

Collective Action

A Common Fate is Our Common Cause



Russell Blair

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“Mankind, it seems, makes a poorer performance of government than of almost any other human activity.”

Barbara Tuchman, *The March of Folly* (2014)

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“A reconstruction of the international system is the ultimate challenge... The contemporary quest for world order will require a coherent strategy to establish a concept of order within the various regions, and to relate these regional orders to one another.”

Henry Kissinger, *World Order* (2015)

Introduction:

Kissinger’s Challenge

Kissinger (above) was correct. Global order must include regional order. That is not, however, what we have nor is it where we appear to be headed. Three empire-states (USA, China, and Russia) exercise grossly disproportionate international agency and the 190 nation-states are forced to do damage control. Our global community of common fate fails to act collectively at the scale required to mitigate, much less solve, critical problems.

This essay shows that language is the foundation of political order (PART III) and that an equitable global order must be built on an inclusive language rationalization policy of 2MT bilingualism. We are at a fork in the road. Down one path lies hegemonic empire-state order. Down the other lies a balanced order that preserves the linguistic and cultural diversity of the nation-state model, combined with universal geopolitical agency through the regional aggregation of nation-states.

The central claim of this essay is simple, but profound. The primary constraints on large-scale collective action is the absence of a common identity, expressed in a common language, with a narrative of common cause in facing multiple global challenges.

Language is more than a tool of communication. It is also the source code of both community and personal identity. Communities form,

persist, and act through shared narratives encoded in a shared language. Where identity is weak or fragmented, community is weak or fragmented. Where community is weak or fragmented, collective action is difficult or impossible. This observation is obvious at small scales. A family requires communication to function as a unit. If each member spoke a different language, biological ties would remain but coordination would collapse. The same principle applies at larger scales: communities—whether cultural, political, or economic—require a shared linguistic environment to maximize cooperation and trust.

The solution is not monolingualism. The path to monolingual unity—established in Europe—involved coercion, exclusion, and the destruction of linguistic diversity. That path is neither desirable nor feasible in a globalized and pluralistic world. The alternative proposed here is complementary bilingualism, specifically in the form of 2 MT (two mother tongue) bilingualism.

“We must indeed, all hang together, or most assuredly we shall all hang separately.”

Benjamin Franklin (1776)

With 2 MT Bilingualism, each individual retains their native language, preserving cultural diversity. Each individual also acquires a second, more broadly shared language. This avoids choosing between unity and diversity—it is a synthesis of the two. It allows for: (1) multilevel identities and the preservation of cultural diversity, (2) unbounded community formation, and (3) improved regional and even global collective action.

2 MT Bilingualism is not a silver bullet, but it will be the first domino. Importantly, this model is not hypothetical. Humans are naturally capable of acquiring two (or more) languages, particularly when exposure begins early in life. The current policy of teaching a *foreign* language, but only for a few hours each week during the school year and beginning after the critical period for acquiring a second language, has never succeeded at the community level and rarely succeeds at the individual level. Governments

invest vast resources in teaching diverse languages inefficiently and with little long-term retention by the great majority of students. Those same resources, redirected to a policy of 2 MT Bilingualism, could establish universal bilingualism in a generation.

This essay argues that 2MT Bilingualism is not only possible but necessary for our global community of common fate. Without a shared linguistic infrastructure, nation-states will continue to be second class polities, regional integration (EU, AU, etc.) will remain stalled, and the global order is likely to become re-polarize (USA vs China). With 2 MT Bilingualism, multiple levels of cooperation and coordination becomes possible—aligning communication, identity, and collective action.

The stakes are high. The problems we face—climate change, AI technology dislocations, nuclear weapons proliferation, and diverse instances of political instability—are not being solved by the existing polities and institutions. 2 MT Bilingualism is more than a language rationalization policy. It is the foundation of a new *zeitgeist*; one that replaces divisive nationalism with region-states and global networks that can both prevent the return of geopolitical polarization and permit global collective action.

The Essay Dissected

The essay is divided into five parts: *Part I: Context*, *Part II: The Evolution of Modern Empires*, *Part III: The Linguistic Foundation of Political Order*, *Part IV Improving Multi-State Governance*, and *Part V: A More Balanced and Equitable Global Order*.

Part I: Context

Part I has two chapters. The first clarifies key terms and contradicts some common myths. The second provides essential context for understanding the centrality of information, codes, and survival vehicles in the

creation, preservation, transmission, and evolution of information: both biological (genetic) and cultural (memetic).

“Political systems evolve in a manner roughly comparable to biological evolution. Darwin’s theory of evolution is based on two very simple principles, variation and selection.

Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution* (2011)

Chapters 1–2

Chapter 1 is titled *Preliminary Matters*. The two sections in this chapter include: (1) important definitions, and (2) the correction of some common myths.

Chapter 2 is titled *Information’s Codes and Survival Vehicles*. While the 21st Century is often referred to as “the age of information,” this chapter makes the point that every century since the emergence of life has been about information’s preservation, replication and evolution. Genetic Survival Vehicles (SV) protect information that is encoded in DNA. Memetic SV protect information that is primarily encoded in the world’s ≈7,000 languages.

Part II: The Evolution of Modern Empires



The global order is misunderstood as a balance of nation-states. To the contrary, the principle characteristic of the world order in the 21st Century is a division between three empire-states (USA, China, and Russia) with disproportionate agency and 190 nation-states with little or none. Conflicts among the empire-states often inflict collateral damage on many of the 190 nation-states, who must always play defense as a result of their lack of international agency.

Chapters 3 – 4

Chapter 3 is titled *The 20th Century: Rise of the Empire-States*. This chapter explains both the decline of the traditional empires and the ascendancy of the three empire-states. It follows the above diagram in focusing on the fate of empires that had size but lacked coherence. The three empires that had both size and coherence became the new empire-state model. India is a fourth power, an inchoate empire-state. The traditional (incoherent) empires were replaced by nation-states with greater coherence but without the requisite size for international agency.

Chapter 4 is titled *The 21st Century: Strategic Autonomy*. By the start of the second decade of the 21st Century, it was apparent that the post Cold War period of USA hegemony was over. This chapter discusses the emerging global order – strategic autonomy for the empire-states and suzerainty for the nation-states.

“I do know that there is no greater necessity for men who live in communities than that they be governed, self-government if possible, well governed, if they are fortunate, but in any event governed.”

Walter Lippmann, Columnist. New York Herald Tribune,
Dec. 10, 1963

Part III: The Linguistic Foundation of Political Order

Because language rationalization is conflated with monolingualism, it is reflexively thought to be too controversial for politicians to consider. Part III shows that this error is based on the history of the European nation-state. It offers an alternative to both monolingualism and elite bilingualism. The alternative is complementary bilingualism with two mother tongues. This alternative, 2MT Bilingualism, both supports the creation of regional and global communities and can preserve any number of languages and the associated cultures.

Chapters 5 – 7

Chapter 5 is titled *Monolingual Rationalization: Europe's Nation-State Model*. It explains the importance of monolingual congruence in the creation of Europe's nation-states. Monolingual congruence was achieved in two distinct ways: 1) state-first, as exemplified by France, and 2) nation-first, as exemplified by Germany. Monolingual congruence, though inappropriate for multilingual states or multi-state aggregations, is still the default language rationalization policy. The chapter looks closely at the three European countries which are often cited, incorrectly, as examples of a multilingual nation-state. These three unexceptional exceptions (Luxembourg, Switzerland and Belgium) actually demonstrate the crucial role of monolingual congruence in the European nation-state model.

Chapter 6 is titled *Post Colonial Language Rationalization*. It looks at the efforts of two post-colonial nation-states, Indonesia and Tanzania, to use an indigenous trade language for bilingual linguistic congruence. Other former colonies are also discussed, based on their choice of an exogenous European language for linguistic congruence. The former European colonies, whether using an indigenous or an exogenous language, pioneered bilingual language rationalization in ways that foreshadowed 2 MT Bilingualism.

Chapter 7 is titled *2 MT Bilingualism for 21st Century Governance*. This key chapter introduces complementary bilingualism in its ideal form: 2MT Bilingualism. This language rationalization opportunity is the low hanging fruit in achieving the essential task of increasing collective action at multiple levels of governance.

Part IV: Improving Multi-State Governance

To balance against the excessive power of the three empire-states, the inchoate region-states will need to integrate more fully – particularly with respect to high politics. How to achieve that balance is the topic of Part IV.

Chapters 8 – 10

Chapter 8 is titled *Regional SV: Language Rationalization and Geopolitics*. The best future for the nation-states requires their aggregation into region-states that are capable of competing with the empire-states. This chapter looks at the more robust high politics (security and international relations) that are possible if aggregations of nation-states establish linguistic congruence. Region-state high politics is essential if the nation-states are to avoid suzerainty.

Chapter 9 is titled *Revitalizing the EU and the AU*. The EU and the AU are the leaders in the aggregation of nation-states into region-state polities. This chapter shows how it is possible to revitalize these two aggregation projects with 2 MT Bilingualism.

Chapter 10 is titled *SV Networks: Global Governance Without a Hierarchy*. It looks at the Commonwealth as a global network for organizing both nation-states and regions into a global community with socio-economic convergence that respects diversity. This global network can easily expand to include most of the world's population and help stabilize world order.

Part V: A More Balanced and Equitable Global Order

This part moves the discussion from the regional level, with network possibilities, to the adoption of 2 MT Bilingualism as a key part of the reformation of the UN – our global SV. After 80 years, some of its institutions and practices have become anachronistic. The next two decades, leading up to the UN Centennial, may be our best – maybe our last – chance to enact the changes necessary to make our global SV fit for purpose in the 21st Century.

Chapters 11 – 13

Chapter 11 is titled *The Common Language: Any Reasonable Choice Will Work*. This chapter looks at four alternatives to standard English for global

2 MT Bilingualism. One alternative, very appropriate for the AU and the EU (individually or jointly), is *Afrançaise*. This is a modification of French to make it easy to learn. A second alternative, appropriate for the EU and Latin America (either individually or jointly), is *Americano*. It is a hybrid of Spanish lexical words and Portuguese grammatical words. The chapter also looks at the options of using either a designed English or Esperanto.

The first large polity (EU, AU, etc.) or group (Commonwealth, BRICS+, G-77, etc.) to adopt a policy of 2 MT Bilingualism and designate a specific language will trigger a global decision. Any reasonable choice will tip the first domino and lead to global complementary bilingualism. The UN would be the ideal entity – but it is not the only option.

Chapter 12 is titled *The UN: Our Global Survival Vehicle*. The global collective action necessary to respond both adequately and equitably to the 21st Century's multiple crises requires a reformed UN. Suggestions are offered in this chapter. Global language rationalization with 2 MT Bilingualism will support the essential updating of both the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly. A transformative updating is required, if we are to have adequate global collective action to equitably meet the challenges of the 21st Century

Chapter 13 is titled *Conclusion: A Virtuous Circle*. We must change the prevailing *zeitgeist* of the 21st Century from pessimistic acceptance of the status quo to an optimistic embrace of a global identity and community that complements diversity and permits equitable and effective global collective action.

Part I

Context

“Compared to language, all other inventions pale in significance, since everything we have ever achieved depends on language and originates from it.”

G. Deutscher, *The Unfolding of Language: An Evolutionary Tour of Mankind’s Greatest Invention* (2005)

Chapter 1

Preliminary Matters

Before advancing the essay’s argument, it is necessary to clarify key terms and challenge several widely held assumptions. Some of the concepts used in this book—such as complementary bilingualism, and empire-state are neologisms. Others may be familiar but have meanings that are ambiguous or contested.

“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.”

Lewis Carroll, *Through the Looking Glass, and What Alice Found There* (1871)

1.1 Important Concepts Defined

Like Humpty Dumpty, the author’s use of words can be idiosyncratic. Hopefully, these definitions will lower the risk of miscommunication. The idiosyncratic use of standard terms and the judicious creation of neologisms is useful, perhaps essential, for the reconsideration of conventional beliefs.

Political Concepts

(1) Polity. A polity is any politically organized group with a collective identity that is capable of collective action through institutional

governance. It includes states, federations, confederations, political unions (EU, AU, etc.), and international organizations (UN). The defining feature of a polity is not its form, but its capacity to act as a political unit.

(2) State. A state is a polity with the capacity to enforce rules within a defined territory, including the legitimate use of force. As Max Weber observed, a state “claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” States are a common form of polity, but not the most powerful. They are predominant, but not dominant.

“War makes the state, and the state makes war.”

Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990–1990* (1990)

(3) Nation-State (Consolidated State). A nation-state is a state in which the population (the demos) is unified by a shared identity, typically encoded in a hegemonic language. In practice, this identity is often constructed rather than organic. The key feature is linguistic congruence—the alignment between the language of governance and the language of the population.

The difference between my usage and the standard usage is clarified by considering Spain. Because it includes the Basque, Catalan, and Galician ethnolinguistic nations, Spain is sometimes referred to as a multinational state rather than a nation-state. This is a useful distinction in some contexts but is not relevant here. Because Castilian is hegemonic, Spain has linguistic congruence and is considered a nation-state.

(4) Empire (Classical). A classical empire is a large polity composed of a dominant center and subordinate peripheries. It is characterized by asymmetry: the center extracts resources and exercises control over distinct populations that are not fully integrated.

(5) Empire-State. Unlike the classical empires, empire-states achieves integration through communication, infrastructure, and cultural consolidation—especially linguistic congruence. The three examples are the United States, China, and Russia. These entities possess a decisive advantage: they

combine scale with coherence, enabling them to dominate international affairs.

(6) Region-State. A region-state is an aggregation of nation-states into a larger, coherent polity. Its defining feature is not geography alone, but the achievement of linguistic and institutional coherence across multiple states. Existing regional organizations such as the European Union and African Union are best understood as incomplete or inchoate region-states.

(7) Strategic Autonomy. Strategic autonomy is a situation in which a country can pursue its domestic interests and adopt its preferred foreign policy without depending significantly on any other states.

“The struggle for existence holds as much in the intellectual [memetic] as in the physical world. A theory is a species of thinking, and its right to exist is coextensive with its power of resisting extinction by its rivals.”

T. H. Huxley, “*The Coming of Age of ‘The Origin of the Species’*” (1880)

Cultural Concepts

(8) Meme: A meme is a unit of cultural information transmitted through imitation or teaching. The concept, popularized by Richard Dawkins, provides a useful analogy to genes: just as genes replicate biological information, memes replicate cultural information.

“Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches. Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperms or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation.”

Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene* (1976)

(9) Survival Vehicles: In addition to inventing the word *meme*, Dawkins coined the term *survival machine*. I use *survival vehicle* in order to reduce the mechanical aspect of the metaphor. (A horse is also a vehicle.) Survival

vehicles protect information: both genes and memes. Survival vehicles are structures that protect information – genetic or cultural. Cells, organisms, families, communities, and institutions can all function as survival vehicles. The key insight is that information persists through protective structures that enable preservation, replication, transmission, and evolution.

Genetic Survival Vehicles. Our potentially immortal genes are fragile and need protection in order to remain intact and to function properly. They get protection from a cell wall. In eukaryotic cells, the DNA encoded information gets additional protection from a nuclear membrane. An organism’s multicellular form, the genes expressed in a phenotype, is a larger SV for the same genes. Close relatives in a kinship based community are members of a kinship SV with respect to their shared genes.

Information Type	Code	Replicator	Survival Vehicles
Genetic Information	nucleotide base-pairs	genes	cells, phenotypes, kinship groups
Memetic Information	languages	memes	phenotypes, kinship groups, communities

Memetic Survival Vehicles. Memes also need SV. For example, the memplex of Christianity encodes its memes both in language (the King James Bible) and in artifacts. Leonardo Da Vinci’s famous painting of the Last Supper is a meme of Christianity. As shown on the above chart, phenotypes and kinship groups are both genetic and memetic survival vehicles.

(10) Community. A community is a group bound by shared memetic content—most importantly, language. Language enables both communication and identity. A common language provides efficient and effective communication and is critical for the maintenance of a common identity. Proximity and communicative capacity, given the social nature of humans, are all that is required for a memetic community to coalesce.

“[Culture is] ... that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.”

E. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, Vol 1 (1874)

(11) Culture. Culture is the totality of the memetic information that a distinct, by self definition, society acquires and transmits inter-generationally by being taught or by simply observing the behavior of the more admired or powerful members of the culture. It can be distinctive in multiple ways, such as food preferences and preparation, clothing and bodily adornments, music and dance, symbols, and, critically, a common language and narrative of unity and exceptionalism.

(12) Society. A society is a formal community with functional relationships that integrates across economic, social, and political domains.

“... because of differences of language, all the similarity of their common human nature is of no avail to unite them in fellowship. So true is this that a man would be more cheerful with his dog for company than with a foreigner.”

St. Augustine, *The City of God* (Circa 400 AD)

Linguistic Concepts

(13) Language Rationalization. Language rationalization refers to policies that align linguistic practices with institutional needs. Historically, this has often meant reducing diversity through monolingualism. This book proposes an alternative: achieving coherence without sacrificing diversity.

(14) Multilingualism vs Plurilingualism. Plurilingualism refers to an *individual's* ability to use more than one language and move between them (code switching). Plurilingual individuals are multilingual, but

multilingual communities are not called plurilingual. Belgium (§ 5.3.3) and Switzerland (§5.3.2) will be discussed as multilingual societies – but not plurilingual societies.¹ Multilingualism is the community-level cohabitation of more than one language. For example, the European Union (EU) has a failed aspirational policy of trilingual *plurilingualism* for its individual citizens. The EU's *de facto* institutional policy is *elite multilingualism* (English, French and German).

(15) Bilingualism. Bilingualism refers to the use of two languages by either an individual or a community. The relationships among the terms bilingual, multilingual and plurilingual can be confusing. A plurilingual individual with two languages is called bilingual. A bilingual or other multilingual community may be composed almost entirely of monolingual members.

Complementary Bilingualism. In linguistically diverse communities, complementary bilingualism combines a common second language with every individual's mother tongue. This creates bilingual congruence. Complementary bilingualism can add either an indigenous (internal) or an exogenous (external) language. Complementary bilingualism permits unlimited direct communication, the creation of a shared narrative, and a common identity in a linguistically diverse community. Simultaneously, it maintains linguistic diversity and preserves the associated cultures.

Elite Bilingualism. The incomplete form of complementary bilingualism is elite bilingualism.² An elite language is a barrier to upward social and economic mobility. It restricts elite status and its associated privileges. The identity function of the complementary language has been co-opted by an elite minority. Instead of creating an inclusive identity, it creates elite closure. Elite bilingualism is common, at least initially, in


¹ Luxembourg (§5.4.1) and Paraguay (§ 5.4.1, see footnote) could be called plurilingual states, but such rare examples have not led to the use of that term.

² Another form of complementary bilingualism is reciprocal bilingualism, as practiced by the Belgian military. See §8.1.

post-colonial governance. It can be converted to full complementary bilingualism by providing adequate educational support for multiple indigenous languages, in those places where each is predominant, and also for the common language.

2 MT (Mother Tongue) Bilingualism. 2 MT stands for “two mother tongues.” Complementary bilingualism is most equitably, effectively, and efficiently achieved with 2 MT Bilingualism. The key to 2 MT Bilingualism is early bilingual education in both the child’s family language and also in a second MT, a geographically broader common language. Children easily learn two languages simultaneously and starting in the home is both cost effective and dual identity enhancing. For monolingual parents who are not comfortable with bilingualism at home, the early introduction of the common language in schools will be sufficient (early consecutive bilingualism).

Continuum of Language Rationalization



There are four points of reference on my language rationalization continuum (above). The absence of rationalization, on the left end of the continuum, is *laissez faire* multilingualism. *Laissez faire* multilingualism doesn’t necessarily occur in the absence of an official language. Elite bilingualism or even *de facto* hegemonic monolingualism can emerge without an official language. English in the USA is a hegemonic language.

1.2 Some Common Myths Corrected

Beliefs are typically handed down from previous generations or diffuse through social contacts within a community. We do not think about most of them, much less analyze them. The following are eight

myths (false beliefs) and corrections that are helpful to understanding this essay.

Myth #1: Nation-states are the natural foundation of global order.

Correction: Europe developed the monolingual nation-state model over hundreds of years of coercion and bloodshed. The European model was exported globally, primarily through colonialism and almost always with an elite language of colonial administration. The global export of the European nation-state model caused the number of nation-states to increase and appear to be the basis of global order.³ However, this perspective overlooks the dominant empire-state model which is represented by the three contiguous and monolingual⁴ empire-states (USA, China and Russia) and multilingual India, which is an empire and an inchoate empire-state.

In the 20th Century, *multilingual* empires and *colonial* (noncontiguous) empires were split into multiple smaller polities. The result was additional countries (nation-states) and the reduction of the USSR to a monolingual Russian empire-state. The three empire-states are hiding in plain sight. Their hegemonic monolingualism leads people to misperceive them as examples of the monolingual nation-state model. A more productive view is to recognize them as empire-states. Empire-state status is an emergent property. At imprecise and subjective points on a continuum of size and power,⁵ a further quantitative increase has qualitative consequences. Like beauty, it is hard to define but you know

³ I refer to countries as nation-states, even if they do not have linguistic congruence, as it is a common goal for polities. Even if a country has multiple official languages, there is generally a strong bias towards a hegemonic language.

⁴ The use of the term monolingualism simply means that there is a very dominant (hegemonic) language across the polity, not that there is an absence of other languages. Absolute monolingualism is vanishingly rare in any but the smallest of polities.

⁵ There is a discontinuity based on the possession of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are a necessary but not sufficient requirement for empire-state status.

it when you see it. Nation-states may be ubiquitous, but empire-states are preeminent and dominant.

Myth #2: Sovereignty provides international agency.

Correction: Sovereignty is the *de jure* right, under largely unenforceable international law, to choose domestic and foreign policies. Agency is the *de facto* power to influence the terms of the available policy choices. Meaningful international agency requires a polity with a combination of size (geographic, demographic, military, and economic) and the coherence of linguistic congruence. Currently, meaningful international agency is monopolized by three empire-states: China, Russia and the USA. India, an inchoate empire-state, seeks comparable international agency.

Myth #3: Linguistic congruence requires monolingualism. French citizens speak French. German citizens speak German.

Correction: This myth creates an apparent conflict in language rationalization between the benefits of congruence and the desire to preserve linguistic diversity. Monolingual congruence prioritizes efficiency and effectiveness over the preservation of diversity. Complementary bilingualism, by using two languages, can preserve diversity while also providing for linguistic efficiency and effectiveness that is comparable to monolingualism.

Myth #4: Diversity prevents large-scale political integration.

Correction: Diversity is not the obstacle—reduced communicative capacity and incomplete identity is the obstacle. With a common linguistic infrastructure, diverse communities can better integrate politically and coordinate collective action more effectively.

“If in the Middle Ages you had dared to predict the death of Latin as the language of education, people would have laughed in your face...”

David Crystal, *English as a Global Language* (1997)

Myth #5: English has an insurmountable lead as the language of global communication.

Correction: To appreciate the potential for the displacement of any *lingua franca*, including English, consider the recent experience of Russian as a *lingua franca*. When the USSR adopted policies of *perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost* (openness) in 1985, Hungary began retraining 1,000 Russian language teachers to teach German. As reported in the Moscow Times on November 28, 2019, Russia's Education Ministry estimated that the number of students learning Russian as a second language dropped by almost 50% in the first two decades after the collapse of the USSR, from 74.6 million to 38.2 million. Outside of the former USSR Republics, the number of students learning Russian fell by **95%**, from 20 million to 1 million.

Even the former members of the USSR, especially after the Russian invasions of Ukraine, have begun to reduce the role of *lingua franca* Russian. In 2023, Kyrgyzstan required that all civil servants be fluent in Kyrgyz and that all official documents be in Kyrgyz. In addition, 60% of media content must be in the Kyrgyz language. Neighboring Kazakhstan raised its requirement for media use of Kazakh from 50% to 70%, increasing by 5% each year from 2025.

English as a *lingua franca* is equally fragile. For example, translation technology will reduce the utility of any *lingua franca*. An elite *lingua franca* like English will only be useful for elite identity and elite closure. Like Medieval Latin, English is adequate for international relations, multi-state commerce and academic exchange. But, to create a global culture, a global society or to permit global collective action, we need equitable, efficient, and effective linguistic congruence without elite closure. Critically, we need for global linguistic congruence to be relatively easy to implement, including acquisition, maintenance and intergenerational transmission.

Myth #6: Democratic governments cannot engage in language planning and policymaking because citizens will not let the state rationalize their language use.

Correction: Democracy required language rationalization. It was only because the monolingual nation-state model provided linguistic

congruence that democracy was possible. However, an inevitably coercive policy of monolingual congruence is not an option for 21st Century regional aggregations like the EU and the AU or for use in a linguistically diverse nation-state. Multilingual polities can, without coercion, achieve linguistic congruence with 2 MT Bilingualism. Once people realize that language rationalization does not require coercion or loss of linguistic or cultural diversity, they will embrace bilingual language rationalization for its many important benefits.

Myth #7: Technology is part of culture.

Correction: Throughout most of human history, culture and technology coevolved. This led to thinking of them as conjoined. Thinking of technology as a part of culture obscures its increasingly disruptive impact on cultures. Since the Enlightenment, the speed and scope of technology's evolution has accelerated and eclipsed cultural evolution. Technology's evolution increased exponentially, while cultural evolution remained linear. As with all exponential growth, departure from a linear growth rate starts slowly but inevitably turns into the classic "hockey stick" shape of explosive growth. We are in the explosive period of technological dominance over culture and may be on the cusp of technological absolutism and a technology determined culture. Even genetic evolution could be subsumed into technology's evolution.

Myth #8: We need to choose a specific common language before we can commit to a policy of bilingual language rationalization.

Correction: For 2 MT Bilingualism, any reasonable choice will work. We need our political leaders to embrace 2 MT Bilingualism and then, after due deliberation, make a reasonable choice – any reasonable choice. Getting government to appreciate the need for complementary bilingualism, in general, and 2 MT Bilingualism, in particular, is the critical *first* step. Choosing a common language first is putting the cart before the horse. Esperantistoj (speakers of Esperanto) failed to appreciate this point. Focusing their argument on the perceived merits of their language preference, without first making a convincing case for bilingual language

rationalization, was a self-inflicted and possibly fatal mistake. This essay puts the horse before the cart.

Myth #9: Nation-States can compete successfully with empire-states.

Correction: In the 21st Century, empire-state strategic autonomy is the emerging model and most allies will be a net burden rather than a net benefit. Trump's denigration of NATO is the extreme expression of this changing dynamic. Becoming an ally with either the USA or China will require an individual nation-state to accept suzerainty in their high politics (defense and international relations) and peripheral status for their economies. The only way for any nation-state to retain agency, particularly international agency, will be to aggregate into a region-state or join a survival vehicle network, or both. Perhaps ironically, the nation-states must share their sovereignty in order to preserve and increase their capacity for self-determination.

“The story of human evolution, then, shifts gradually at first and then with increasing frequency from Darwinian selection on individuals and the evolution of gene pools to socio-cultural selection on the structural and cultural formations, such as groups and all of the structures built from groups and their cultures.”

S. Abrutyn and J.H. Turner, *The First Institutional Spheres in Human Societies* (2022)

Chapter 2

Information’s Codes and Survival Vehicles

Both our genes and our ideas are potentially immortal. Their longevity is increased by two types of survival vehicles: genetic and memetic. From single cells in our bodies to the largest international organization, self-replicating information is fundamental to all life and all social order. I am not using “information” as a metaphor. Life at every scale is and always has been about self-replicating information. Our self-replicating information exists in a continuum of nested survival vehicles – like Russian Matryoshka dolls.

2.1 *Genetic* SV: Cell, Phenotype, and Family

The bonds between the complementary base pairs in DNA are weak (hydrogen) bonds. This weakness is essential in order for the base pairs to unzip during gene expression. An obvious disadvantage of weak bonds is the accidental breaking of the hydrogen bonds. To function appropriately and maintain integrity between expressions, our potentially eternal genes need protective survival vehicles. A useful metaphor is the shell of turtle.

Cells. A cell wall protects the enclosed genes. A cell, therefore, is a simple SV that allows DNA – genes – to function over time. It is the genome’s *encoded information* that is protected. In prokaryotic cells, there is a single cell wall. In the more complex eukaryotes, the cell wall surrounds and protects the entire cell and an inner membrane surrounds and provides additional protection for the nucleus and its DNA. The analogy would be to a castle’s *keep* inside of the castle’s outer wall.

“When a bacterium makes a copy of its DNA, no new atoms are created, but a new set of atoms are arranged in the same pattern as the original, thereby copying the information.”

