 6,000

languages whose fate is yet to be determined. By removing much of the pressure for language shift, complementary bilingualism will allow more languages to survive and even flourish, sustaining greater cultural diversity.

The ten largest languages (Mandarin, English, Hindi-Urdu, Spanish, Russian, Arabic, Bengali, Portuguese, Malay-Indonesian and French) are spoken by more than two and a half billion people. The top 20 languages account for more than half the world's population. The 500 "safe" languages are spoken by 90% of the world's population.

The 10% of humanity who do not know one of the 500 safe languages are severely marginalized. Their very small languages may not even have a standard dialect or a written form. Without bilingualism, these *700,000,000 people* are isolated from the other 90%. Not speaking one of the top 20 languages, a circumstance affecting nearly *3,000,000,000 people*, severely limits the ability to participate in and fully benefit from the global exchange of information and ideas.

Please pause and reflect on these staggering statistics. About half of the world's population could use complementary bilingualism to fully participate in the modern world, while retaining their birth language and its associated culture. This is the largest human development issues of the twenty-first century, and *it has been ignored*. Complementary bilingualism represents a corresponding opportunity to increase human development and reduce both poverty and isolation for billions of people.

What, if anything, can we do for the thousands of languages that are not safe? In dozens of books and hundreds of academic articles, linguists and other language mavens have grappled with such questions as:

(1) How many languages do we need? Does Papua New Guinea need 900 languages? Do the half-million residents of the Solomon Islands need 70?

(2) If there are multiple dialects, with no consensus for selecting one as the standard, must we save every dialect? If not, how can we achieve sufficient agreement to produce a consensus dictionary and grammar? Who decides and what criteria should they use?

(3) Which languages can be saved and which cannot? Is creating a written and oral record of a language enough, or must there be a population of native speakers? If so, how many?

(4) Can we put a value on a language? What does it cost to save a language? Who should pay? Who is willing to pay?

For me, the answer to all of these perplexing questions lies in preserving choice. If people want to save a language, no other reason is necessary. If they don't, no reason will be sufficient. The question we should ask is "How can people exercise their language preference and still participate fully in their local community, national community, any regional community and even the global community?" My two-word answer: complementary bilingualism. Linguists who are documenting endangered languages should, of course, continue to do so. My point is that complementary bilingualism can help communities preserve their relatively small languages *in situ*, preserving not only their language but also their culture.

Access to Greater Diversity. I know enough Spanish to read a newspaper, and it has been interesting and enlightening to do so. But, like most people, my curiosity exceeds my linguistic competence. One of the things that most appeals to me about complementary bilingualism, as an individual, is its promise of access to many new sources of information, ideas and points of view.

In a 1964 essay, *The African Writer and the English Language*, Chinua Achebe explained his decision to write in English: it was flexible enough for him to express his African experience and it gave him a much larger audience than any African language. He recalled reading Jorge Amado's *Gabriella* in an English translation and getting a glimpse "of the exciting Afro-Latin culture which is the pride of Brazil and is quite unlike any other culture." He noted that there were hundreds of other Brazilian writers, but "the vast majority will be closed to the rest of the world forever, including no doubt the work of some excellent writers." He concluded: "There is certainly a great advantage to writing in a world language." Anyone who has read Mr. Achebe in English is grateful for his linguistic dexterity.

Complementary bilingualism will increase the audience for writers from the periphery. This will benefit both those writers and their expanded audiences. Smaller language communities will gain access to global discourse and everyone will gain access to their ideas. Critically, all of this increase in intercultural access will not come at the cost of language shift, as complementary bilingualism will shelter the smaller languages and the associated cultures from the current pressures that cause language shift and reduce linguistic and cultural diversity.

4.3 The Value of a Superordinate Goal

A policy of complementary bilingualism can be a superordinate goal that unites Belgian (Chapter 5) and EU (Chapter 6) citizens across the current linguistic divides. This is how a superordinate goal works:

A study on group formation and intergroup dynamics recruited 22 boys to spend three weeks at a summer camp. Behind the facade of a summer's idyll, an experiment in social anthropology was conducted by the University of Oklahoma (Robbers Cave Study).

The boys were split into two groups. Each group arrived at the camp separately. They were kept apart and unaware of each other. In the first week, each group engaged in activities designed to foster a group identity and cohesion. Each group lived in a single dormitory, chose a group name (Eagles and Rattlers) and designed a shirt that displayed their group's name.

Late in the first week, the groups were moved close enough to hear each other, but they could not see each other. Mere knowledge of another group's proximity created feelings of territoriality, and each group spontaneously expressed negative feelings about the unseen others.

In the second week, the groups were introduced and participated in various intergroup competitions. As expected, competition increased each group's solidarity and also increased antipathy toward the other group. By

the end of the second week, the boys sometimes engaged in aggressive behaviors that required staff intervention. It was easy to promote hostility with competition.

In the final week, the groups were combined, and situations were contrived so that, in order to achieve a desired result, the boys had to work together or reach a compromise. By the end of the final week, the original groups had lost almost all of their salience and a general camaraderie emerged. Working together to achieve *superordinate goals* replaced suspicion and hostility with solidarity and community. Implementing complementary bilingualism can be a superordinate goal that brings Belgians and Europeans together, in the common enterprise of converting "us against them" into just "us."

4.4 The Take-Away: Efficient Multilingualism

The only way to both achieve congruence and preserve diversity is with complementary bilingualism. It is the rational alternative for linguistically diverse communities because, unlike monolingualism, it does not require coercion or reduce diversity. Complementary bilingualism has been used successfully by two relatively poor countries, Tanzania and Indonesia, so it is a practical solution for other countries with greater resources.

Despite these examples, language rationalization with complementary bilingualism is virtually unknown in the West, much less understood and appreciated. This reflects the tremendous success of the European monolingual model of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and its global expansion through colonialism. In the twenty-first century, linguistically diverse countries and regions can choose complementary bilingualism.

A policy of complementary bilingualism rationalizes a *multilingual* environment. It is *efficient multilingualism*. The next chapter discusses the bilingual options for Belgium. The essay then looks at the EU.

> The conquest by the Franks is an important event in Belgian history. Indeed, it is from the fifth century that the bilingualism and ethnographic dualism of Belgium may be said to date.
>
> Leon Van Der Essen, A *Short History of Belgium* (2012)

Chapter 5

Communication and Identity in Belgium

This chapter explains how Belgium can become less of an exception to the European norm of congruence between ethnolinguistic communities (nations) and the institutions of their governance (states). The first section looks at increasing territorial monolingualism, below the federal level, by eliminating the federal mandate for facilities. This is the Swiss model for congruence. The specifics include eliminating the 6 BCR rim facilities, by adding those municipalities to the BCR, and ending the federal mandate for facilities in 21 border municipalities, deferring to a local solution that can better meet the local needs and conditions. Eliminating the facilities is a preliminary step that sets the stage for bilingual congruence.

The second section looks at how Belgium can go beyond the territorial monolingualism of Swiss-style congruence, using either a policy of equal sets bilingualism (the Luxembourg and Paraguay model) or a policy of complementary bilingualism. Either option increases intercommunity communicative capacity, creating universal direct communication for Belgium's citizens. Either option can also strengthen a Belgian identity.

A third section looks at the potential for merging the linguistically divided political parties. National parties can reduce interregional and linguistic conflicts with intraparty compromises.

5.1 The Swiss Model: Territorial Congruence

Belgium uses the problematic personality principle in two ways. In the 19 municipalities of the BCR, the personality principle appears in the form of alternative and competing official languages. In 27 other municipalities that either border the BCR (6 rim municipalities) or fall along a boundary between language communities (21 border municipalities) it comes in the form of federally mandated facilities for speakers of an unofficial language.