Max Tegmark, *Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence* (2017)

Phenotypes. An aggregation of cells under the direction of DNA, when fully expressed as an individual plant or animal, is a *phenotype*. A phenotype is a larger survival vehicle (SV) created by aggregating smaller (cells) survival vehicles. Over long periods of time, genetic information built (evolved) more and more complex and useful phenotype SV to better protect genetic information and to facilitate reproduction with variation. All living things are survival vehicles that help their potentially immortal genes persist, reproduce, and evolve.

“It has been often remarked that a hen is only an eggs way of making another egg.”

Samuel Butler, *Life and Habit* (1878)

Kinship. Our potentially immortal genes are found not just in the cells of our own body but also, in varying amounts, in our relatives. Although the term *kin selection* was not popular until the mid-1960s, the idea of selection being applied to a genetic family was discussed by Darwin in *On the Origin of Species*.⁶

⁶ Darwin’s comments were triggered by consideration of eusocial animals with predominantly sterile members, specifically bees.

Kin altruism improves the reproductive success of any organism's genetic information by supporting the success of the common genes in close relatives. Kin altruism occurs when individuals are able to recognize relatives. It also occurs, even without kinship recognition, in groups in which kin relationships are common due to limited population dispersal. Collective parenting by relatives other than the biological parents is an important form of kin altruism.

Although kin altruism can have negative effects, such as nepotism, it is beneficial for the common genes in the kinship group. Motivated by natural (nature) and social (nurture) affection, individuals provide resources to their children, siblings and aging parents, as well as more distant relatives in some circumstances. This support would otherwise not be provided or, if provided in an advanced and affluent society, would require a less efficient and more costly social structure.

“Me and my brother against my cousin. Me
and my cousin against a stranger.”

“بِزَغْلَا عِ يَمْع نَبَا وَ اَنَا عِ يَمْع نَبَا عِ يَخْأ وَ اَنَا” (Syrian Arabic).

The same point was made, but with a dose of humor, by the eminent biologist J. B. S. Haldane:

“Would I lay down my life to save my brother? No, but I would to save two brothers or eight cousins.”

Beyond Kinship: Fictive Kinship. We can extend our kin altruism with fictive kinship. Fictive kinship relies on recognition markers or their absence. For example, racism is based on the observed lack of a similar skin pigmentation.⁷ However, when people of different racial

⁷ A genetic propensity to be wary of strangers is not a justification for racism. An explanation is different from an excuse. Memes anchored in a distant and anachronistic social environment need to be replaced by elevating memes that are fit for a global community of common fate.

backgrounds are combined in a military unit with a common goal (perhaps victory or perhaps just survival) and have a common dress (uniforms) as the recognition marker for their group identity, the recognition markers and the superordinate goal of survival compensates for the absence of a dermal recognition marker. We can have both a problem cooperating, due to different markers, and a solution to that problem in our capacity to create memetic recognition markers. The most powerful fictive kinship marker is the most basic one – a common language. It is necessary, if not always sufficient.

Memetic SV for fictive kinship groups coalesce, maintain coherence and make decisions based on shared narratives. A common language is necessary for direct communication. Direct communication is necessary for creating shared narratives and for establishing and maintaining trust. Trust is essential for cooperation and compromise. Survival *vehicles* that have established a high level of trust among their *passengers* are generally successful and relatively wealthy. Survival vehicles with less trust among their passengers are less successful and relatively impoverished.

“Communication is what makes us human; and if history were written with this simple notion in mind, networks of communication would become the center of attention, and a more satisfactory history of the world (and of all the innumerable subordinate groupings of human-kind) might emerge.”

William H. McNeill, foreword to *The World System:
Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?* (1992)

2.2 Memetic SV: Linguistic Communities

Memes are generally expressed in a language or other code. They may also be expressed in a physical object, an artifact. For example, a Christian may wear a gold cross on necklace. A Star of David would express a Jewish identity. Just as our DNA codes genetic information and is expressed in our phenotype (body), a language encodes our memetic information, expressed either orally or in writing.

Composite SV protect both the genes of the community's members and the memes that define the community. Composite SV cohere with a shared language. The great majority of the world's memetic information is coded in one of the world's $\approx 7,000$ languages. Each of these codes has two functions: *communication* and an *identity*. For people from different language communities to communicate, a bridge language is needed. Communication with a bridge language does not invoke a common identity, although it can increase understanding, respect, and sympathy. This contrasts with a common language that is a mother tongue (MT) and which unites a language's communication function and its identity function.

The importance of composite SV is clearly presented by the fate of *Homo sapiens neanderthalensis* (Neanderthals) and *Homo sapiens denisovan* (Denisovans), genetically similar to *Homo sapiens sapiens* (modern humans). *Homo sapiens sapiens* migrated from Africa to Eurasia and competed for the same resources as Neanderthals and Denisovans. While Neanderthals and Denisovans became extinct, *Homo sapiens sapiens* flourished.⁸

Based on DNA and ear morphology, Neanderthals and Denisovans are thought to have been able to speak at the level of a 3 year old.⁹ This resulted in their having smaller memetic communities than modern

⁸ A small amount of Neanderthal and Denisovan DNA was added to the *Homo sapiens sapiens* gene pool. Given the current size of the human population, there is more extant Neanderthal and Denisovan DNA in the current gene pool than there was at the peak of the Neanderthal and Denisovan populations.

⁹ Modern humans possess a regulatory substitution in the FOXP2 gene that is nearly universal among living populations but absent from Denisovan and Neanderthal genomes. This regulatory change is likely to have contributed to the development of complex language in modern humans. Denisovan inner ear structures resembled those of Neanderthals and both differed from modern humans. The difference impacted the surrounding bone structures and the distinct shape of the Neanderthal and Denisovan cranial structures. This reflects a separate evolutionary path from modern humans. Although absolute brain size is not larger in modern humans, Neanderthal and Denisovan brains had larger areas devoted to smell, vision, and motor control, but smaller brain areas for abstract reasoning and language.

humans. Perhaps their SV were limited to kin. As will be seen throughout this essay, unless offset by a deficiency of coherence, larger memetic communities are superior SV.

2.2.1 Bridge Languages: Communication. Bridge languages come in three flavors: jargons, pidgins, and *lingua franca*. Today, because a *lingua franca* is almost always available, jargons and pidgins are rarely created.

Jargons and Pidgins. The most rudimentary form of a bridge language is called a jargon. A jargon is created when two groups meet and start the process of communication from zero. This can occur either because the encounters are so infrequent that the jargon is forgotten or because the periodic encounters involve a significant change in the membership of the interlocutors.

A pidgin is created when there is *regular* contact between different language communities and no common language is available. It only develops to the extent necessary for specific objectives, such as trade. There are no native speakers of a pidgin. True pidgins are now rare, but some languages that began as pidgins are still called pidgins or even use Pidgin as their name. This reflects their origin, but they have become creole languages. Unless it becomes a creole language, a pidgin will last no longer than the circumstances that motivated its creation.

Pidgin to Creole. If a pidgin is their primary means of communication, children in a linguistically diverse community can elaborate it to meet all of their needs. By the time they become adults, the pidgin can have expanded into a complete language, which is called a creole. Locally, it may partially or completely displace one or more of its source languages. This is common when the source languages' communities are diasporas, as was the case in the creation of many plantation creoles. Like any other language, a creole can be used as a *lingua franca*.¹⁰

Lingua Franca. The proper name *Lingua Franca* means Language of

¹⁰ Tok pisin (talk pidgin), an English-based creole, is the *lingua franca* in Papua New Guinea.

the Franks and refers to a pidgin that was used in Mediterranean trade for centuries. The generic term *lingua franca* came into use much later and refers to *any* language that is used as a communication bridge. It can be the first language of some of its users. If the *lingua franca* is their first language, native speakers have a major advantage (e.g., English in Europe). This is why over 80% of Europeans have said that they do not want the EU to privilege the language of any EU member state.¹¹

Although only a few languages are widely used as *lingua franca*, learning any second language makes it available as a *lingua franca* bridge for communication with its native speakers. In a world with thousands of languages, knowing a major *lingua franca* is useful. It is especially useful for the members of small language communities. The following have been important *lingua franca*:

Aramaic. Imperial Aramaic was the *lingua franca* of the Achaemenid (Persian) Empire. It is also a language in which parts of the Talmud and the Old Testament were first written. Jesus probably preached in an Aramaic dialect. Its historic use has been documented as far as China. Although now endangered, Aramaic dialects are still used by some communities in the Middle East.

“A major source of tensions within the Axial mega-empires was their massively multi-ethnic character. In Achaemenid Persia, only a small minority of inhabitants spoke Persian. The main official language of the empire was in fact Aramaic.”

P. Turchin, *Ultra Society: How 10,000 Years of War Made Humans the Greatest Cooperators on Earth* (2016)

Greek. Greek was standardized for military and general government use (Koine Greek). Due to the conquests of Alexander the Great, Greek displaced *lingua franca* Aramaic in the Hellenized regions of the Mediterranean Basin and was the original language of the New Testament. It was prominent for 900 years (300 BCE to 600 CE) and was used by

¹¹ This survey preceded Brexit, so the percentage is now even larger.

the Byzantine government until the 15th Century CE. It is still used as a liturgical language. Greek, of course, is the national language of Greece.

Latin. Latin's use as a *lingua franca* flourished with the Roman Empire. It survived the fall of Rome because it was the language of the Roman Catholic Church—whose clergy were the literate class in feudal Europe. As late as the closing decades of the 18th century, most books published in Europe were written in Latin.

French. Power, both soft and hard, made French the most important *lingua franca* in the Courts of Europe and in diplomacy from the 17th century until the 20th Century. The number of French speakers continues to increase, principally in Africa, and French remains an important *lingua franca* in both Europe and Africa.

English. When Eurasia was decimated by two wars in the first half of the 20th Century, economic and military leadership shifted to Great Britain's former settlement colonies. At the end of World War II, the USA produced almost half of the world's manufactured goods. As Eurasia recovered from its 20th Century wars, the use of *lingua franca* English did not decline. The development of the Internet and other improvements in communication and transportation technology increased the utility of *lingua franca* English—but primarily for elite communication and with an elite identity in places where it was not generally spoken. Global corporations value linguistic congruence but, since they are elite run organizations, elite bilingualism with *lingua franca* English meets their needs. This elite English coherence enhances the power of international corporations in their interactions with non-Anglophone nation-states.

“The emotional investment in the Chinese language, for those who have known it all their lives, is synonymous with being Chinese.”

Jing Tsu, *Sound and Script in Chinese Diaspora* (2010)

2.2.2 Mother Tongue (MT) Languages: Identity. Human languages, which are multiple orders of magnitude more powerful than the

rudimentary communication of other animals, are the defining characteristic of our species. Complex language capacity makes humans and human communities unique. It is not surprising, then, that language differences are powerful recognition markers for differentiating between “us” and “them.” This reflects the identity function of a language. Shared identities bond us and different identities divide us. If religion, history, and culture are variables, a common language may be the principal basis for cohesion in a pluralistic society

“Individuals inhabit multiple often contradictory identities – religious, ethnic, class, gender, professional, sexual, even transnational – and these become more or less salient as we move from one context to another.”

C. Reus-Smit, *On Cultural Diversity: International Theory in a World of Differences* (2018)

Adding the Identity Function. There are at least four ways for an identity to attach to a language: 1) mother tongue (MT) identity, 2) a pidgin can become a MT creole, 3) part of a language community can differentiate its language use to create a distinct identity, and 4) a linguistically diverse population can converge on a single choice to become a unified language community.

From Pidgin to Creole. The capacity to create a pidgin and elaborate it into a creole was documented at two government schools in Nicaragua that taught deaf students. Until the late 1970s, the deaf in Nicaragua had no community. They used gestures that were created independently by each family. In 1977, a program for deaf children of elementary school age was established in Managua. In 1980, a vocational school for deaf adolescents was added.

These schools achieved modest success in their explicit goals of teaching written Spanish and lip reading. Spontaneously, in the schoolyard and going to and from school, the children taught themselves to communicate with gestures. It was a signing pidgin, a hybrid negotiated from their family signs.

Having difficulty understanding the students' signing and curious about its extent, the faculty asked for help and the Ministry of Education contacted the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Graduate students from MIT documented the students' signing and discovered that the younger students had a larger vocabulary and used a more complex grammar than the older students. Students who started school as adolescents usually stopped progressing once they acquired the pidgin. Younger students, exposed to the pidgin during the years when children learn a first language, playfully experimented and expanded the pidgin into a creole and became a regular language community. The pidgin of the older students was named *Lenguaje de Signos Nicaragüense* (LSN), and the creole created by the younger students was named *Idioma de Señas de Nicaragua* (ISN).

There is one concern about Nicaragua's unique sign language. The concern is that its users are isolated from deaf communities that use other sign languages. This is no different than the situation for other small language communities. Currently there is no global sign language. Like other languages, sign languages carry cultural information. Complimentary bilingualism for deaf communities globally would combine the local sign languages, like ISN, with a global sign language. This is something for deaf communities to consider, especially as members of the deaf community become more active globally.

"A common language connects the members of a community into an information sharing network with formidable collective powers."

Stephen Pinker, *The Language Instinct* (1994)

Adding the Identity Function by Convergence: Hebrew in Palestine. Convergence has often been coerced monolingualism as part of the creation of a nation-state. However, even without a government policy, a linguistically diverse group can choose to become a unified community by converging on a single language. One non-governmental example is the revival of Hebrew by Jewish settlers in Palestine.

The revival of written Hebrew for publishing was a project of the

literary elite in the Ashkenazi diaspora. The subsequent addition of an identity function occurred in Palestine, where Hebrew moved from print to the street. The revival of Hebrew in Palestine is usually divided into three periods: the First or Farmer's Aliyah (1881–1903), the Second Aliyah (1904–1914), and the period of the British Mandate (1915–1948). In some agricultural settlements of the First Aliyah, notably in Rishon LeZion (First in Zion) circa 1886, schools taught Hebrew and used it as the language of instruction for some classes. Problematically, both Ashkenazi and Sephardic dialects were used without standardization. To address this problem, in 1890 the Hebrew Language Committee (Va'ad ha-Lashon ha-'Ivrit) was established to standardize spoken Hebrew.