5.1.1 Eliminating the Six BCR Rim Facilities. To end the role of the personality principle in the 6 BCR rim municipalities, it is time to revisit the 1963 decision to limit the Brussels capital region to 19 municipalities. It has been over half a century since that decision. Raising the limit to 25 will permit the inclusion of the 6 BCR rim municipalities that have French majorities but use Dutch as their official language. Their addition to the BCR will eliminate these 6 rim facilities and the friction that they can cause.

There follow brief descriptions of the rim municipalities, grouped by their location on the rim. Adding the three southern municipalities will not just eliminate the need for facilities; it will also join the BCR to Wallonia. This will change Belgium's capital from an enclave in Flanders into a bridge that connects Flanders and Wallonia. The change will be largely psychological, but in an important and positive way. Enclaves create psychological walls. Bridges create psychological connections. Which does Belgium want for its capital?

The Southern Rim: Sint-Genesius-Rode, Drogenbos and Linkebeek

Sint-Genesius-Rode (Rhode-Saint-Genèse) had a January 2017 population of 18,231. It is about two-thirds Francophone. After the 2012 municipal elections, the council was split between IC-GB, with seven seats, and Respect, with four seats. The mayor was elected from the IC-GB list.

If Sint-Genesius-Rode is added to the bilingual BCR, it will physically connect the BCR to Wallonia.

Drogenbos is about three-quarters Francophone. In January of 2017, the population was only 5,457. The mayor is a member of Drogenbos Plus, and the council is split between Drogenbos Plus–LB, with six seats, and UF, with three seats. If Drogenbos, along with the adjacent municipality of Sint-Genesius-Rode, is merged into bilingual BCR, a part of the bridge will be widened. Including Sint-Genesius-Rode in the BCR is essential to create a connection with Wallonia. Drogenbos would not, by itself, make the connection.

Linkebeek is about four-fifths Francophone. Linkebeek, like adjacent Drogenbos, would widen a part of the Sint-Genesius-Rode corridor that turns the BCR into a bridge between Flanders and Wallonia. In the 2012 municipal elections, Linkebeek's voters elected just 2 Dutch-speaking council members and 13 French speakers. Famously, from 2007 until 2015, its mayor was only its *acting* mayor. His election was not certified by the government of Flemish Brabant because he violated the language law – but Francophones continued to support him. In October of 2015, a Flemish Brabant minister appointed a new mayor. This precipitated the resignation of all 13 Francophone council members, which provoked the new mayor's resignation and a December 2015 election. The election changed nothing, and 28% of the citizens, showing their frustration, either didn't vote or cast blank ballots.

The Eastern Rim: Kraainem and Wezembeek-Oppem

Kraainem (Crainhem) is about three-fourths Francophone. Of its 14,000 citizens, fewer than a quarter are monolingual Dutch speakers. Proximity to NATO headquarters, the European quarter and the airport make Kraainem international in its outlook. In the 2012 municipal elections, the nine council seats were divided between Union (eight) and Open (one).

Wezembeek-Oppem is a little less than three-fourths Francophone. The presence of the International Deutsch School of Brussels and proximity to the British School of Brussels in Tervuren have resulted in a large international contingent among Wezembeek-Oppem's 15,000 residents. The 2012 municipal elections divided the vote 75.6% LB-Union and 24.4% Open.

The Northern Rim: Wemmel

Wemmel is marginally Francophone and the only municipality with mandatory facilities that is located on the northern rim of the BCR. That it is marginally Francophone may be due to the ability of EU citizens to vote in municipal elections.[11] Neither linguistic community would be disadvantaged in bilingual Brussels. The municipal vote in 2012 was 47.71% WEMMEL, 38.27% LB, 14.02% UF. The council is composed of six WEMMEL members, four from LB and one UF member. As the BCR is bilingual, Dutch speakers in this suburb may well be sanguine about the change.

5.1.2 Eliminating Border Facilities Between Flanders and Wallonia. Complete congruence in Flanders and Wallonia (excluding the German community, discussed later) can be accomplished by the elimination of federally mandated language facilities. This does not mean that assisting minority language communities will be prohibited. Municipalities everywhere in Belgium, regardless of their linguistic demographics, should be free to provide services to significant minorities in their own languages.

Normal civility, local political considerations (all votes are equally valuable to candidates) and the common interest in functional governance can achieve better results than an inflexible federal mandate. For example,

11 While it is clear that EU citizens can vote in municipal elections, if language preferences or inclusion in the BCR is conducted as a non-binding referendum, it is not clear that EU citizens must be included.

online access to government services, utilizing translation and translation technology as appropriate, makes it easy to provide services to multiple language communities. Facilities were intended to mitigate the effect of a single official language. In practice, *mandated* facilities perpetuate and exacerbate ethnolinguistic tension.

> [T]he Walloons of today are the descendants of the old Gallo-Romans from behind the limits of the Sylva Carbonaria, and the Flemings of Northern Belgium are the descendants of the Franks. This line drawn in the Fifth Century has undergone little change in the course of ages and, although the famous coal wood disappeared many centuries ago, the separation between Walloons and Flemings has remained more or less apparent down to the present.
>
> Leon Van Der Essen, *A Short History of Belgium* (2012)

Elimination of Mandatory French Facilities in Flanders. Here's a quick look at the six federally mandated (French) border facilities in Flanders:

Bever (Biévène). The municipality of Bever had a 2017 population of only 2,160. The mayor is a member of CD&V. I do not have a breakdown of the votes by party for the mayor or council members. Nor do I have any information on the percentage who prefer French or Dutch.[12]

Herstappe. With a stable population of less than 100, Herstappe is Belgium's least populous municipality. It wants to merge with neighboring Tongeren, to achieve economies of scale, but this is prevented by the federal obligation to maintain language facilities.

Mesen (Messines). In 2017, Mesen had a population of only 1,049. Its mayor belongs to the MLM party. Mesen is composed of

12 I need the reader's help in understanding the acronyms that are used for the smaller political parties and *kartels* in all of the municipalities with facilities and whether each is affiliated with a language group. Please email information to: russellblair2@gmail.com.

two noncontiguous pieces, the town of Mesen and a partial enclave in Ploegsteert that abuts Wijtschate.

Ronse (Renaix). Ronse had a 2017 population slightly in excess of 26,000. Its mayor is a member of CD&V. There is also support for sp.a. I do not have election results by party or linguistic preference.

Spiere-Helkijn (Wapiweewa-Helchin). Spiere-Helkijn had a 2017 population of only 2,142. Its mayor is a member of LB.

Voeren (Fourons). With a 2017 population of only 4,129, Voeren is located on the extreme eastern end of the border between Flanders and Wallonia. Although it is part of the Flemish province of Limburg, it is not geographically attached to the rest of the province. It is bordered on the north by the Netherlands, and 20% of the population are Dutch nationals. It is otherwise surrounded by the province of Liège. The linguistic environment is complicated by the prevalence of Limburgish, a close relative of Dutch and German. In recent elections, the community has split its vote between Voerbelangen (51.4% in 2006 and 52.9% in 2012) and Retour@Libertes (48.6% in 2006 and 47.1% in 2012).

Voeren was once part of the Wallonian province of Liège, as a result of Napoleon's invasion. The 1930 census determined that the population was predominantly Dutch speaking: 80% Dutch and 20% French. The next census, held in 1947 and published in 1954, was dramatically different. A majority of 57% were now French speaking, and 43% spoke Dutch. Nevertheless, Voeren was incorporated into Dutch-speaking Limburg, with facilities for Francophones added later.

Language politics came to a boil in the 1983 mayoral election. José Happart, a Francophone who either could not or simply would not speak Dutch, was dismissed as mayor for refusing to take a Dutch-language test. After dragging out the dispute for four years, in October 1987 the federal government fell, in part, over this conflict. The following year, as a concession to Francophones, the province of Limburg transferred some authority to municipal governments. In addition, the French region was authorized to build facilities for Voeren's Francophones. Several of the

concessions, including the Walloon building rights, were subsequently declared unconstitutional.