In the Second Aliyah, there was a strong desire to show commitment to *Ērēts Yisrael* by consciously separating one's identity from the former life in the diaspora. This encouraged the use of Hebrew and it expanded into public spaces, especially for gatherings that drew from multiple language communities. In 1909, Tel Aviv was established as a Jewish housing estate on the outskirts of the port city of Jaffa. In 1913, when the Company for the Aid of German Jews specified German as the language of instruction at a science and engineering school that they established in Tel Aviv, a backlash forced them to accept the use of Hebrew.¹²

The third period of Hebrew's revival followed the end of the Ottoman Empire at the conclusion of World War I.¹³ In predominantly Jewish communities of the British Protectorate, the Legion of the Defenders of the Language used social pressure to get immigrants to learn Hebrew. Speaking any other language in public, even if merely overheard, could be met with the remonstrations—"Ivri, daber ivrit" (Hebrews speak Hebrew). Thus, beginning decades before Israel was established in 1948, the groundwork was laid for Hebrew to be used as its identity language.

¹² The school, founded in 1912, was originally called the Technikum (now the Technion – Israel Institute of Technology.) The conflict over language use is remembered as the “war of languages.”

¹³ Sometimes divided to reflect a Fourth (1924–28) and Fifth Aliyah (1929–39).

Adding the Identity Function By Divergence. When people who share a language want to create a distinct community, divergence in language use establishes distinct identities.¹⁴ My favorite example of identity by divergence involves the intentional creation of a new dialect in Papua New Guinea. A group within the Buin language community created the Uisai dialect by switching the markers for words in different grammatical gender categories. This simple change was startling to speakers of standard Buin, and consequently, created a distinct identity for its users.

Divergence After Convergence. Identity by divergence is currently occurring in the Balkans in the aftermath of the breakup of Yugoslavia. It began with standardization and convergence in the 19th century. In the late 20th Century convergence was reversed, reflecting a desire to acknowledge and promote different identities.

Historically, language use in the Balkans was a Slavic continuum. In the middle of the 19th century the literate elite championed standardization. Serbian and Croatian writers and academics created a standard that was based on the Slavic dialect spoken in Zagreb. Standardization facilitated the printing and sale of books. The proposed standard was published in 1850 as the *Vienna Literary Agreement*, which unified a written language.

After World War I, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, renamed Yugoslavia in 1929, used the standard of the *Vienna Literary Agreement* as its written language. For the average and often illiterate citizen, the Slavic continuum was still their linguistic environment. In 1941, Germany occupied Yugoslavia. The anti-Nazi resistance ignored the elite written standard, as partisans came primarily from the less literate agricultural communities. After World War II, the newly established Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia initially recognized multiple dialects, rather than privileging one of them.

In 1954, Yugoslavia's writers and academicians renewed the call for standardization. In a declaration called the *Novi Sad Agreement*, they

¹⁴ Teenage slang is an example. Minority and subculture slang is the same phenomena.

insisted on a single language, called Serbo-Croatian, with two dialects: Western (Zagreb) and Eastern (Belgrade). It could be written in either the Latin or Cyrillic script. Serbo-Croatian was adopted by the communist government for all purposes, but especially for education, because language rationalization was increasingly appreciated as useful both for increasing literacy (communication) and for political solidarity (identity).

“In the hands of Serbian then communist authorities, language served as a tool for political unification. It has now become a tool for divisive nationalist representatives who seek to pursue their own designs.”

Paul Garde, *Unity and Plurality in the Serbo-Croatian Linguistic Sphere*, in T. Judt and D. Lacorne, Ed., *Language, Nation, and State: Identity Politics in a Multilingual Age* (2004)

Subsequent Divergence. In March 1967, 130 influential Croatian writers and academicians, published a *Declaration on the Status and Name of the Croatian Literary Language*. Unlike the authors of the *Vienna Literary Agreement* and the *Novi Sad Agreement*, they advocated for multiple and distinct languages. Many were Croatian nationalists who were upset that Croatian was treated as a provincial dialect. They wanted a distinct Croatian identity language, written and oral, especially for publishing and public education.

President Tito employed the necessary force to suppress nationalism, but he could not extinguish ethnolinguistic aspirations. To defuse tension, a new constitution in 1974 decentralized Yugoslavia's government. Authority and responsibility were significantly transferred to regions of greater ethnolinguistic congruence. The federal government retained limited powers. This devolution considerably increased the congruence between distinct linguistic communities and the primary institutions of their governance.

The 1974 changes presaged the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Skipping the bloody specifics, the result is four official languages: Croatian, Bosnian, Serbian, and Montenegrin. As the written forms of the four languages are based on the Serbo-Croatian of the *Novi Sad Agreement*

and the *Vienna Literary Agreement*, they can be seen as variants of a polycentric language. That is not, however, how their users perceive them. The languages are becoming identity languages for distinct communities. Differences are continually accreting, making them increasingly distinct in fact.

The ethnolinguistic nationalism implicit in the divergence of the formerly unifying Serbo-Croatian language has critics. On March 30, 2017, 200 prominent individuals from Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia issued a joint *Declaration of the Common Language* to counter the narrative of linguistic diversity. It was subsequently signed by ten thousand individuals from the four states. They hoped to persuade the general public, despite the increasing diversity, to conceptualize the languages as one polycentric language, rather than separate languages. Many linguists concur, but the process of differentiation continues and academic discussions have had little, if any, effect. The academic tail does not wag the political dog.

2.3 Elevating Memes vs Anchored Memes

In the endless debate about nature versus nurture, some take the position that nature is dominant. Others take the opposite position – that nurture is dominant. The former see our genetic inheritance as an anchor that limits cultural evolution. The latter focuses on our capacity to rise above the tyranny of our genes.¹⁵ A more consequential dichotomy than the one between nature (genes) and nurture (memes) is the dichotomy between two types of memes.¹⁶ One type of meme reflects our genetic inheritance and the other type of meme elevates us beyond our instincts. I refer to the former as anchored memes and the latter as elevating memes.

¹⁵ Bioengineering may complete our escape from some of our genetic limitations, unleashing a host of new problems and opportunities that may require global collective action.

¹⁶ Studies of the genetic basis for human actions are still important and will necessarily need to consider the relationship between nature and nurture.

However useful they may have been in our Paleolithic past, anchored memes are often (but not always) dysfunctional in the 21st Century. Elevating memes can prophylactically negate or replace anachronistic anchored memes that are now dysfunctional. This meme vs meme dichotomy can be fully handled within the humanities and social sciences. When nature is used as an excuse for failing to take full advantage of our incredible memetic capacity, the argument is illogical (naturalistic fallacy) and the position espoused is often harmful to our collective and long term interests.

“The growth of modern contraceptive techniques is a splendid example of the use of reason to overcome the normal consequences of our evolved behavior. It shows that reason can master our genes.”

Peter Singer, *The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution and Our Moral Progress* (1981)

Anchored Memes. Racism and xenophobia are anchored memes, grounded in our Paleolithic ancestors’ rational fear of strangers. We also see this fear in the dehumanizing anchored memes that proliferate during conflict. If the enemy is a lesser class of human, using highly subjective criteria, harming them is easier to justify. We also see it in the sometimes xenophobic reaction to foreigners and immigrants. To increase cooperation and decrease conflict, anchored memes must be replaced by more inclusive, elevating memes.

“As man advances in civilization, and small tribes are united into larger communities, the simplest reason would tell each individual that he ought to extend his social instincts and sympathies to all the members of the same nation, though personally unknown to him. This point being once reached, there is only an artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies extending to all men of all nations and races.”

Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man* (1871)

Elevating Memes. Chivalry is one of my favorite examples of an elevating meme, perhaps because of its ironic history and misappropriation. Chivalry was invented by monks in France, in the 10th century, and was promoted by the Catholic Church as a way to curb the excessive violence

of the Frankish aristocracy. It was brought to England with the Norman invasion in 1066.

The Arthurian legends and the famous roundtable of King Arthur are chivalry's contribution to the English literary canon. Chivalric memes reached their apogee with the rediscovery of chivalry in Victorian England by an aristocracy that was being marginalized by capitalism. They repurposed the chivalric memes for an ego boost and improve public relations – elite capture.

Chivalry was originally intended, in addition to reducing elite violence, to elevate the status of women by giving them power over the knights who were expected to treat them with reverence and unrequited love. (Perhaps an echo of the Virgin Mary.) In practice, this rarely worked, as the elevated status was reserved for well-born ladies.

Chivalry was repurposed for hypocritical Victorian morality and the exclusion of women from politics and the economy. An elevating meme that was originally intended to reduce elite violence, especially against peasants, was repurposed to promote anachronistic class and gender privileges. Our memes are what we make of them – buyer beware. They must be continuously updated in a world that is changing – especially as the pace of that change is accelerating at an unprecedented rate.

In the 21st Century, inclusive and elevating memes can replace the divisive anchored memes that inhibit collective action. Instead of basing our actions on zero-sum competition between different SV, we can adopt memes that recognize that we are a global community of common fate. Elevating memes, in a common language that is accessible and inclusive, are the appropriate and necessary tools for organizing global collective action to reduce inequality and ameliorate suffering. Crucially, this does not require monolingualism.

Part II

The Evolution of Modern Empires

“The strong do as they will. The weak suffer as they must.”

Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War* (431 BCE)

Chapter 3

The 20th Century: Rise of the Empire-States

There are 190 nation-states and only three empire-states. This numeric disparity leads most people, including academics and even most practitioners of geopolitics, to fail to differentiate the empire-states. This is understandable, but misses the crucial fact of continuing empire dominance in a new model. The empire model was refined into the empire-state model and the number of *empires* was reduced to three empire-states and, one inchoate empire-state (India).

Since the end of World War II, nation-states have had relatively little international agency. The re-polarization of the global order since the end of USA hegemony, circa 2008, will extinguish what little agency the nation-states had during the brief unipolar moment (1998–2008). In light of the rise of AI and its likely monopoly by the USA and China, residual nation-state agency in geopolitics is likely to evaporate within two decades – unless the nation-state aggregate into region-states and networks.

“A language is a dialect with an army and navy.”

Max Weinreich (1945)

3.1 World War I: *Multilingual* Empires Shattered

The weakness of the multilingual empires became evident in the second half of the 19th century. This was, not coincidentally, a golden age

in the formation of monolingual European nation-states. The greater legitimacy of monolingual nationalism undermined the legitimacy of the multilingual empires. World War I resulted in the destruction of two multilingual empires (the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires) by the combined forces of two colonial empires (Great Britain and France) and two empire-states (USA and Russia).

Because Russia withdrew from the war after the overthrow of the Tzar, its territorial objectives at the start of the war are not well-remembered. If Russia had stayed the course, history would have been dramatically different. The Russian empire-state had three goals: 1) destruction of Austria-Hungary, with the Carpathian Mountains as Russia's new southwest border; 2) destruction of the Ottoman Empire and the annexation of the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, Constantinople, and adjacent territory; and 3) the annexation of Armenia, Kurdistan, and Azerbaijan.

The Triple *Entente* (Great Britain, France, and Russia) opposed the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary) and the Ottoman Empire, collectively called the Triple *Alliance*.¹⁷ Russia withdrew after the communist revolution. This weakened the Triple Entente, but the USA provided a replacement empire-state. Troops from the USA tipped the balance on the Western Front and ended the stalemate. The Triple Alliance had achieved a temporary victory on the Eastern Front, leading to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk,¹⁸ but the Triple Alliance collapsed when Germany lost on the Western Front. Victory on the Western Front and the withdrawal of Russia on the Eastern Front determined the post-war global order.

¹⁷ Prior to Italy's decision to switch sides, the Triple Alliance included Italy but not the Ottoman Empire. Italy's decision to switch changed the Triple Entente to the Quadruple Entente. Japan made it the Quintuple Entente, but the group became more commonly known simply as the Allies.

¹⁸ This treaty, and the subsequent defeat of the Central Powers, was a major boon to the nation-state model. Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine gained independence.

The war extinguished the multilingual Ottoman and Austro-Hungary empires. However, as a result of its withdrawal to consolidate its revolution, Russia did not achieve its territorial objectives. The victorious empires disassembled the Austro-Hungarian empire, ultimately resulting in modern Austria, Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Croatia. The breakup also added territory to Poland, Romania, Serbia, Ukraine and other adjacent countries. The Ottoman Empire was divided into nation-states, with British and French zones of influence. Great Britain and France also divided the African colonial holdings of Germany. In World War I, empires defeated empires and the victorious empires reaped most of the spoils. Nation-states arose where and when it was convenient or necessary for a balance of power.

“Only three countries aspired to territorial expansion and war as a means to achieve it. They were Italy, Germany and Japan.”

Niall Ferguson, *The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West* (2006)

3.2 World War II: Suppressing *Revisionist* Empires

Germany, Italy, and Japan, three Versailles Treaty revisionists, disrupted the *status quo* and precipitated World War II. They were aggressively expansionist, aspirational empires. Their violent bids for empire status and the implications for the balance of power, not their fascist ideology, created a security dilemma for the *status quo* empires. The geopolitical ambitions and the backlash, not ideologic differences, determined the alliances in World War II.

All three revisionists lacked essential size and resources, within their borders, for successful competition with the world's *status quo* empires. This was particularly the case for oil. Most oil extraction occurred in the Western Hemisphere. The Middle East produced one-tenth as much. The British, French, and Dutch colonial empires—along with two empire-states, the USA and Russia—monopolized the world supply of many essential commodities.

To become competitive, Germany, Italy, and Japan were determined to acquire both space and essential natural resources. Free trade did not exist, so they saw no alternative to becoming empires. They knew the *status quo* empires would oppose their expansion. Mobilization sufficient to overcome this opposition required a fascist ideology. Fascism refers to the quasi-military organization of a state on the principle of full mobilization of all resources, including human resources.

Fascism was deemed necessary for expansion because of the emergence of total warfare during World War I. Total mobilization in anticipation of total warfare was perceived as essential and could best be realized with fascism. It is often argued that fascism led to World War II. A more complete statement would be that a revisionist desire for empire caused both domestic fascism and World War II.¹⁹

A fascist state is autocratic and depersonalizing in exactly the same way as a military organization. All Germans, Italians, and Japanese were, at least metaphorically, conscripted for total warfare by the fascist ideology. Like all forms of authoritarianism it can be used by a charismatic leader for personal goals unrelated or even contrary to the logical and long term interests of the country. Nazism was fascism combined with Hitler's pathological anti-semitism.²⁰

Fascism was no more antithetical to liberal democracy than was Russian communism. It was not fascism, *per se*, but revisionism that led to war. Fascist Spain and Portugal focused on consolidating domestic control (internal political coherence) and stayed out of the war, despite German support for Spain in its recent civil war. Spain and Portugal were not

¹⁹ I try to explain fascism for the same reason that Hannah Arendt tried to explain Nazi brutality in her book, *The Banality of Evil*. Explaining isn't justifying, it's understanding.

²⁰ Sadly, racism and xenophobia can coexist with almost any ideology or polity. Their waxing appeal in the USA in the second decade of the 21st Century is evidence of this capacity.

interested in challenging the *status quo* empires. After the war, Portugal was a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

“Counterproductive aggressive policies are caused most directly by the idea that the state’s security can be safeguarded only through expansion.”

J. Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (2013)

Germany. After being stripped of its overseas territory and naval strength by the Treaty of Versailles and suffering greatly during the interwar period’s “beggar thy neighbor” protectionism, Germany perceived the *status quo* as oppressive and harmful to its interests. Surrounded by both empires and empire-states and lacking an opportunity to add overseas colonies, the only option appeared to be an expansion within Europe. Germany’s ambition focused on the creation of a large, contiguous, and German-speaking empire-state at the center of Europe. Germany appreciated that an empire-state was stronger than a colonial empire.²¹ Otto Von Bismarck’s Prussian-dominated *Kleindeutschland* (Lesser Germany) was to be replaced by a *Grossdeutschland* (Greater Germany) that even incorporated large areas without a significant German population. To achieve ethno-linguistic coherence, the Slavic populations were to be exterminated, subjugated or displaced by Germans.

The German goal was to acquire *Lebensraum* (living space) through eastward expansion at the expense of Slavs. The *status quo* empires could not permit Hitler to succeed, at least not beyond the acquisition of the German-speaking Sudetenland and the Austrian Anschluss (joining). Invading Slavic Poland was unacceptably destabilizing to the European

²¹ Hitler repeated Napoleon’s error of invading Russia, but with a very different intent. Napoleon wanted a secure Eastern border for a European empire. Hitler was influenced by Halford MacKinder’s geopolitical argument, in *The Geographical Pivot of History* (1904), that control of Eastern Europe, called the Pivot Area or Heartland, was the key to control of all of Eurasia and thus of the world. Technological advances during the intervening 130 years made MacKinder’s theory plausible to Hitler

balance of power. The *status quo* powers needed to respond. Hitler allied himself with two other Versailles Treaty revisionists who also saw the need for a fascist ideology in order to mobilize for total war. Italy and Japan were building their own revisionist empires, respectively in the Mediterranean and Pacific.

Italy. Like Germany, Italy was a late arrival (1871) to European nation-state status and consequently was also disadvantaged in the acquisition of foreign colonies. It thought that it had resolved this problem in the 1915 Treaty of London. The treaty was a secret agreement with the UK, France and Russia, which would give Italy substantial Austro-Hungarian territory, including Trieste, South Tyrol and Northern Dalmatia. This transfer would give Italy a dominant position in the Adriatic. The potential spoils of war convinced Italy to leave the Triple Alliance and join the Triple Entente, even though Italians favored neutrality.

When the USA prevented some of the terms's of the secret Treaty of London from being included in the Versailles Treaty, Italy felt betrayed by France and Great Britain.²² So, despite being on the winning side in World War I, post-war Italy was a Versailles Treaty revisionist.

When Mussolini came to power in 1922, he formalized Italian control of Libya and sought Italian hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean. Mussolini saw Italy as marginalized in the Mediterranean by France and Great Britain. His ambition was unfettered access to the Atlantic—controlled by Great Britain at Gibraltar—and to the Indian Ocean—controlled by France and Great Britain at the Suez Canal. In addition, Corsica, Tunisia, Malta, and Cyprus gave the French and British an unacceptable dominance in the Mediterranean basin. Mussolini also coveted the African coast of the Mediterranean, Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa, the Dalmatian Coast, the Balkans, Greece, and Macedonia. His ambition can only be understood as a desire to establish a new Roman Empire.

²² France and Great Britain countered that Italy's delayed declaration of war against Germany was a violation that voided the agreement.

“Modernity and industrialization in an era without free trade demanded Japan become an empire.”

Peter Zeihan, *Disunited Nations: The Scramble for Power in an Ungoverned World* (2020)

Japan. By the end of the 19th century nearly half of the world's population and land area were under the control of European colonial empires—Belgium, Great Britain, the Netherlands, France, Portugal, and Spain. Adding the three empire-states, Russia, China and the USA, it was clear that empires were the basis of global order. Japan saw its future in stark terms—become an empire or become a *de facto* colony. Japan's empire-building began with four military victories: the First Sino-Japanese War, assistance in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion, the Russo-Japanese War, and World War I (as a member of the Triple Entente).

The First Sino-Japanese War (Qing-Japan War) in 1894–95 ended in a Japanese victory and the Treaty of Shimonoseki. It gave Japan control of Korea, Taiwan, the Penghu Islands, and the Liaodong Peninsula. The Liaodong Peninsula was ceded back, as a result of pressure from Russia, France, and Germany. Their interest in exploiting China caused them to oppose what they considered excessive Japanese influence. The forced relinquishment of the fruits of war convinced Japan that its perceived need for an Asian empire required a showdown with Europe's colonial empires.

Although it was allied with the Triple Entente and Italy in World War I, the Treaty of Versailles only gave Japan possession of the formerly German-controlled islands in the Western Pacific, north of the Equator, and Germany's Kiautschou Bay Leased Territory. Useful as these were for the Japanese Navy, they did not represent a significant territorial gain. Particularly upsetting for Japan was the rejection of its proposal that the Treaty of Versailles include a provision for racial equality for the alien nationals of all member states of the League of Nations (LON). The limitation to LON members avoided an objection by the colonial empires, as their colonies would not be members. However, the provision for racial equality was blocked by the USA and Australia. Like Italy, an insufficient return on its war effort made Japan a Versailles Treaty revisionist. The

rejection of its call for racial equality language in the charter of the LON made it clear that Japan would not be treated as an equal in any future disputes or their resolution.²³

In September 1931, after Japanese troops engineered the Mukden incident,²⁴ Japan invaded Manchuria and established a puppet state (Manchukuo) to permit Japanese occupation, resource exploitation and mass Japanese migration. The invasion created a problem for the LON, as Japan was a member of its governing Council. It took the LON a year to investigate and issue a report. In that year, Japan consolidated its position in Manchuria. The report found that the Mukden incident and the subsequent colonialism were Japanese aggressions and the LON Assembly demanded that Japan withdraw. Japan refused and left the LON. The LON had authority for three types of sanctions: verbal, economic and physical. It only used the verbal.

Japan wanted to fight only China and Europe's Asian colonies. This seemed possible because the European powers were preoccupied by the war in Europe and the USA was preoccupied with recovery from the Great Depression. Japan knew that conflict with the USA, China, and the European colonial empires would be more than it could handle.

“Japan's attacks on Russia in 1904 and the United States in 1941 were intimately related to Japanese fears of future access to the raw materials and trade of the East Asian theatre.”

Dale C. Copeland. *Economic Interdependence and War* (2015)

²³ At Versailles, Japan was interested in improving the status of its overseas nationals. The Naturalization Act of 1906 (USA) and the Gentlemen's Agreement (1908) sharply limited Japanese immigration to the USA and citizenship for Japanese nationals. (see *Ozawa vs USA*, 260 US 178 (1922)). Japan was equally racist. This was made very clear in a report from the Ministry of Health and Welfare's Institute of Population Problems, titled *An Investigation of Global Policy With the Yamato Race as Nucleus* (July 1, 1943).

²⁴ On September 18, 1931, a small bomb destroyed a section of the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway. Although the explosion was the work of Japanese troops who were ostensibly guarding the railway, Japan claimed it was a Chinese attack and used it as a pretext for the invasion of Manchuria.

On July 2, 1940, Congress authorized President Roosevelt to institute export restrictions on strategic goods and natural resources. It was an attempt to strengthen his negotiating position with Japan, but failed to curb Japan's ambitions. A year later, on July 26, 1941 Roosevelt froze Japan's assets in the USA. On August 1, 1941, Roosevelt embargoed the oil and gasoline shipments that Japan needed to sustain its expansion.²⁵ Eighty percent of Japan's oil came from the USA. The British and Dutch governments, which controlled the oil fields in Asia, joined the oil and gas embargo in the hope that Japan would see the futility of continuing its quest for an Asian empire. Japan, however, saw no future without an empire.

"Fundamentally the reason Japan took the risk was that she had either to go forward or content herself with the status quo, which no one was willing or could politically afford to suggest."

Barbara Tuchman, *The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam* (1984)

Japan realized it could not establish an Asian empire if it limited its ambition to what was acceptable to the *status quo* empires. The only hope for success appeared to be a series of quick and decisive victories, achieving temporary naval dominance in the Pacific and securing the British and Dutch oil fields in Asia. This, it was hoped, would be enough for a negotiated peace which allowed Japan to retain Manchuria. Japan's desperate gambit was initiated at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The final alignment in World War II was three Versailles Treaty revisionists, who were aspirational empires, against all of the *status quo* empires and their colonies.

²⁵ The timing of the embargo was crucial to preventing the Japanese from attacking Russia in Siberia. In the Fall of 1941, Operation Barbarossa was reaching its zenith on Russia's Western Front and a coordinated Japanese attack in Siberia could have driven Russia out of the war. By embargoing oil and gasoline, Roosevelt forced the Japanese to attack the oil producing regions in South East Asia rather than Russia.

“Moreover, American policy-makers, Roosevelt in particular, harbored a thinly veiled ambition to see the British Empire broken up.”

Niall Ferguson, *The War of the World:
Twentieth-Century Conflict and the
Descent of the West* (2006)

3.3 The Cold War: *Colonial* Empires Collapse

Prior to Pearl Harbor, there was little reason for the USA to save either the European colonial empires or the equally closed USSR. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s opposition to Europe’s colonial empires was clear. Four months before the Pearl Harbor attack, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill held their first wartime meeting on August 14, 1941. Afterward, they issued a “Joint Declaration” of eight principles for a post-war world order. It became known as The Atlantic Charter. At Roosevelt’s insistence, the third principle of the charter was a declaration of opposition to colonialism:

“Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.”

Despite the plain meaning of the word *all*, there was no meeting of the minds. Roosevelt did not want the USA to expend its citizens’ lives and resources to make the world safe for either colonialism or communism. Churchill only agreed to the third principle under the pressure of Great Britain’s reliance on the USA for war material and credit. An immediate domestic outcry forced Churchill to declare that it was his understanding that the right of self-determination should only apply in the territories of the fascist powers. It did not, he asserted, apply to the British Empire and, by logical extension, its European allies.

“There never has been, there is not now, and there never will be any race on earth fit to serve as masters of their fellow man ... any nationality, no matter how small, has the inherent right to its own neighborhood.”

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, White House
Correspondents Dinner (March 15, 1941)

When Japan attacked the Pearl Harbor, the USA did not declare war on Germany and Italy—only on Japan. The interests of the USA were still not sufficiently aligned with those of the European colonial empires or the USSR so as to justify the direct involvement of the USA in the European war. Only when Germany and Italy declared war on the USA did the interests align—but only for the duration of the war.

After the war, the interests of Europe’s colonial empires and the expansionist USSR aligned in opposition to self-determination. The Paris Peace Treaties of 1947 took a realistic and pragmatically *ad hoc* approach to establishing boundaries and spheres of influence.²⁶ Nevertheless, the colonial empire model was mortally wounded by the war, if still breathing. Even though it had recently been allied with Great Britain and France, the political and economic interests of the USA were better served by stripping the European powers of their colonies and reducing them to nation-state allies. Supporting colonialism became impossible when Europe’s rebellious colonies became potential allies in the global contest with the USSR.

The Suez Crisis. After supporting the European colonial powers in two global wars, colonial subjects were aware of the limits of colonial Europe’s power. The two world wars also increased the colonial subjects’

²⁶ The USA also had colonies. However, the Philippine Independence Act of 1934 already provided for its sovereignty after a ten year transition period. Guam, American Samoa, and Puerto Rico were still useful to the military and incapable of revolution. They were small and economically dependent, so their status remained unchanged. In 1959, Hawai’i became the 50th state of the USA.

solidarity, self-confidence, and desire for independence. Across Africa and Asia, indigenous leaders rallied their people in liberations movements. Often, they received help from the Soviet Union.

The weakness of Europe's colonial empires and the continued antipathy toward them by the USA were starkly revealed in the 1956 Suez Crisis. In response to Egypt's acquisition of the stock of the privately owned Suez Canal in a forced sale²⁷ and the exclusion of Israeli shipping, Great Britain and France conspired with Israel to recover the canal. The plan involved Israel securing the canal in a military action against Egypt, after which Great Britain and France would use the ruse of separating the combatants as a pretext to recover the canal. Great Britain was concerned that a successful Egyptian takeover of the canal would promote the nationalization of its assets in its former colonies and would accelerate the independence of the remnants of its colonial empire. France had similar concerns and, in particular, was angry that Egypt was supporting Algeria's independence struggle.

President Eisenhower learned of the plan and warned Great Britain's Prime Minister Eden that proceeding would "very seriously affect our people's feelings" and have "the most far reaching consequences."²⁸ His warning was ignored. The French, British and Israeli governments timed the Israeli attack and British and French response to occur during the final days of the 1956 Presidential election.²⁹ They assumed Eisenhower would be unable to respond.

²⁷ Egypt seized the canal, in order to use its revenue to help fund the Aswan High Dam. It offered to compensate the shareholders based on the Paris Stock Exchange price on the day before the seizure. The stockholders initially refused the offer, but were paid years later.

²⁸ The Soviet Union invaded Hungary in October of 1956. The Suez crises provided a useful distraction. Countenancing a nearly simultaneous invasion of Egypt by its allies would make it impossible for the USA to criticize the aggression in Hungary. Khrushchev was also threatening to send Soviet troops to defend its Egyptian allies. The prospect of a defense of colonialism triggering World War III was entirely plausible.

²⁹ This delay of several months undermined the purported justification for a joint

To the surprise of the British, Eisenhower threatened to sell a substantial amount of the USA's holdings of British bonds and to deny the British the option of purchasing oil from the USA with British pounds. The Treasury Department arranged with the IMF to cut-off the British drawing rights. This trifecta would raise the borrowing cost for Great Britain to an unsustainable level. Considering the potential impact on its weak economy, Great Britain was forced into an immediate and humiliating withdrawal. It did not even consult with France and Israel. France could not execute its role in the plan without Great Britain and also stood down. Israel, after negotiating access rights to the canal and the Straits of Tiran, withdrew in March 1957.³⁰

After the Suez Crisis, except for delusional elements in colonial offices and the military, the world knew that Europe's colonial empires were unsustainable. The Cold War competition for global influence and allies made both the USA and USSR hostile to European colonialism. After the Suez crisis, the British were the most realistic and attempted to negotiate extended colonial withdrawals. However, when rebuffed by potent independence movements, they left. The Portuguese, having avoided the weakening effects of World War II by abstaining, were the most recalcitrant colonialists and were not ejected from Africa until 1975. South Africa, with domestic colonialism, held out even longer. Apartheid only ended in 1994.