Since the 2000 municipal elections, EU nationals have been allowed to vote. Even given the large number of Dutch nationals who are eligible to vote, the Dutch-speaking Voerbelangen (Voeren's Best Interests) party received only a slim majority of the 2006 municipal votes and was elected to a bare majority of the council seats (8 of 15). Six years later, Voerbelangen increased its vote to 61% and its council majority to 9 of the 15 seats.

Considering the large number of non-Belgian voters, the interest in contiguous borders and the municipality's economic reliance on the city of Liège, the decision to include Voeren in Flanders can logically be reconsidered, perhaps in a non-binding plebiscite that excludes EU nationals, but the constitutional impediment is daunting. In reality it can be considered, if at all, only as part of an offsetting trade with its mirror image – Comines-Warneton (discussed below). Whatever the outcome, federally mandated facilities should be phased out, in favor of letting the municipality find a local solution.

Elimination of Mandatory Dutch Facilities in Wallonia. Here's a quick look at the four border municipalities in Wallonia that have federally mandated Dutch-language facilities.

Mouscron (Moeskroen). Mouscron had a 2017 population of 57,773. Governance is provided by CDH and PS. With the establishment of linguistic borders, Mouscron was transferred from West Flanders to Hainaut.

Flobecq (Vloesberg). With a population of 3,500, Flobecq has often been disputed between Flanders and Hainaut. When the language borders were established, Flobecq became part of Wallonia. Given its current demographics, Flobecq should be allowed to discontinue mandatory language facilities. Perhaps the Dutch-speaking area of D'Hoppe (La Houppe) could be separated and added to Flanders. Local solutions are needed.

Enghien (Edingen). Enghien had 13,563 residents in 2017. Politically, it supports Ecolo, MR and PS for its governance.

Comines-Warneton (Komen-Waasten). The 18,000 residents of Comines-Warneton favored Action, MR, PS and Ecolo. Although a part of Hainaut, Comines-Warneton is surrounded by West Flanders, except on its southern border with France. It is a mirror image of Voeren. A trade of the two municipalities between Flanders and Wallonia would establish a continuous border. This may be feasible and desirable from a national perspective if contiguous borders matter sufficiently.

5.1.3 Eliminating Border Facilities in German Wallonia. The 11 municipalities known as the East Cantons include the 9 municipalities of the German-speaking community and two Francophone municipalities (Malmedy and Waimes), which are part of the French community. All 11 of the municipalities were part of Germany until 1920. They were annexed after the First World War and became known as the *cantons rédimés* (redeemed cantons). They reverted to German rule during the Second World War and were returned to Belgium at the war's conclusion.

There is a German community, but no German region. The German community is an enclave of Francophone Wallonia, abutting Germany. Malmedy and Waimes divide the German community into four northern municipalities, the Land of Eupen, and the five southern municipalities of Belgian Eifel.

Malmedy. After the Franco-German war in 1870–1871, Bismarck forced Malmedy to use German in its schools. Catholic priests could not even preach in French. Despite this history, Malmedy's population of 12,503 is overwhelmingly Francophone, with only about a 5% minority of German speakers. Among this minority, French bilingualism is common, so the discontinuation of mandated facilities will not cause major problems. In the 2012 municipal elections, the results were PS 9.21%, EC 43.32%, Alternative 26.24%, Forces Vives 19.4% and MDY-LB 1.7%.

Waimes. Waimes is the other Francophone municipality in the East Cantons. Its 2017 population was 7,493. In the 2012 municipal elections,

the vote distribution was 39.6% OSER, 37.9% EP and 22.47% ON. Again, local solutions can better address local conditions.

Land of Eupen: Kelmis, Eupen, Lontzen and Raeren

Kelmis (La Calamine). Kelmis was once governed as a condominium, jointly by Prussia and the Netherlands and later by Germany and Belgium. Commissioners from the two countries would choose Kelmis' mayor. Its 2017 population was about 11,000. The 2012 municipal votes went to CSP 51.13%, SP 20.95%, PFF-MR 16.63% and Ecolo 11.29%.

Eupen. The 2017 population was 19,461. Eupen became part of Prussia in the Treaties of Vienna (1815) and then part of Germany in 1871. The vote distribution in the 2012 municipal elections was CSP 39.15%, PFF-MR 21.49%, Ecolo 14.15%, SP+ 10.02%, Vivant 7.89% and POB 7.28%.

Lontzen. Composed of Lontzen, Herbesthal and Walhorn, there were 5,684 residents in 2017. Its 2012 municipal election votes were distributed as follows: Union 53.07%, Ecolo 17.34%, Energie 24.51% and Vivant 5.08%.

Raeren. The population in 2017 was 10,964. The electorate distributed their votes in the 2012 municipal election as follows: MIT UNS 44.97%, CSL 34.0%, Ecolo 12.36% and fBL 8.67%.

Belgian Eifel: Bütgenbach, Büllingen, Amel, St. Vith and Burg-Reuland

Bütgenbach. Composed of Bütgenbach and Elsenborn, the 2017 population was 5,583. Residents distributed their 2012 municipal votes between FBL 55.33% and Reuter 44.67%.

Büllingen (Bullange). There are 27 villages in Büllingen, sharing a 2017 population of 5,489 residents. The 2012 municipal votes went to WIRTZ 48.55%, FBB 40.62% and B2006 4.87%.

Amel (Amblève). Similar in size to Büllingen, Amel is divided into 18 villages. It is famous as the scene of Charles Martel's victory in 716 and saw heavy fighting during the Battle of the Bulge in December of 1944.

The governing party is GI, which received 69.93% of the 2012 municipal vote. The remainder went to GZ.

St. Vith (Sankt Vith). Located between Amel and Burg-Reuland, the municipality of St. Vith (Sankt Vith, Crombach, Lommersweiler, Recht and Schönberg) was once a part of the Duchy of Luxembourg. The 2012 municipal votes went to Krings-FBL 76%, FDV 15.86% and Berebs 8.14%.

Burg-Reuland. The 4,000 residents of Berg-Reuland are divided between Reuland and Thommen. The municipality is located at the intersection of Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg. The 2006 municipal votes were allocated as follows: GI 55.99%, wfE 26.33% and ZOK 17.67%.

The elimination of the rim and border facilities achieves congruence with territorial monolingualism, except for the bilingual BCR. But that is only a preliminary step. Belgium needs more than congruence with territorial monolingualism. It needs a bilingual congruence that reflects its diversity and allows all Belgians to communicate directly with all other Belgians.

> Among people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary to the working of representative government cannot exist.
>
> John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty and Other Essays* (1861)

5.2 Bilingual Congruence in Belgium: Three Options

The substitution of local solutions for the federally mandated facilities can be considered on its own merits. However, doing so risks avoidable objections from the current users of facilities who are skeptical of the majority's willingness to provide adequate local solutions. While the desire

of candidates to gather votes from across the spectrum should avoid this problem, combining the elimination of federally mandated facilities with a policy of bilingual congruence will make the loss of facilities irrelevant. This section looks at three options for such bilingual congruence.

Bilingual congruence in Belgium is possible. The mathematics of combinations makes this clear:[13]

$$ {}_nC_r = \frac{n!}{(n-r)!r!} $$

This formula calculates the number of different possible ways of selecting a group of r choices from n options. If you take three options ($n = 3$) and select them in groups of two ($r = 2$) there are only three possible combinations:

$$ C \text{ (combinations)} = 3!/[(3-2)! \times 2!] = 6/(1 \times 2) = 3 $$

In other words, if we have three languages (Dutch, French and German) and group them in pairs, there are only three possible combinations: D + F, D + G and F + G. If you take any two of these possible combinations, there will be an overlap of one language. So if each Belgian learns two languages (bilingualism), everyone in Belgium will have a common language – although it will not necessarily be the same common language for any random pair of Belgians. Don't worry about the mathematics; the following three options make the meaning clear.

The three options were chosen so that each maximizes one of three different objectives: identity, communication or choice. All you need to do is decide whether you want to maximize the identity function, the communication function or individual choice. In the following three tables, D

13 The exclamation point means "factorial," which is the product of an integer and all the integers below it. For example, 3! = 3 × 2 × 1 = 6.

stands for (Flemish) Dutch, F stands for French, G stands for German and E stands for English.[14]

Option 1: Maximum Belgian Identity (Equal Sets)

Flanders	Wallonia	BCR	German Community
D + F	F + D	F + D / D + F (identical)	G + F

5.2.1 Maximum Belgian Identity (Equal Sets). To maximize identity, we need the equal sets form of bilingualism using Dutch and French. The German community is sufficiently small that it can be an outlier of German - French bilingualism.[15] Over 99% of Belgians will be bilingual in Dutch and French. Less than 1% (0.7%) will be German and French bilinguals in Wallonia. Since the Dutch and German dialects spoken in Belgium are part of a linguistic continuum, this is a very small departure from strict equal sets bilingualism

Implementation in Flanders would require the teaching of French in the primary grades, with sufficient time and resources to achieve the goal of Dutch and French bilingualism before puberty. In Wallonia,

14 Options 2 and 3 use English. They achieve approximately the same outcome as the three-language result, because German involves a very small minority. Only 0.7% of Belgians have German as their birth language, and many of these individuals are already bilingual in French. This small German deviation from a strict three-language model still allows about 99.65% of Belgians to communicate directly in a common language.

15 I understand that there is some discussion about creating a German region so that Wallonia and the German community can both consolidate their region and community governments in the interest of greater efficiency and the reduction of confusion. The three options would be the same whether or not this occurred.

implementation would be the mirror image of Flanders. It would have the same goal of French and Dutch bilingualism before puberty. Schools in the BCR would have the same goal. The small German population would not be taught Dutch in primary school. The similarity of the spoken versions of Dutch and German in Belgium would make it possible for Dutch to be introduced in secondary school, at least as an option.

Of the three options, the maximum identity option will create the strongest Belgian identity, on the model of Luxembourg and Paraguay. The 99.3% learning the same language pair will share a superordinate goal. As discussed in section 4.3, this will create immediate feelings of community and solidarity among the primary school students and their parents. Many parents will be stimulated by their children's learning to improve their own second-language skills.

Option 2: Maximum Global Communication (English Bridge)

Flanders	Wallonia	BCR	German Community
D + E	F + E	F + E and D + E	G + F

5.2.2 Maximum Global Communication (English Bridge). There is some indication that English is so highly valued as to make communicative capacity in the global *lingua franca* a higher priority, in some areas, than establishing a stronger Belgian identity. The maximum global communication option supports this priority.

In this option, English plays the role of the broader language in the communication form of complementary bilingualism. It preserves the underlying diversity but prioritizes global communicative capacity over Belgian identity formation. Common communicative capacity would

exceed 99.65%, [16] but *lingua franca* English would have less of an identity function.

This choice has implications in the context of Brussels' crucial role in the European Union. The next chapter addresses bilingualism in the European Union. Perhaps the reader should not make a final decision before reading Chapter 6.

Option 3: Maximum Individual Choice

Flanders	Wallonia	BCR	German Community
D + F or D + E	F + D or F + E	D + F, D + E or F + E	G + E or G + F

5.2.3 Maximum Individual Choice. This option offers choices and may, therefore, be the way to achieve agreement between those who want to prioritize identity and those who want to prioritize global communicative capacity.

In this option there is the same small (German) gap in the capacity for direct communication by all Belgians with all other Belgians. If you put a finger over the German column, you will see that the remaining three columns provide both choice and the ability to communicate in at least one language.

This small gap, affecting relatively few people, may be justified by providing individual choice. I hope Belgians will be able to reach a consensus and rationalize their language environment. In doing so, they will set an example for the EU in the creation of a European community of communication (it will be much simpler in the EU despite its 24 official languages).

16 Interactions are not random. In the real world, proximity increases the probability of interaction. Encounters lacking a common language will be very rare.

5.3 The Return of National Political Parties

The split of the political parties into linguistically divided pairs, referred to in Section 2.2, was disruptive to federal governance. The current federal organization only occurred only because of the inclusion of one Francophone party. Will the 2019 federal election see a return to the gridlock of 2007–2011?

There are many opportunities for political entrepreneurs in this essay's proposals for reducing linguistic tension. One of the most consequential would be the return of national political parties. Let me suggest, as possibilities not predictions, how a return to national political parties can be initiated:

(1) General. Any party or even a group within any of the parties can embrace one of the options, or support a plebiscite to choose one of the options, and then join with their counterparts in a *kartel* for the 2019 federal elections. After the elections, the *kartel* will be the basis for a national party. Even if there is too little time to form a *kartel*, the parties can begin negotiations in preparation for post-election government formation and, of course, for future elections.

(2) Specific. Ecolo and Groen have occasionally combined slates in municipal elections. This makes sense, since the environment does not recognize language borders and cannot be protected "here and there." If substantial elements of each of the ecological parties jointly support a platform of bilingualism, it will be the beginning of a national ecological party. This party could simultaneously expand its base by explicitly adding either a specific option or a plebiscite to its platform. This combination would attract voters from other parties who are interested in linguistic peace and Belgian unity.

5.4 The Take-Away: Everyone Wins

Increase the BCR to 25 Municipalities. Increasing the BCR from 19 to 25 municipalities will reduce mandatory federal facilities by

eliminating six French-language facilities in the BCR rim municipalities. Far from being a loss for Francophones, however, this change is highly desired by them. As for the minority Dutch speakers in these six municipalities, they will still be able to address government in Dutch, without Dutch facilities that create the impression of second-class citizenship.

Remove the Federal Mandate for Border Language Facilities. Local solutions will better address local problems, so there should be only winners. This move sets the stage for bilingual congruence.

Choose One of the Three Bilingual Options. Bilingual congruence means that every Belgian will have the capacity to communicate directly with every other Belgian, with the very minor exceptions in the German community, in Options 2 and 3.

Option 1. This option will maximize the development of a Belgian identity. With equal sets bilingualism, all Belgians will speak the Dutch and French bilingual pair, except for the German community, which, speaking German and French, will still be able to converse directly with all other Belgians.

Option 2. This option adds English, to maximize the individual's global communicative capacity. It still provides for nearly all Belgians to enjoy the social and political benefits of direct communication.

Option 3. This option maximizes individual choice. Belgians can decide for themselves whether to prioritize the formation of a Belgian identity or the maximization of their global communicative capacity. Again, there will only be a very small number who will not be able to communicate with every other Belgian in a common language.

Access to Diversity. With nearly all Belgians able to communicate directly with their fellow citizens, there will be greater access to diverse ideas. French media will expand north. Dutch media will expand south. Both will consequently be more respectful of the diversity of opinions in Belgium and less xenophobic.

Superordinate Goal. With any option, the common effort to achieve a superordinate goal will replace "us against them" with "us."

National Political Parties. National political parties provide an opportunity for compromise within each party, reducing linguistic conflict based on regional political considerations and objectives.

There is no doubt about it, our internal coherence and international relevance are inextricably linked.

José Manuel Durão Barroso, EU President, September 11, 2013

Chapter 6

Efficient Multilingualism for the EU

In becoming monolingual nation-states, European countries achieved congruence. The EU, however, does not have congruence. Therefore, it lacks the same degree of legitimacy as its members. This chapter looks at how the EU can establish congruence, strengthen its citizens' European identity and establish a European community of communication. This will give the EU a legitimacy that is comparable to that of its nation-state members, by using *complementary bilingualism* to create *efficient multilingualism*.

After consideration of the three options in Belgium, this chapter will be refreshingly simple in its proposal. It calls for the use of English as Europe's broader language, preserving its linguistic diversity with efficient multilingualism.