"The nation-state alone does not have a future."

German Chancellor Angela Merkel (May 18, 2020)

English and French involvement and subsequent operation of the Suez Canal, which was an assertion that Egypt was unable to operate the canal.

³⁰ For the British, the lesson learned was that it should stay close to the USA. The *special relationship* was and remains a code phrase for acknowledging suzerainty. For the French, the lesson was that you could not trust the British or the USA. The consequent British-French split ended the effort to establish an exclusively European defense community of any consequence and assured the primacy of NATO.

In summary, 20th Century military conflicts and competition resulted in a splintering of the contiguous but multilingual Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, after World War I, the defeat of the Versailles Treaty revisionists, in World War II, and the collapse of Europe's colonial empires during the Cold War. The final piece of a global order at the end of the 20th Century occurred in 1991 with the collapse of the multilingual and multinational USSR. Fourteen Soviet states left the USSR, which survived as the Russian Federation, an empire-state. Russia's diminished capacity for coercion permitted its former Eastern European vassal states to defect to NATO and the EU.³¹

³¹ Russian was the *lingua franca* of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact states. But, without linguistic congruence, the USSR was an unconsolidated multilingual empire. As a result, Russia's 20th Century empire was no more successful in Central and Eastern Europe than the multilingual Austro-Hungarian empire in the previous century.

“The globalized world economy is fragmenting into regional trading blocs, with partial decoupling attempted in the areas of high technology and finance, and ever fiercer contention between the powers for economic and political primacy. In the process, a much more dangerous world is emerging.”

Shivshankar Menon, *Nobody Wants the Current World Order*, Foreign Affairs (Aug. 3, 2022)

Chapter 4

The 21st Century: Strategic Autonomy

The emerging international order is increasingly defined by a quest for strategic autonomy by the four largest polities: the USA, China, Russia, and India. Each is trying to maximize internal resilience, minimize external dependency, and increase geopolitical influence. While their methods differ, reflecting to their different circumstances, their common goal is the ability to act unilaterally within a less interdependent world.

The effect is a weakening of global institutions and a fragmentation of the global economy. What emerges is not isolationism. It is a strategic autonomy for the empire-states so as to maximize unfettered agency. This could easily lead to a new bipolar system (USA and China) but without the economic separation between capitalism and communism. This repolarization will be more fraught than the Cold War.

“Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”

Deng Xiaoping

Deng's strategy to "hide capabilities and bide time" (*tao guang yang hui*), was adopted in the early 1990s to prioritize China's economic growth over its foreign policy. It was a low-profile approach to foster economic growth without provoking a confrontation with the USA.

4.1 From Chimerica to Re-Polarization

The transition from Mao's inwardly focused and perpetually revolutionary China to a globally oriented and competitive market economy began with Paramount Leader³² Deng Xiaoping. Deng (1978–1989) and his designated successor, Jiang Zemin (1989–2002) were domestic revisionist, but not global revisionists – except to the extent that China's relative rise was inherently destabilizing. Deng and Jiang established a symbiotic relationship with the USA that became known as Chimerica.³³ Conforming or appearing to conform to the USA led world order was essential to China's rise.

The most crucial moment for Deng's reforms occurred *after* his official retirement in November 1989.³⁴ When a conservative backlash to the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1992 risked a reversal of his economic reforms, Deng undertook a Southern Tour to the Special Economic Zones. He was accompanied by his successor Jiang Zemin.

³² The unofficial title of Paramount Leader is reflected in the order of precedence on ceremonial and official occasions. The top three official leadership positions in China are the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, the Chair of the Central Military Commission, and the President of the Peoples Republic of China. Deng Xiaoping held only the Chair of the Central Military Commission, but he was nonetheless China's paramount leader from December 1978 until November 1989. His successors as paramount leader have held all three of the key positions.

³³ Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick coined the term Chimerica in 2006.

³⁴ Deng remained influential until his death, in 1997, despite the lack of a formal role. Similarly, Jiang Zemin had significant influence during the first five year term of his successor.

With the Southern Tour, Deng and Jiang dramatically assert the continuing need for economic growth and market reforms.

After succeeding Deng, Jiang presided over the return of Hong Kong (1997) and Macau (1999), both of which were negotiated under Deng, respectively in 1984 and 1987. On July 13, 2001, China secured the 2008 Summer Olympics for Beijing. But, these historic events were eclipsed in significance by the establishment of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status for China (1994) and China's 2001 membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). After joining the WTO, China's economy grew by 1,100% in just over two decades.

"For corporations with little direct stake in US-China trade but with much influence in Washington, the Chinese government offered generous deals and Chinese officials were outspoken about these deals as rewards for the corporations' lobbying efforts."

Ho-fung Hung. *Clash of Empires: From Chimerica to the New Cold War.* (2022)

Most Favored Nation Status. After defeating President George H.W. Bush, President William J. "Bill" Clinton initially favored conditioning MFN status for China on improvements to its domestic human rights record. In response, China enlisted the help of some of the largest and most influential USA corporations, including Boeing, AT&T, GM, McDonald Douglas and IBM, in a successful effort to change President Clinton's position on MFN status. Unconditional MFN status was granted in 1994.

"It seems clear that the United States erred in supporting China's entry into the WTO on terms that have proven to be ineffective in securing China's embrace of an open, market-oriented trade regime."

US Trade Representative 2017 Report to Congress
on China's WTO Compliance (January 2018)

WTO Membership. President Clinton also supported China's application for WTO membership. It became effective in 2001, in his successor's first year in office.

“Apple, in other words, set in motion a series of events that help Chinese suppliers win more orders and advance their understanding of cutting edge manufacturing. At the same time, Western manufacturing of electronics atrophied.”

Patrick McGee. *How Apple tied its future to China*
Financial Times, January 16, 2023

Jiang Zemin was succeeded by Hu Jintao (2002–2012). By the end of Hu’s first five year term, in 2007, the Chimerica supply chain was being perfected by Apple. Tim Cook continued the initiative of Steve Jobs by shifting much of Apple’s production to China and implemented cutting-edge supply chain innovations. With the benefit of hindsight, 2008 was both the apogee of Deng’s vision and an inflection point. Chimerica began to unravel during Hu Jintao’s second 5 year term (2008–2012).

Deconstructing Chimerica (2008–present). At the juncture of Hu Jintao’s two five year terms, a series of global events and changes to China’s governance model caused China to take a more self-assured and assertive approach to geopolitics. The shift was largely triggered by three factors: 1) the breakdown of the collective leadership model, 2) the return of the SOE, and 3) the global financial crisis.

“During his second term, Hu appeared to lose his grip over China’s foreign policy.”

S.L. Shirk. *Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise* (2023)

The Breakdown of Collective Leadership. Deng’s collective leadership model used the Standing Committee of the Politburo (Standing Committee).³⁵ The Standing Committee is the supreme council of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) and the interface between the paramount leader and both the CPC and the government bureaucracy. Deng’s expectation was that the Standing Committee’s collective decisions would

³⁵ Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

reflect a consensus that maintained the *status quo* he had established. If the standing committee was unable to reach a consensus decision, the paramount leader would impose a resolution to preserve unity.

In the 2002 transition from Jiang to Hu, except for Hu the other members of the Standing Committee were replaced and two new positions were added, increasing the Standing Committee's membership from seven to nine. The two added members reflected a growing concern for internal and external security. Standing Committee members Li Changchu (ideology and propaganda) and Zhou Yongkang (domestic security)³⁶ would be key actors in the 2008 pivot to a more confrontational geopolitical and economic relationship between China and the USA.

Instead of a *status quo* supporting consensus model, during Hu's tenure the Standing Committee informally divided its authority and responsibilities into a system of discrete fiefdoms. Each of the members was given tremendous deference in their own area of interest and expertise and generally allowed to make largely unilateral decisions. The end of consensus decision making reduced Hu's role, as he was no longer called upon to resolve disagreements. In addition, Hu failed to effectively control a Standing Committee which had been selected by his predecessor.

The Return of the SOE. As soon as China was admitted to WTO membership, it began shifting from a market driven economy to an economy in which the state controlled access to capital and managed critical elements of the economy. The motivation was both to protect the state owned enterprises (SOE) from foreign competition and to use the Nichibei (Japan-America) planning model that worked for Japan (Kieretsu and Zaibatsu), Taiwan (Guanxi Qiye), Hong Kong (Hongts) and Korea (Chaebol).³⁷ The critical difference was that these smaller Asian Tigers

³⁶ After Hu's first five year term, Zhou Yongkang replaced Luo Gan. Luo retired in October of 2007, after reaching mandatory retirement age.

³⁷ Although these conglomerates were not state owned, the symbiotic relationship between them and the government produce effects which are similar to those between China and its SOE.

were aided in their economic rise by the USA because it needed them as part of its policy of containment during the Cold War. They were allies, not revisionist.

“... a simplistic faith in the magic of markets had hollowed out U.S. industry, welcomed a rising adversary (China) into free-trade agreements, and riddled global supply chains with critical security vulnerabilities.”

H. Farrell and A. Newman. *The New Economic Security*
State. Foreign Affairs October 19, 2023

Liberal Capitalisms Epiphany. As early as 2004, USA based corporations were asking Congress for help in market access and in the protection of intellectual property rights. China, they argued, was not living up to the promises that it had made while seeking MFN status and membership in the WTO. Extending the Nichibei model to China, with the creation of Chimerica, had not result in either democracy or a true market economy. Chimerica was a transactional relationship that, after 2008, was less symbiotic.

The Global Financial Crisis. In 2008, China was still not well integrated into the global financial system that was established by the Bretton Woods Conference³⁸ at the end of the Second World War. This limited the damage from financial contagion during the 2008 financial crisis. However, as an export driven economy, China suffered a sharp drop in exports which caused a loss of 20 million jobs. China responded with a \$586 billion stimulus package that focused on infrastructure.

The 2008 global financial crisis shocked Chinese supporters of market capitalism and reminded its communists of Marx's prediction that capitalism would self-destruct because of fundamental internal contradictions. It

³⁸ Formally titled the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference. Delegates from the war's victorious alliance met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to establish the post war financial and monetary system. This included the establishment of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), now part of the World Bank group, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

seemed to many as if Marx's prediction was coming true and, therefore, that it was time for China to provide a new economic model and assert international economic leadership that would replace the Bretton Woods order.

“Clearly, China is continuing a mission to establish its dominance in east Asia and its influence globally. The Chinese system is fundamentally different from ours, and we are aware of the nature of the rivalry.”

EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, EU Summit, October 21, 2022

The Decline of Chimerica. By 2010, USA corporations' hopes for Chimerica were dashed and their exposure to the Chinese economy began to decline. This correlated with President Obama's "pivot to Asia," which China saw as evidence of a desire to thwart its rise.

When he became China's paramount leader in 2012, Xi replaced the Standing Committee's failed collective leadership with a level of personal authority that was reminiscent of Chairman Mao. Any comparison to Mao, however, ignores profound differences. Mao's autocratic regime was internally focused and its goal was perpetual revolution to maintain the purity of its communist ideology. Mao did not want his revolution to be polluted by contact with Western liberalism or market capitalism. Xi's goal is far more ambitious. He seeks a global reordering that replaces the Bretton Woods order (1944) with a system that reflects China's 21st Century rise, future potential and ambitious high politics.

Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has embraced the narrative of "Making China Great Again," rooted in its historical identity as the Middle Kingdom—a civilization-state destined for centrality in Eurasian affairs. The trauma of the "century of humiliation" at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialism animates a national project of rejuvenation.

Xi's policy initiatives, such as One Belt, One Road (2013), the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (2013), and the ongoing expansion of the

BRICS+ membership are all focused on leading a coalition comprised of the countries which are less successful under neoliberal capitalism and are open to a non-Western alternative.

“The new world order is an order of empires – empires like China, like India, like Russia, like the United States of America... Only together in a real European union, can we succeed and survive.”

Guy Verhofstadt, Candidate for EU Commission President
and Former Prime Minister of Belgium (May 2, 2019)

4.2 Make the Empire-States Great Again

The three empire-states and India are competing and, at the same time, seeking strategic autonomy. No matter which of the great powers prospers, likely through regional hegemony rather than global hegemony, the losers will be the nation-states. The nation-states are belatedly coming to appreciate that the goal of the Big Four (India plus the empire-states) is a hierarchy under which they dominate the nation-states. They seem, however, to be unable to fashion a collective response.

“What does China’s President Xi Jinping want? Four years before Donald Trump became president, Xi became the leader of China and announced an epic vision to, in effect, ‘make China great again’—calling for ‘the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.’”

Graham Allison, author of *Destined for War*,
in *The Atlantic* (May 31, 2017)

4.2.1 Make China Great Again. Post-Chimerica the Chinese strategy is strategic autonomy. Rather than retreating from globalization, China is actively reshaping it to serve its own interests with international alternatives to the Bretton Woods organizations. At the center of this strategy is the Belt and Road Initiative, which seeks to build infrastructure corridors across Eurasia, Africa, and beyond. While often framed as development assistance, these projects function to secure supply chains, expand market

access, and create long-term dependencies that enhance China's geopolitical leverage.

In parallel, China has invested heavily in reducing its vulnerability to external pressures. This includes efforts to achieve technological self-sufficiency, particularly in semiconductors and advanced manufacturing, the diversification of the sources of its energy and raw material imports, and the establishment of strategic reserves. China's partnerships—whether through trade agreements, development financing, or diplomatic alignment—create a China-centered ecosystem, in which interdependence exists on terms that enhance both China's autonomy and its geopolitical influence. Thus, China's version of strategic autonomy is architectural: it seeks to build a global system in which China is indispensable, but not dependent.

Infrastructure as Geopolitics. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is not merely economic—it is also strategic. It focuses on projects to secure supply chains and expand Chinese influence, such as: (1) the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), linking western China to the Arabian Sea, (2) port developments in Gwadar (Pakistan) and Piraeus (Greece), that create logistical nodes that support both commercial and potential military uses, (3) rail links from China to Europe to reduce reliance on maritime routes that are vulnerable to U.S. naval power, and (4) Digital Silk Road projects to embed Chinese standards in telecommunications.

Technological Autonomy. China's "Made in China 2025" and subsequent policies aim to reduce reliance on foreign technology. For example: (1) making massive state investment in domestic semiconductor firms like SMIC (Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation), (2) accelerating development of Chinese operating systems, and (3) building massive data centers to support its artificial intelligence (AI) programs.

Resource Security. China has pursued long-term contracts and investments in critical resources: (1) rare earth mining dominance, including

long-term mining concessions in Africa (cobalt, lithium), (2) agricultural land and energy investments in Africa and Latin America, and (3) energy partnerships with Russia, the Middle East, and Central Asia. This ensures stable access to inputs essential for industrial production.

Circumventing Bretton Woods Rules. China has established or strengthened institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and expanded the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. These provide alternatives to Western-led institutions while embedding China at the center. China's approach is not isolationist; it is system-building—creating a global network that increases agency through strategic autonomy.

“As China's star rose, Beijing determined that it faced a short window of strategic opportunity to pull ahead of a distracted West – putting it on a collision course with a dysfunctional but belligerent United States and showing the world definitively, the kind of superpower China was set to become.”

Bethany Allen, *Beijing Rules: How China Weaponized Its Economy to Confront the World* (2023)

China's Future: Too Big to Fail. Using GDP (PPP) China now has the world's largest economy. China's economy is large enough that it “creates its own weather,” so the middle income trap will not constrain further growth, as it does in the case of smaller economies. China's long-term trajectory remains positive, but it faces three significant challenges: 1) a declining and rapidly aging population, 2) the impact of global warming, and 3) the partial de-globalization of the world's economy.

“The greatest threat to the transatlantic alliance [is] not its external enemies, but the ongoing disintegration of our alliance.

Donald Tusk, Poland's Prime Minister, *The Independent*. May 3, 2026

4.2.2 Make America Great Again. The USA benefited from its role as the architect of the post–World War II, capitalist order. However, by 2016 a growing part of both the American elite and the broader electorate were disillusioned with globalization. As a result, Donald Trump's

“Make America Great Again” (MAGA) slogan resonated strongly with enough of the electorate to propel him into the White House. It represents a dramatic pivot from international leadership to strategic autonomy. The United States is not retreating into isolation, but it is reducing its commitments to global order. Strategic autonomy is not isolationism. It prioritizes resilience in an increasingly anarchic (lack of hierarchy) environment. It is a combination of battleship and lifeboat in the world’s increasingly troubled waters.

“From this day forward, it’s going to be only America first. America first. Every decision on trade, on taxes, on immigration, on foreign affairs will be made to benefit American workers and American families Protection will lead to greater prosperity and strength.”

Donald Trump, First Inaugural Address (January 20, 2017)

Economic Nationalism. The MAGA movement advocates re-shoring manufacturing, protecting domestic industry through tariffs, and reducing reliance on global supply chains—especially those involving political or economic rivals. The COVID-19 pandemic and its supply chain disruptions accelerated bipartisan support for economic nationalism and strategic autonomy.

Industrial Policy and Supply Chain Resilience. A major example of economic nationalism is the *CHIPS and Science Act* (2022), which allocated \$280 billion dollars to domestic semiconductor manufacturing and scientific research. This will reduce reliance on a global supply chain, especially in East Asia, to increase its control of critical technologies. Similarly, the *Inflation Reduction Act* (2022) included incentives for domestic clean energy production and electric vehicle manufacture, in many cases by requiring North American sourcing.³⁹

“America’s decision to abandon the role it has played for more than seven decades thus marks a turning point. The liberal world order cannot survive on its own, because others either lack the interest or the means

³⁹ Both of these programs were enacted during the term of President Biden. Strategic autonomy is bipartisan.

to sustain it. The result will be a world that is less free, less prosperous, and less peaceful, for Americans and others alike.”

Richard N. Haass, President, Council on
Foreign Relations (March 21, 2018)

The abandonment of liberal internationalism is not absolute, but it is transformative. The United States has increasingly prioritized domestic resilience, industrial policy, and technological sovereignty. Policies aimed at re-shoring manufacturing, restricting technology transfer, and securing supply chains—especially in semiconductors, energy, and pharmaceuticals—reflect a growing concern with vulnerability to external shocks. It is a policy of strategic autonomy.

Collective Security. Simultaneously, there has been a relative decline in the willingness of the USA to provide global common goods. Participation in large-scale humanitarian efforts, multilateral institution-building, and long-term development financing has become more conditional, episodic, or politically contested. The implicit logic is that global policies must now support domestic priorities, even if this reduces global stability.

“For the Trump administration, acknowledging multi-polarity doesn’t mean accepting limits on American power. Instead, it serves as a justification for abandoning the traditional U.S. conception of global leadership and the responsibilities that come with it.

C. Raja Mohan, Motwani-Jadeja Institute of American Studies.
The Multipolar Delusion. Foreign Affairs March/April 2026

MAGA orthodoxy demands that NATO allies and other security partners shoulder more of the burden. It is skeptical of institutions like the UN, WTO, and NATO. In its most aggressive forms, this strategy undermines institutions that are perceived as failing to acknowledge American exceptionalism. The mainstream Democrats echo, though more softly, the same message of strategic autonomy.

It is hard for liberal institutionalist to argue for global USA leadership in an increasingly chaotic and dangerous world. In Asia, North Korean

missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads as far as the mainland USA. Taiwan's contested future and South China Sea confrontations could lead to a military confrontation with China. The cost of leadership has increased and the benefits have not.

In Europe, the invasion of Ukraine raised the cost of NATO leadership. In the Middle East, the 2023 Hamas attack on Israeli and Israel's devastating response increased domestic discord and increased tension with European governments. The cost of the 2025–2026 precautionary attacks to prevent a nuclear armed Iran are being borne, in large measure, by USA taxpayers whose interests and concerns are overwhelmingly domestic.

The primary existential threat to the USA is a nuclear war and that threat is largely a function of the USA being “chain ganged” to allies who are both economic competitors and widely perceived to be free-riders in terms of collective security benefits. These heritage alliances are self-imposed obligations which can, and almost surely will, dissolve in the face of a deteriorating global order in the second quarter of the 21st Century.

“Globalization was always dependent upon the Americans’ commitment to the Global Order and that Order hasn’t served Americas’ strategic interests since the Berlin Wall fell in 1989.”

Peter Zeihan, *The End of the World is Just the Beginning: Mapping the Collapse of Globalization* (2022)

Reduced Provision of Global Public Goods. Historically, the U.S. Navy ensured global maritime security and USA funded large-scale development and humanitarian programs. While these have not disappeared, there has been both severe contraction and politicization. Examples include: (1) fluctuating commitments to organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) during and after the COVID-19 pandemic, (2) reduced emphasis on long-term nation-building projects after withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, (3) increasing conditionality in foreign aid, often tied to strategic goals rather than universal development goals, (4) limited participation in global environmental initiatives,

and (5) reducing and reallocating development aid to advance strategic objectives.

Weaponization of Interdependence. The U.S. has leveraged its centrality in the global financial architecture to exert financial pressure on geopolitical opponents, including: (1) financial sanctions, including asset freezes and the denial of access to the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) secure messaging network,⁴⁰ (2) export limits on advanced AI chips and lithography equipment, to constrain China's technological rise, and (3) pressure on NATO members, East Asian allies (Japan and Korea), Indo-Pacific partners such as AUKUS, and the Quad members to redistribute security costs.

Has Atlas Shrugged? Containing the USSR during the Cold War was difficult, dangerous and expensive, but the closed communist economies limited competition to the military sphere. The Cold War's alliances, spheres of influence, and areas of competition were clear and this reduced the cost of global leadership. In a world that doesn't support USA hegemony, the cost of maintaining a world order is increasing and the offsetting benefits are decreasing.

Will Atlas shrug and drop its global leadership burden? Are the USA's military allies, who are also economic competitors willing to share the burden sufficiently so as to make global leadership by the USA cost effective? Even if they are willing to belatedly spend more on defense, is the USA willing to prioritize its relations with Europe. The tariffs imposed by President Trump strongly point to a new economic reality in which Europe will need to fend for itself in a world where empire-states are less interested in alliances than in strategic autonomy.

4.2.3 Make Russia Great Again. In 2005, over a decade before President Trump was elected on his promise to "Make America Great Again," President Vladimir Putin called the collapse of the USSR "the greatest

⁴⁰ The G-10 central banks oversee SWIFT, which does not process transactions for heavily sanctioned nations like Russia, Iran, or Belarus.

geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th Century.” Putin is committed to the restoration of Russia’s 19th and 20th Century status as a Great Power.

Russia’s Demographic Problem. Russia suffered 3 million excess deaths (military and civilian) in World War I, as many as 7 million excess deaths in the Russian Civil War (1917–1923), and between 25 and 27 million excess deaths in World War II. Stalin’s forced industrialization and enforcement of communist orthodoxy killed another 9 million.⁴¹ Cumulative excess deaths approaching 50 million, in the first half of the 20th Century, wiped out the gains from Russia’s final decades of relatively high fertility.

After the 1991 collapse of the USSR, as a result of the economic turmoil created by the “shock therapy” transition to a market economy, unemployment and inflation impoverished a large part of the population. As a result, Russia’s birthrate collapsed. By 2022, the number of Russian babies born had fallen from 2.5 million to 1.3 million – a drop of 48%.

When the USSR collapsed in 1991, Russia had a population of 148,394,000. Thirty year later, in 2021, the population was 145,864,296 – a 2% decline. In comparison, over the same thirty year period, the population of the USA increased 30% from 253,500,000 to 331,900,000.

“Already there is a strong ethnonationalist current in Russian politics Blaming Russia’s problems on Muslims, Central Asian migrants, and corrupt elites, Russian ethnonationalists promise to Make Russia Great Again

J. McGlynn and K. Shamier *The Return of Ethnonationalism*, Foreign Affairs August 17, 2024

Russia’s decline in births has been offset by the annual arrival of around 4.5 million immigrants. Immigration is overwhelmingly coming from

⁴¹ This includes about 1.7 million deaths in the Gulag system (1931–1953) 400,000 deaths from the destruction of the Kulaks (1929–1934), and up to 400,000 deaths during Stalin’s Great Purge. These 2.5+ million victims combined with about 6 million excess Russian deaths during the 1932–1933 famine may exceed 9 million excess deaths

five non-Slavic “stans” which were formerly part of the USSR (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan). Immigration from the former Soviet Central Asian Republics is coupled with an emigration of ethnic Russians. So, in addition to loosing population, Russia is becoming less Slavic.

An Irredentist War to Gain Slavic Population. The granting of EU and NATO membership to its former Warsaw Pact allies made European democracy increasingly threatening to Russia. The Ukrainian invasions in 2014 and 2022 were a gamble by an empire-state in relative decline. The successful annexation of Crimea in 2014 led to hubristic overreaching in 2022. After more than four years, the outcome of the war in Ukraine is undecided. Any Russian success will be a pyrrhic victory.

Russia’s demographic decline makes it is easier to understand Putin’s 2022 invasions of Ukraine.⁴² Putin has acknowledged that Russia’s demographic decline haunts him. Thus, anticipating only a one or two week military jaunt to Kyiv, Putin believed that Russia would add 40 million new Slavic citizens: a 28% increase in Russia’s population and a larger percentage increase in its Slavic population. But, instead of a demographic windfall, by May 2026, Russia had suffered $\approx$ 1.2 million military casualties of which $\approx$ 500,000 were deaths. Casualties are growing by around one thousand per day.⁴³

To avoid the draft, political repression and economic instability, hundreds of thousands of Russians fled the country following the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The total of 800 thousand is the largest exodus since the Bolshevik Revolution. Many of these expatriates are highly skilled. It is often their skills that make relocation feasible. As both its military casualties and war refugees are largely members of the already small child bearing cohort, the knock-on effect will be more significant

⁴² There are 9 people per square kilometer in the Russian Federation. There are almost 70 Ukrainians per square kilometer in Ukraine.

⁴³ Casualty figures are from a speech given by the Director of the British Government Communication HQ on May 27, 2026.

than the raw numbers suggest. As of this writing, there is no end in sight to the war in Ukraine

“The illegitimate restrictions imposed on the Russian economy may indeed have a negative impact on it in the medium term.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin, TASS March 29, 2023

Even winning the war in Ukraine would create problems for Russia. According to a poll by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology, in July of 2023, over 95% of Ukrainians support joining the European Union and over 90% favor joining NATO. Unsurprisingly, only 2.2% of Ukrainians have a favorable opinion of Russia. Trying to incorporate 40 million angry and resentful Ukrainians into an empire-state in relative decline will stress, not strengthen, Russia – especially as many of those Ukrainians now have military training, combat experience and access to arms. Irrespective of any eventual acquisition of territory, Russia has already lost the war with Ukraine.

Russia's Economic Problems. Since its days as a fur trader, Russian exports have relied on its natural resource. The exception was Stalin's industrialization between 1929 and 1941. That decade provided Russia with the industrial capacity it needed for World War II, but at great human cost. Five decades later, when the USSR imploded in 1991, Russia's industrial infrastructure was so out of date that much of it was simply abandoned in the shift to market capitalism

Russia's economy is not comparable in size to either of the other empire-states' economies. Even using PPP, Russia provides only 3.1% of global GDP. This is little more than Germany's 2.9%. China is first at 17.3% and is followed by the USA at 15.6%. Russia's GDP was 20% lower in 2023 (1.86 trillion USD) than it was in 2013 (2.29 trillion USD).

Positioned between 450 million EU citizens and 1.4 billion Chinese citizens, with Japan and South Korea near its Eastern border, Russia is surrounded by more advanced industrial economies. Under these

circumstances it has little chance of becoming a competitive manufacturing center except in military hardware that is consumed in the Ukraine war.

As global warming forces a shift to alternative energy sources or, in the absence of a robust response to global warming, leads to the collapse of governments and economies across the globe, the oil and gas wells in Russia must eventually go the way of whale oil and beaver pelts.⁴⁴ Russia's economy will contract proportionately. As, even before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, fossil fuel revenues fund over one-third of Russia's national budget, the future loss of tax revenue from declining oil and gas exports will require Russia to substantially increase taxes on other businesses and on its citizens. This will further depress economic growth.

Militarization of the State and Economy. A significant portion of Russia's industrial capacity is now directed toward defense production. This creates: (1) short-term resilience in sustaining conflict, and (2) long-term risks of economic distortion and stagnation. It reduces consumer spending, private capital formation, and domestic investment, thereby reducing Russia's economic vitality and future GDP growth.

Energy Exports. Following Western sanctions, Russia redirected energy exports toward Asia, particularly China and India. Projects like the Power of Siberia pipeline exemplify this pivot but, to a less favorable and more limited market.