6.1 *Laissez Faire* Multilingualism in the EU

The effect of individual choice in second-language acquisition in Europe has been a tripartite elite multilingualism. The clear trend is a slow movement from this tripartite elite multilingualism, which privileges

English, French and German, toward elite English bilingualism. Europe can change the outcome from elite English bilingualism to complementary bilingualism. This will make the EU a more successful organization by increasing its legitimacy in three ways: outcome legitimacy (growth), process legitimacy (democratic legitimacy) and affective legitimacy (patriotism). It will also protect linguistic diversity in Europe better than any alternative policy.

6.1.1 The Multilingual Chimera. The EU asserts that all 24 of its official languages are equal. In practice, English is the first among equals. French is second and German third, although second and third place are converging, and both are losing ground to *lingua franca* English. Everyone knows that, in the real world, equality for 24 official languages is a chimera. The charade of equality reflects the EU's language policy paralysis.

Yet the reality of elite multilingualism, favoring English, French and German, is undeniable. For example, in establishing the European Patent Office, Article 14 provides:

> (1) The official languages of the European Patent Office shall be English, French and German.
> (2) A European patent application shall be filed in one of the official languages or, if filed in any other language, translated into one of the official languages in accordance with the Implementing Regulations. Throughout the proceedings before the European Patent Office, such translation may be brought into conformity with the application as filed. If a required translation is not filed in due time, the application shall be deemed to be withdrawn.

Tripartite elite multilingualism in the EU is inevitable, because education systems can offer only a limited number of alternatives, and consumer preferences among these limited alternatives further restrict outcomes. Demand is ultimately determined by the utility of the foreign

language and reflects the four considerations previously discussed: network externalities, path dependence, probability sensitivity and maximin communication.

Because these four factors are unequal, among the limited second-language options, the current elite multilingualism is merely a prelude to elite bilingualism with English in the role of the elite language. In 2011, a reported 83% of primary and lower secondary level students and 94% of upper secondary level students were studying English as a foreign language (Eurobarometer 386). On September 25, 2014, Eurostat News Release 144/2012 reported a comparable 96.7% for lower secondary students studying English, compared with 34.1% for French, 22.2% for Spanish and 22.1% for German.

Between 2005 and 2012, there was a 13-point drop in the percentage who felt that it was important for their children to learn French. German suffered a smaller drop of 8 percentage points (Eurobarometer 386). The EU is on a slow road to elite bilingualism. However, this can be converted to the complementary bilingualism that Europeans have said that they want.

6.1.2 Europeans Have Spoken. In 2012, the European Commission released Special Eurobarometer 386, entitled "Europeans and Their Languages." Among its findings were the following:

(1) The majority of Europeans (81%) think that all languages spoken within the EU should be treated equally. Governments, in other words, should not privilege any substantial linguistic community in the EU.

(2) Around seven in ten (69%) also think that Europeans should be able to speak a common language. This is an endorsement of the idea of a European community of communication.

These otherwise conflicting preferences of Europeans can be reconciled using complementary bilingualism. Using a common language that is not, after Brexit, the official language of any large member, the EU will meet its citizens' neutrality preference and still create the desired community of communication.

6.2 The Benefits of Complementary Bilingualism for the EU

The fundamental problem for the EU, inhibiting the solution of all other problems, is its lack of legitimacy comparable to the legitimacy enjoyed by its individual members. Achieving congruence between a European community of communication and EU institutions will increase three types of legitimacy: outcome legitimacy (growth), process legitimacy (democratic legitimacy) and affective legitimacy (patriotism).

6.2.1 Outcome Legitimacy (Growth). When its economy experiences growth, a government's outcome legitimacy is enhanced. For decades, the outcome legitimacy of the EU and its predecessor organizations benefited from solid economic growth across Western Europe. The extent to which this growth is attributable to the EU is contested, but this period of economic success is now referred to as the "era of permissive consensus." Economic success provided the output legitimacy that created a consensus in support of EU institutions that were focused on economic performance. The permissive consensus ended in 2005, with the failure to ratify the Constitutional Treaty, when the EU went beyond economic integration.

Since 2008, economic results in the EU have been mixed and often disappointing for many members. Achieving congruence with complementary bilingualism will increase the EU's outcome legitimacy by increasing intra-Europe trade in goods and, even more dramatically, in services.

It is not controversial to point out that the existence of a common language substantially increases trade. In February of 2009, the *European Economic Review* published a study by Jan and Jarko Fidrmuc that looked at the economic impact of *lingua franca* English proficiency on EU trade. They reached the following conclusions:

(1) While individuals benefit from learning any language, countries benefit only by increasing the number of speakers of a *lingua franca*.

(2) Gains from a common language are equal to the gains from a common currency.

(3) *Lingua franca* English increases EU trade by 30% and is one of the main drivers of international trade in Western Europe.

(4) If EU countries increased their English proficiency by 10%, trade among them would increase 14%.

(5) If the other EU countries matched the success of the Netherlands in learning English, EU trade would increase by 70%.

(6) In the newer EU member states and the candidate countries, the impact of English proficiency is even greater. Trade is 74% higher than it would be without their current English capacity.

The Fidrmuc study may underestimate the effect that it documents. The EU members' economies are increasingly reliant on services, and trade in goods is far less reliant on communicative capacity than is trade in services. Complementary bilingualism may, therefore, have an even larger impact than this study suggests, as it accelerates the shift in intra-European trade from almost exclusively goods to a balance of goods and services.

6.2.2 Process Legitimacy (Democracy). A second type of legitimacy is "process legitimacy." In the case of democracies, process legitimacy is called "democratic legitimacy." A common language in which all citizens can communicate is a necessary condition for successful democratic governance. There is a widespread agreement that the EU suffers from a *democratic deficit* relative to its members. With 24 official languages, this can hardly be a surprise.

Lack of congruence distances the EU government from its citizens, and the lack of common communicative capacity separates Europeans from each other. The effect is to preclude reforms that would make EU operations more democratic. Among the most important of these would be the emergence of pan-European political parties. With congruence, a European demos will form, and this will permit political parties to

organize and campaign across Europe, not just forge post-election coalitions among national political parties whose real agenda is success in their individual country's elections. The current lack of congruence benefits only Euro-skeptics.

Consider the definition of democracy in President Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address: "government of the people, by the people, for the people." Europe does not yet have a "people." Majority rule makes sense only if it is the majority of a community that recognizes itself as such. At a minimum, this requires the ability to communicate.

> Democracy is inextricably bound with language and one wonders how it can be managed without a community of communication. Achieving meaningful, plurilingual democracy is a challenge that has not yet been taken up. It is perhaps the greatest obstacle to overcoming the EU's democratic deficit.
>
> Susan Wright, *Community and Communication: The Role of Language in Nation State Building and European Integration* (2000)

Between elections, only a common language permits the continuous dialogue that is a prerequisite for the periodic elections to be meaningful. Whenever the EU adopts a new policy, the minority experiences being outvoted by "others" as tyranny, rather than as democracy. A common language reduces the risk of feeling that you are governed by others – a feeling that is the basis for the EU's democratic deficit.

Most problems require political compromise, not just bureaucratic management. The EU is still dealing with the destabilizing effects of monetary and fiscal policies that are better for northern Europe than for southern Europe. Any long-term solutions will require the transfer of significant fiscal and monetary authority from the member nation-states to the EU. For the inherently contentious and political task of budgeting to be democratically accomplished, there must be a European demos that can confer legitimacy on the actions of elected officials. Such a demos

cannot emerge until there is a European community of communication and pan-European elections. It cannot be achieved in 24 languages.

In addition to fiscal and monetary problems, the EU is struggling with an immigration problem. The additional transfer of authority required to deal coherently and equitably with immigration cannot occur without greater understanding of and empathy for the more seriously impacted members. Solidarity is essential and requires a stronger sense of community. A European community will require a much greater communicative capacity and, ideally, a more robust common identity. Only a unified European community can craft and implement a response that effectively addresses a migration problem that disproportionately impacts Mediterranean Europe.

These ongoing crises and unanticipated but inevitable future challenges will require the EU to achieve democratic legitimacy substantially equivalent to that enjoyed by its members. Without a European demos, there cannot be sufficient democratic legitimacy to turn back the robust nationalism of the Euro-skeptics.

6.2.3 Affective Legitimacy (Patriotism). A third type of legitimacy is affective legitimacy or, colloquially, patriotism. In its most elemental form, affective legitimacy is measured by the response to the question "Who is willing to fight and possibly die for Europe?"

In addition to supporting a common language, Europeans favor a common EU defense. In 2016, Standard Eurobarometer 85 reported that three-quarters (74%) of Europeans supported it. Between 2004 and 2016, this support fluctuated only between 71% and 78%. As support in the United Kingdom was below 60%, support in a post-Brexit EU should be about 80%. Germany, France and Spain were all above 80%.

It is one thing for citizens to support a common defense, but quite another for the EU to implement it. Resources are not the problem. The EU population is 3.5 times the size of Russia's. The GDP of the EU is 13 times as large as Russia's. The EU members of NATO spend 4 times

as much for defense and security as Russia. There is no rational reason for the EU to be intimidated by Russia, except that most of the EU's latent power is unrealized and, under current circumstances, will not be realized.

> The change in Washington puts the European Union in a difficult situation; with the new administration seeming to put into question the last 70 years of American foreign policy.
>
> Donald Tusk, President of the EU Council, January 31, 2017
> Open letter to the 27 heads of the EU member states

A combination of factors has created a sense of urgency among the EU members of NATO. First, President Trump declared NATO obsolete and complains about insufficient European spending on its own defense.[17] Second, the United States continues to run large deficits that will eventually require significant budget cuts. Those cuts will not be limited to domestic programs, which are far more popular than NATO. Third, political stalemate in Washington has eroded the leadership capacity of the United States. Fourth, the Cold War is over and voters in the United States elected an America First candidate. Fifth, Russia is increasingly provocative in the Baltic region and continues to occupy the Crimean peninsula, increasing the risk of conflict in Europe. It is not prudent to assume that the current and foreseeable leadership in the United States will risk the safety of its own citizens to protect European interests.

Without the Cold War imperative, Europe is simply less important to Washington. Europe has the latent capacity to defend itself. It just needs to reduce the waste and inefficiency of its member-centric defense spending. A good place to start improving the EU's defense and security capacity is by rationalizing language use in a combined military force. An EU defense

17 A complaint that was earlier expressed, if less confrontationally, by several of his immediate predecessors. This disagreement will not go away with a change of administration.

force, unlike the EU parliament, cannot use 24 languages. Belgium has already demonstrated the utility of bilingualism in military operations.

The Belgian Solution. Belgium had problems, particularly during the First World War, with officers who spoke only French leading troops who spoke only Dutch. A bias toward promoting French-speaking officers persisted, to some degree, into the 1970s. Today, the language preference of Belgian soldiers is presumed to match that of their community of origin. Basic training is in either French or Dutch, according to the recruit's birth language. Soldiers serve in monolingual units, so orders and commands are in the soldier's native language.

Non-commissioned and commissioned officers, however, are required to be fluent in either French or Dutch and to have a working knowledge of the other language. Fluency in both French and Dutch is required for Majors and above. The percentage of officers who are native speakers of each language now matches the pattern in the country as a whole, with 40% native French speakers and 60% native Dutch speakers.

The Belgian military is an example of equal sets bilingualism. An efficient and effective European military force needs complementary bilingualism, which can achieve effective and efficient communication, even with 24 languages.

6.3 The Take-Away: Efficient Multilingualism

It took decades of effort, sometimes bloodshed and always a degree of coercion to achieve the territorial monolingualism that provided the European nation-states with congruence. Despite the great cost, the payoff was also great. Congruence provided the necessary foundation for both the modern nation-state and democracy. The EU needs substantially similar congruence Its only real choice is complementary bilingualism.

All of the EU's current problems are exacerbated by its lack of sufficient legitimacy. Until there is congruence between EU institutions of

governance and a European community of communication, sufficient legitimacy will be lacking. The EU will be unable to solve its problems and, sooner or later, it will fracture. Brexit is the canary in the coal mine. Delay may well be fatal.

> Those who speak the same language are joined to each other by a multitude of invisible bonds … they understand each other and have the power of continuing to make themselves understood more and more clearly; they belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable whole.
>
> Johann Fichte, *Address to the German Nation* (1808)

Chapter 7

Conclusion: Ending Monolingual Division

Monolingualism's chief advantage is that it requires a smaller cognitive investment than bilingualism. However, when initiated at a very young age, it appears to be much easier to acquire a second language. Why, then, do most countries' school systems delay second-language acquisition until puberty, when it becomes much more difficult, and then devote only a few hours each week for a fraction of the year? As a consequence of the late and half-hearted introduction of a second language, bilingualism has an undeserved reputation as a difficult goal. If governments appreciated the benefits of complementary bilingualism and embedded the teaching of a common second language into early elementary education, there would be a tremendous difference in outcomes. As children grew to adulthood, bilingualism in the next generation would be even more easily accomplished.

7.1 Bilingual Congruence

Belgium can begin Europe's transformation from monolingualism to bilingualism (complementary or equal sets). It will show the EU that it, too, can rationalize its linguistic environment.

7.1.1 Belgium. There are about 512 million EU citizens. There are about 11.5 million citizens of Belgium. That suggests we should begin with Belgium.

Ending Mandatory Facilities. There are 46 municipalities that use, to some degree, the personality principle, including 27 municipalities with federally mandated facilities and 19 municipalities in bilingual Brussels.

This essay proposes the end of the federal facilities mandate, allowing local solutions for local conditions. Think of the approximately 90 citizens of Herstappe who want to merge with Tongeren but are prevented from doing so by the federal mandate. Democracy works better on a smaller scale. Let the municipalities experiment, especially given the ability to provide many municipal services online. As part of the elimination of mandatory facilities, including the six rim municipalities with facilities in the BCR will convert the walls of the BCR enclave into a bridge between Flanders and Wallonia.

Three Bilingual Options for Belgium. Ending the divisive facilities regime is just the beginning. The more important step is to rationalize language use with bilingualism. The three options are straightforward: identity, communication or individual choice. There simply needs to be the political will to pick one and implement it.

National Political Parties. Language rationalization will not neuter Belgian politics or eliminate its north-south divide. There will still be a split between the more socialist south and the more liberal north. However, that is normal left-right politics that can be buffered by national political parties with chapters throughout the country. Hopefully, and very probably, when the era of linguistic partisanship ends, there will be fewer

political parties and the survivors will have broad national support. This should make compromise, a necessity for successful democracy, easier to achieve and the formation of a federal government both easier to achieve and more stable.

7.1.2 The EU. After Belgium shows the initiative and resourcefulness to rationalize its language environment, the EU will have the inspiration to rationalize its own. Compared with Belgium, the situation in the EU is simpler – if not easier to implement. Complementary bilingualism will provide the efficient multilingualism that Europe needs.

7.2 Preserving Diversity and Maximizing Human Potential

You may have read this essay as a proposal for improving governance in Belgium and the EU. It is that, of course, but complementary bilingualism is much more. It is the best way to maximize communication and cooperation, without reducing diversity, in every one of the globes multilingual political system. It overcomes the world's monolingual tribalism, a vestige of outdated European models for achieving congruence.

Governments everywhere can do better at facilitating the achievement of every citizens' full potential. Complementary bilingualism is about respecting each citizen's heritage and simultaneously unleashing their full potential. The societies that will succeed in the twenty-first century are those that optimize every citizen's potential.

Step back. Complementary bilingualism is bigger than politics. I made this point earlier and would like to conclude by repeating it:

> The 10% of humanity who do not know one of the 500 safe languages are severely marginalized. Their very small languages may not even have a standard dialect or a written form. Without bilingualism, these *700,000,000 people* are isolated from the other 90%. Not speaking one

> of the top 20 languages, a circumstance affecting *3,000,000,000 people*, severely limits the ability to participate in and fully benefit from the global exchange of information and ideas.
>
> Please pause and reflect on these staggering numbers. About half of the world's population could use complementary bilingualism to fully participate in the modern world, while retaining their birth language and its associated culture. This is one of the largest human development issues of the twenty-first century *and it has been ignored*. Complementary bilingualism represents a corresponding opportunity to increase human development and reduce both poverty and isolation for billions of people.

Belgium, the capital of Europe, can and must show the EU the way by unifying its own linguistically diverse community. Then, Europe can follow Belgium[18] and again lead the world in language rationalization. This time with bilingualism, not monolingualism.

18 Giving, of course, due recognition to Tanzania, Indonesia, Paraguay and Luxembourg.

"The best time to plant a tree was 20 years ago. The second best time is now."

African proverb

Bibliography

Abley, M. (2008). *The Prodigal Tongue*. Boston, MA, Houghton Mifflin.

Ager, D. (1997). *Language, Community and the State*. Exeter, UK, Intellect Books.

Alesina, A., and Spolaore, E. (2003). *The Size of Nations*. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.

Anderson, B. (2006). *Imagined Communities*, revised edition. London, Verso.

Anderson, B. (2006). *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia.* Sheffield, UK, Equinox.

Banchoff, T., and Smith, M.P., eds. (1999). *Legitimacy and the European Union*. London, Routledge.

Barbour, S., and Carmichael, C., eds. (2000). *Language and Nationalism in Europe*. Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press.

Bayliss, J. (2014). *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press.

Benhabib, S., Shapiro, I., and Petranovic, D., eds. (2007). *Identities, Affiliations, and Allegiances*. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.

Bennett, J. (2004). *The Anglosphere Challenge: Why the English-Speaking Nations Will Lead the Way in the Twenty-First Century*. Plymouth, UK, Rowman & Littlefield.

Bickerton, D. (1995). *Language and Human Behavior*. Seattle, WA, University of Washington Press.

Bodlore-Penlaez, M. (2011). *Atlas of Stateless Nations in Europe: Minority Peoples in Search of Recognition*, English edition. Talybont, Wales, Y Lolfa.

Bootle, R. (2014). *The Trouble With Europe*. London, Nicholas Brealey.

Brands, H. (2016). *Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order.* Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press.

Brass, P.R. (1974). *Language, Religion and Politics in North India*. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.

Braumoeller, B. (2012). *The Great Powers and the International System: Systemic Theory in Empirical Perspective* (Cambridge Studies in International Relations). Cambridge, UK, University Printing House.

Brooks, S. (2008). *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.

Buckle, R., *et al*. (2015). *Brexit 2015: Directions for Britain Outside the EU* (Hobart Paperbacks). London, Institute of Economic Affairs.

Byram, M., and Parmenter, L. (2012). *The Common European Framework of Reference: The Globalization of Language Education Policy*. Bristol, UK, Multilingual Matters.

Calvert, L. (1998). *Language Wars and Linguistic Politics*. Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press.

Castiglione, D., and Longman, C., eds. (2007). *The Language Question in Europe and Diverse Societies*. Oxford, UK, Hart Publishing.

Chappell, L. (2016). *The EU, Strategy and Security Policy: Regional and Strategic Challenges* (Routledge Studies in European Security and Strategy). Abingdon, UK, Routledge.

Checkel, J.T., and Katzenstein, P.J., eds. (2009). *European Identity*. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.

Cohen, E.A. (2016). *The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force.* New York, Basic Books.

Colomer, J. (2007). *Great Empires, Small Nations*. London, Routledge.

Cooper, R. (2004). *The Breaking of Nations*. London, Atlantic Books.

Crystal, D. (1997). *English as a Global Language*. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.

Crystal, D. (2005). *How Language Works*. Woodstock, NY, Overlook Press.

de Schoutheete, P. (2000). *The Case for Europe*. London, Lynne Rienner.

de Swaan, A. (2001). *Words of the World*. Cambridge, UK, Polity Press.

Deprez, K., and Du Plessis, T., eds. (2000). *Multilingualism and Government: Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Former Yugoslavia, South Africa*. Pretoria, Van Schaik.

Deutsch, C. (1966). *Nation Building in Comparative Contexts*. Abingdon, UK, Routledge.

Deutsch, C. (1966). *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundation of Nationality*, 2nd edition. Boston, MA, MIT Press.

Diamond, L. (2008). *The Spirit of Democracy*. New York, Henry Holt.

Distin, K. (2011). *Cultural Evolution*. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.

Doidge, M. (2011). *The European Union and Interregionalism: Patterns of Engagement*. Farnham, UK, Ashgate.

Drozdiak, W. (2017). *Fractured Continent: Europe's Crises and the Fate of the West*. New York, W.W. Norton.

Ferguson. N. (2002). *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power.* London, Penguin.

Ferguson, N., and Zakaria, F. (2017). *Is This the End of the Liberal International Order?* (The Munk Debates), ed. R. Griffiths. Toronto, House of Anansi Press.

Fukuyama, F. (1995). *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. New York, Free Press.

Fukuyama, F. (2004). *State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press.

Fukuyama, F. (2011). *The Origins of Political Order*. New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford, UK, Blackwell.

George, S., and Bache, I. (2001). *Politics in the European Union*. Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press.

Gode, A. (1951). *Interlingua-English Dictionary*. New York, Storm.

Gode, A., and Blair, H. (1951). *Interlingua Grammar*. New York, Storm.

Goodman, M. (2015). *Future Crimes*. New York, Random House/Doubleday.

Greene, R. (2011). *You Are What You Speak*. New York, Delacorte Press.

Grin, F. (2005). "L'enseignement des langues étrangères comme politique publique." http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/054000678.pdf

Haass, R. (2017). *A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order.* New York, Penguin.

Habermas, J. (2009). *Europe: The Faltering Project*, English edition. Cambridge, UK, Polity Press.

Habermas, J. (2012). *The Crisis of the European Union: A Response*. Cambridge, UK, Polity Press.

Hardacre, A. (2011). *How the EU Institutions Work and ... How to Work with the EU Institutions*. London, John Harper.

Hardt, M., and Negri, A. (2000). *Empire*. Boston, MA, Harvard University Press.

Hardt, M., and Negri, A. (2009). *Commonwealth*. Boston, MA, Harvard University Press.

Harrison, L., and Huntington, S. (2000). *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*. New York, Basic Books.

Hertzler, J.O. (1965). *A Sociology of Language*. New York, Random House.

Hewitt, G. (2013). *The Lost Continent*. London, Hodder & Stoughton.

Hix, S. (2008). *What's Wrong With the European Union and How to Fix It*. Cambridge, UK, Polity Press.

Hix, S., Noury, A.G., and Roland, G. (2007). *Democratic Politics in the European Parliament*. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.

Hobsbawm, E.J. (1990). *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.

Hogan-Brun, G., and Wolff, S., eds. (2003). *Minority Languages in Europe: Frameworks, Status, Prospects*. New York, St. Martin's Press.

Huntington, S.P (1968). *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.

Huntington, S.P. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations*. New York, Simon & Schuster.

Ikenberry, G.J. (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.

Ikenberry, G.J. (2011). *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation*

of the American World Order (Princeton Studies in International History and Politics). Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.

Ikenberry, G.J. *et al*. (2009). *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.

Ingleton, R. (1994). *Mission Incomprehensible*. Clevedon, UK, Multilingual Matters.

Jesse, N., and Williams, K. (2005). *Identity and Institutions: Conflict Reduction in Divided Societies*. Albany, NY, State University of New York Press.

Johnson, L. (1996). *Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbors, Friends*. Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press.

Judt, T., and Lacorne, D. (2004). *Language, Nation and State*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

Kamusella, T. (2008). *The Politics of Language and Nationalism in Modern Central Europe*. Basingstoke, UK, Palgrave Macmillan.

Kaplan, R. (2012). *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate*. New York, Random House.

Kaplan, R. (2014). *Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific*. New York, Random House.

Kaplan, R., and Baldauf, R., Jr. (1997). *Language Planning: From Practice to Theory*. Clevedon, UK, Multilingual Matters.

Kennedy, P. (1987). *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. New York, Random House.

Keohane, R., ed. (1986). *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York, Columbia University Press.

Kirchick, J. (2016). *The End of Europe: Dictators, Demagogues, and the Coming Dark Age*. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.

Kissinger, H. (1995). *Diplomacy.* New York, Simon & Schuster.

Kissinger, H. (2014). *World Order*. New York, Penguin.

Kjaer, A., and Adamo, S. (2011). *Linguistic Diversity and European Democracy*. Farnham, UK, Ashgate.

Kraus, P. (2008). *A Union of Diversity: Language, Identity and Polity Building in Europe*. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.

Kriesi, H., and Trechsel, A. (2008). *The Politics of Switzerland: Continuity and Change in a Consensus Democracy*. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.

Leconte, C. (2010). *Understanding Euroscepticism* (The European Union Series). New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

Lee, N. *et al*. (2009). *The Interactional Instinct*. Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press.

Leonard, M. (2006). *Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century*. New York, Fourth Estate.

Leung, C., and Jenkins, J., eds. (2006). *Reconfiguring Europe: The Contribution of Applied Linguistics* (British Studies in Applied Linguistics vol. 20). London, Equinox.

Liddle, R. (2014). *The Europe Dilemma: Britain and the Drama of EU Integration*. London, I.B. Tauris.

Linder, W. (2010). *Swiss Democracy: Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies*, 3rd edition. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

Lipson, C. (2003). *Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.

Majone, G. (2009). *Europe as the Would-be World Power: The EU at Fifty*. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.

Marshall, T. (2015) *Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need to Know aAbout Global Politics*. London, Elliott and Thompson.

Mazower, M. (2012). *Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present.* New York, Penguin.

McDermott, R. (2004). *Political Psychology in International Relations* (Analytical Perspectives on Politics). Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press.

McGregor, R. (2017). *Asia's Reckoning: China, Japan, and the Fate of U.S. Power in the Pacific Century*. New York, Penguin Random House.

McWhorter, J. (2001). *The Power of Babel*. New York, Times Books.

McWhorter, J. (2008). *Our Magnificent Bastard Tongue*. New York, Gotham Books.

McWhorter, J. (2011). *What Language Is*. New York, Gotham Books.

Merand, F. (2008). *European Defence Policy: Beyond the Nation State.* Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press.

Meunier, S., and McNamara, K., eds. (2007). *Making History: European Integration and Institutional Change at Fifty* (The State of the European Union vol. 8). Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press.

Milner, H. (1997). *Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.

Mingst, K. (2014). *Essentials of International Relations*, 6th edition. New York, W.W. Norton.

Moisi, D. (2009). *The Geopolitics of Emotion: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope Are Reshaping the World*. New York, Anchor Books.

Montiero, N. (2014). *Theory of Unipolar Politics* (Cambridge Studies in International Relations). New York, Cambridge University Press.

Mufwene, S. (2008). *Language Evolution: Contact, Competition and Change*. London, Continuum International Publishing.

Muller, H. (2018). *Great Power Multilateralism and the Prevention of War: Debating a 21st Century Concert of Powers* (New International Relations). Abingdon, UK, Routledge.

Munkler, H. (2018). *Empires: The Logic of World Domination from Ancient Rome to the United States.* Cambridge, UK, Polity Press.

Nye, J., and Donahue, J., eds. (2000). *Governance in a Globalizing World*. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institute Press.

Ohmae, K. (2005). *The Next Global Stage: Challenges and Opportunities in Our Borderless World*. Upper Saddle River, NJ, Pearson Education.

Olson, M. (1965). *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Harvard Economic Studies). Boston, MA, Harvard University Press.

Ostler, N. (2006). *Empires of the Word*. New York, Harper Perennial.

Phillipson, R. (2003). *English-Only Europe? Challenging Language Policy*. London, Routledge.

Pinker, S. (1994). *The Language Instinct*. New York, Harper Collins.

Pinker, S. (2000). *Words and Rules*. New York, Harper Collins.

Pisani, E. (2014). *Indonesia, Etc.: Exploring the Improbable Nation*. New York, W. W. Norton.

Pisani-Ferry, J. (2011). *The Euro Crisis and Its Aftermath*. Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press.

Ramo, J. (2013). *The Seventh Sense: Power, Fortune, and Survival in the Age of Networks*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.

Reynolds, M. (2011). *Shattering Empires*. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.

Ricento, T. (2006). *Language Policy: Theory and Method*. Malden, MA, Blackwell.

Rieu, A., and Duprat, G., eds. (1993). *European Democratic Culture*. London, Routledge.

Risse, T. (2010). *A Community of Europeans: Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press.

Sachs, J. (2012). *The Price of Civilization*. New York, Random House.

Schiffman, H. (1996). *Linguistic Culture and Language Policy*. London, Routledge.

Schmid, C. (1981). *Conflict and Consensus in Switzerland*. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press.

Seidentop, L. (2001). *Democracy in Europe*. New York, Columbia University Press.

Sherif, M. *et al*. (1961). *Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment*. Norman, OK, University of Oklahoma Book Exchange.

Singh, I. (2000). *Pidgins and Creoles: An Introduction*. London, Arnold.

Slaughter, A. (2004). *A New World Order*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.

Slaughter, A. (2017). *The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World.* New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.

Smith, A. (1996). *Nationalism and Modernism*. London, Routledge.

Smith, A. (2012). *Nationalism*, 2nd edition. Cambridge, UK, Polity Press.

Smith, D., and Wright, S., eds. (1999). *Whose Europe? The Turn Towards Democracy*. Oxford, UK, Blackwell.

Spolsky, B. (2004). *Language Policy*. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.

Staab, A. (2011). *The European Union Explained*, 2nd edition. Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press.

Steinberg, J. (1976). *Why Switzerland?* Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, C. (2005). *Identities, Boundaries & Social Ties*. Boulder, CO, Paradigm.

Van Parijs, Philippe. (2011). *Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World*. Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press.

Verhofstadt, G. (2017). *Europe's Last Chance: Why the European States Must Form a More Perfect Union*. New York, Basic Books.

Volpi, V. (2011). *Why Europe Will Not Run the 21st Century*. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Waltz, K.N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Long Grove, IL, Waveland Press.

Watson, A. (1992). *The Evolution of International Society*. London, Routledge.

Weber, M. (1967). *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. and transl. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills. London, Routledge.

Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and Society*, ed. G. Roth and C. Wiltich. Berkeley, CA, University of California Press.

Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge Studies in International Relations). Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.

Wiener, A., and Diez, T. (2009). *European Integration Theory*, 2nd edition. Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press.

Wolfson, N., and Manes, J., eds. (1985). *Language of Inequality*. Berlin, Mouton.

Wright, S. (1999). *Language, Democracy & Devolution in Catalonia*. Clevedon, UK, Multilingual Matters.

Wright, S. (2000). *Community and Communication*. Clevedon, UK, Multilingual Matters.

Wright, S. (2004). *Language Policy and Language Planning*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

Young, T., ed. (2015). *Readings in the International Relations of Africa* (Readings in African Studies). Bloomington, IN, University of Indiana Press.

Yudkowski, E. (2017). *Inadequate Equilibria: Where and How Civilizations Get Stuck*. Berkley, CA, Machine Intelligence Research Institute.

Zielonka, J. (2006). *Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union*. New York, Oxford University Press.

Zimmerman, H., and Dur, A., eds. (2012). *Key Controversies in European Integration*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.