Fragile Alliances. A further limit on Russian revisionism is that nobody really wants to help it. China finds Russia's revisionism useful, as it pits the other two empire-states against each other and makes Russia increasingly reliant of China. The current Sino-Russian "friendship without limit" is hyperbolic. China does not want a strong Russian neighbor.

Global warming will reduce China's capacity to feed its population. As this will also be true for much of the rest of the world, importing

⁴⁴ The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that the global demand for fossil fuels will peak by 2030.

food in the quantities required will become more difficult and expensive. China will want, perhaps need, to acquire additional farmland.⁴⁵ To do so, it may seek to reverse the mid-19th Century “unequal treaty” with Russia that transferred the 600,000 square kilometers of Northern Manchuria to Russia (the Treaty of Aigun and the Convention of Peking)

Russia took advantage of China’s weakness during the Second Opium War to occupy Northern Manchuria. In 1991, as the USSR collapsed, Russia warned China that an attempt to recover Northern Manchuria would be met with a nuclear response. At the time, the USSR controlled 45,000 nuclear weapons. Today, Russia has fewer than 6,000 of which 1,674 are deployed. In 1991, China had 232 nuclear weapons. It now has over 500 and is expected, by 2030, to have deployed more than 1,000. Will recovering 600,000 square miles of territory become, like Taiwan, a *cause célèbre* at mid-century?

But Russia is unlikely to prosper in the coming decades and is likely to become increasingly dependent on China. China, however, has far more to gain from a weak Russian client state than from a strong Russian neighbor.

“The invasion of Ukraine was an epic blunder. Before it, Putin had options. He had a hedging position with the West; influence bought with gas. Now he is an indicted war criminal running a glorified petrol station with a side hustle in leasing mercenaries to warlords.”

Rafael Behr, *Western Democracy is Weaker in this New Cold War Than it was in the First One*, The Guardian, March 22, 2025

A Spartan Hedgehog. The ancient Greek poet Archilochus noted: “The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.” Russia is a hedgehog. From painful experience, it knows that it has the

⁴⁵ China is purchasing or leasing farmland globally, especially in Africa. It controls 186,000 square miles on the African continent. However, in the event of global warming induced food shortages, China could lose effective control of crop selection, production, and export.

capacity to endure and persevere. Russia's patriotic and stoic population absorbed an invasion by Napoleon's troops in 1812 and endured the Siege of Leningrad, from September of 1941 to January of 1943. Russia's ability to withstand a conventional invasion, combined with its formidable nuclear arsenal, gives it the freedom to challenge the *status quo* without running an existential risk. But, Russia does not have the ability to establish strategic autonomy.

4.2.4 Make India Great Again. The case of India differs from the three empire-states. India is neither as linguistically coherent nor as developed as the three empire-states. However, India is positioning to become the fourth empire-state,⁴⁶ and like the others it will also seek strategic autonomy. For the moment, it is more focused on replacing China as the global workshop. This requires a globalization strategy, combined with its historical non-alignment, but including also elements of the emerging shift of the empire-states to strategic autonomy.

India's large population provides both a challenge and an opportunity. It has a vast labor force, for industrialization, and a large domestic market that can help it to sustain growth in an increasingly fractured world order. However, infrastructure gaps and inequality remain constraints on rapid transformation. It is also at great risk that AI and robotics will undermining its ability to benefit from its labor supply.

India's priorities are fundamentally domestic: industrialization, infrastructure development, technological advancement, and poverty reduction. Policies such as "Make in India" and efforts to expand domestic manufacturing capacity reflect a desire for economic self-reliance, even as India remains integrated into global markets.

At the same time, India has maintained a policy of strategic non-alignment, balancing without committing. It participates in Western-aligned initiatives (such as the Quad) while also maintaining relationships with

⁴⁶ Its is trying to compensate for its lack of linguistic congruence by using Hindutva hegemony for greater coherence. This is likely to backfire.

Russia and engaging in Global South initiatives. This flexibility allows India to maximize options while minimizing constraints. India's path to greatness is therefore incremental and pragmatic. It is less about reshaping the global order in the near term and more about building the internal capacity necessary to compete with the empire-states.

Domestic Industrialization and Self-Reliance. The “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (self-reliant India) initiative promotes domestic production including: (1) production-linked incentives (PLIs) for sectors like electronics, pharmaceuticals, and solar energy, (2) expansion of domestic defense manufacturing to reduce reliance on imports, (3) efforts to attract multinational firms (e.g., Apple suppliers) as alternatives to China, (4) infrastructure development for internal connectivity, like the Bharatmala highway network and Sagarmala port modernization, (5) rapid expansion of digital infrastructure through systems like Aadhaar (identity) and UPI (payments), and the India Stack creating a domestic economic backbone, and (6) a scalable domestic market infrastructure to reduced reliance on foreign platforms with a model that can be exported to other developing countries, enhancing influence.

India has increased imports of discounted Russian oil while simultaneously investing in renewable energy and Middle Eastern partnerships. This diversification reduces vulnerability.

India participates in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with the U.S., Japan, and Australia, while maintaining defense ties with Russia and engaging in BRICS+. This reflects a deliberate strategy of multi-alignment, preserving autonomy while extracting benefits from multiple partners. It is “Make India Great Again” in conformance with empire-state strategic autonomy.

Part III

The Linguistic Foundation of Political Order

“The contemporary national state, based on a common language, shared culture, and defined by territories... is a historically conditioned device for adjusting recognition markers to facilitate the intensification of economic and social cooperation in a highly competitive international system.”

R.D. Masters, *On the evolution of political communities: a paradox of Eastern and Western Europe in the 1990s*, in *Human Nature and the New Europe*, Ed. M.T.McGuire, (1993)

Chapter 5

Monolingual Rationalization: Europe’s Nation-State Model

While only marginally relevant to global order, except when destabilizing a region or as part of an alliance, nation-states are numerous. Nation-state prevalence, popularity, and resilience are attributable to the strength of national identities, supported by linguistic congruence. French speak French. Germans speak German. The ideal form of a nation-state is “one-nation, one-state, one-language.” The name of a country is often the same as that of its language, as a quick look at a map of Eurasia shows.⁴⁷

Two Paths. There were two paths to achieving monolingual congruence in Europe: (1) state-first, which started with an existing state and established linguistic congruence by privileging a single language, and (2) nation-first, which drew a state boundary around an ethnolinguistic nation, real or imagined, and added the institutions of governance. In the second case, the circumscribed population was either monolingual or part

⁴⁷ Colonialism in the Southern and Western hemispheres is reflected in the divergence between a country’s name and the name of its dominant language.

of a language continuum. If dialect diversity persisted, as in Germany, there was uniformity in the written language. In both cases, monolingual congruence aligned a language community (demos-nation) with the institutions of governance (polity-state).

“The strong European states that emerged in the nineteenth century were built around a national principle that made language and ethnicity the core of national identity.”

Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay* (2014)

5.1 State-First Monolingual Congruence

The borders of many European states reflect a long dead monarch’s ability to project sufficient military power to hold the territory acquired by conquest, inheritance, and dowry. If natural barriers were significant, they were useful as defensive structures for polities on both sides and state borders generally conformed. As a result, today’s nation-state borders often fail to reflect the distribution of language communities. For example, because both the Catalan and Basque communities cross the Pyrenees, each is a minority community in both France and Spain.

France (Top-Down). In monarchies, language use only concerned the elite and language rationalization often began as a project of the literate minority to standardize a vernacular language, in order to establish a standard for printing books. For example, the Académie Française began as a group of distinguished French citizens who were interested in establishing standards for printing in French. It was a group of nine individuals (now 40) who met at the residence (salon) of Valentin Courant, a councillor and secretary to the King.

In 1637 the Académie Française was formalized and co-opted by Cardinal Richelieu, first minister of King Louis XIII. It was tasked with creating “rules to our language, to render it capable of treating the arts and sciences” and regulating its spelling and grammar. Cardinal Richelieu’s objective was to consolidate the king’s power by establishing a bureaucracy

of lesser nobles and literate commoners (intendants) that used a standardized vernacular. Bureaucrats were geographically rotated to reduce provincial influence on them. A dependent bureaucracy that used a vernacular language diminished the power of both the high nobility and the clergy.⁴⁸

“The French Revolution had, moreover, unleashed not just demands for popular political participation but also a new form of identity by which a shared language and culture would be the central source of unity for the new democratic public.”

Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay* (2014)

Revolutionary France. The revolution of 1789 changed France dramatically. The adoption of a language rationalization policy of monolingualism was one of its most radical changes. A common language was deemed essential because the revolutionary government needed to communicate its authority and political message to each citizen. Minority language communities were often rural, religious, and politically conservative. These qualities made them ripe for counter-revolutionary efforts. Thus, the continued use of a regional language or dialect became a marker for failing to fully embrace the revolutionary order. For the first time, the language used by the people mattered to the government.

“One can assure without exaggeration that at least 6 million Frenchmen, especially in the provinces, are ignorant of the national language; that an equal number is incapable of holding a sustained conversation; that in the last analysis the number of those who speak it fluently does not exceed 3 million”

Abbé Henri Grégoire, *Report to the National Convention* (1794)⁴⁹

⁴⁸ The Ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts, in 1539, required the use of French in all legal acts, notarized contracts and official legislation. The intent, *inter alia*, was to make the church produced documents (birth, confirmation and death records) more available and comprehensible to the general public. The target was Latin, not regional languages and dialects.

⁴⁹ The quotation from Abbé Henri Grégoire is well known. Less well known is that he added: “... the important thing is that all Frenchmen understand and speak the

In the first week of June 1794 an important document was submitted to the revolutionary government by Abbé Henri Grégoire, who had been in charge of the 1790 census. Its descriptive title was *On the Necessity and Means for Eliminating Dialects and Universalizing the Use of the French Language*. The same year, laws were enacted to require the use of standard French (Francien or the Île-de-France dialect) in public affairs.

Napoleonic France. The territorial monolingualism that the revolution established in principle, but lacked the time and resources to implement, was subsequently advanced by Napoleon's military campaigns. The Napoleonic Wars showed that a monolingual army performed better in combat. Speaking a common language avoided misunderstanding orders. Patriotism, based in part on an ethnolinguistic identity, also improved military performance. While Napoleon's army units were initially composed of soldiers from a single area and some units even used a regional language or a nonstandard dialect, replacements were assigned as needed and without regard to the dialect spoken by the replacement or by the unit to which they were assigned. As the campaigns consumed soldiers, all units became more reliant on standard French.

"Of all state simplifications, then, the imposition of a single, official language may be the most powerful, and it is the precondition of many other simplifications."

James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State* (1998)

Modern France. From the 1880s, France mandated primary school education in standard French. The effects of the printing press, Cardinal Richelieu, the French revolution, Napoleonic conscription, and universal education combined to complete the transition from the *laissez-faire* multilingualism of feudalism to the monolingualism of the modern French nation-state.

Precisely how long it took for France to become monolingual is difficult to establish. After the sobering revelation of the 1790 census, questions

national language *without forgetting their individual dialects*." (Emphasis added.) He was an early advocate of what this essay calls complementary bilingualism.

on language usage were dropped from subsequent surveys. However long it took, the results are clear: the French have great affection for their language. For example, to blunt the influence of the 1992 *European Charter of Regional or Minority Languages*, France amended Article 2 of its constitution to specify the following: “The language of the Republic is French.” Not that there was any doubt, but the constitutional designation of a single official language impeded efforts to establish minority language rights.⁵⁰

England (Bottom-Up). Establishing state-first congruence in Great Britain proceeded differently. Linguistic congruence in France was top-down. English congruence was bottom-up. English became hegemonic because the Anglo-Norman feudal aristocracy needed to align its identity with the masses, to win their full support for campaigns to seize territory in France during the Hundred Years’ War (1337–1453). A milestone in the ascendancy of English came in 1362, when Edward III broke a 300-year tradition of using French, dating back to the Norman Conquest, and addressed Parliament in English.

Bottom-up linguistic congruence was easier than trying to impose the Norman French language, especially as there was no educational infrastructure to support such an overwhelming enterprise. While this improved England’s capacity to raise an army and seize territory, the elite in England and France lost their common language and this made it more difficult for the English throne to incorporate French territory. England and France were antagonistically intertwined for over seven centuries, from the Norman invasion of England in 1066 until 1811, when the British monarchs finally renounced all territorial claims in France.

⁵⁰ The president of France signed the *European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages* in 1999. However, its ratification was rejected by the legislative branch. Ratification of the charter was rejected a second time in 2015. If ratified it would apply to at least seven languages (Basque, Breton, Catalan, Corsican, Dutch, German and Occitan.) The opposition to ratification alleged that it would apply to 24 European languages and 51 overseas languages. On April 8, 2021, the French National Assembly passed a law to allow schools to teach in a minority language for the majority of the school day. The French Constitutional Council found it unconstitutional.

“The choice of language and the use to which language is put are central to a people’s definition of themselves in relation to their natural and social environment, indeed in relation to the entire universe.”

Ngugi wa Thiong’o, *Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature* (1986)

5.2 Nation-First Monolingual Congruence

The second path to creating a nation-state drew a state boundary around a real or imagined nation, which was identified by the use of a common language or mutually comprehensible dialects. The nation-first model is exemplified by Germany.

Germany (Aggregation). Speakers of German dialects formed the core of the Holy Roman Empire (HRE)—which, however, included substantial populations that spoke dialects of Czech, Slovene, Dutch, Polish, Italian, and French. Starting with a multilingual empire composed of several hundred mini-states, considerable effort was required to create a monolingual German nation-state.

In the century after the Reformation of 1517, Lutheranism became the official religion in many of the northern polities of the HRE. Roman Catholicism remained dominant in the South, so a religious fault line emerged. Eventually, a mix of religious intolerance and balance of power necessity (or imbalance aspirations) led to Europe’s Thirty Years’ War (1618–48) and the death of at least one-third of the HRE’s German-speaking population. When the slaughter ended in 1648, the Peace of Westphalia expanded religious liberty and established exclusive sovereignty within defined state borders as well as the *de jure* equality of states under international law. States were no longer the private property of monarchs. The Peace of Westphalia was a search for a more stable order and the beginning of the European nation-state system.

The Peace of Westphalia loosened Austrian control in the HRE and allowed Prussia to emerge as a rival for Austria’s historic leadership of

the German-speaking people. The years between the Peace of Westphalia and the French Revolution saw Prussia assert itself in military conflicts, including the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48) and the Seven Years' War (1756–63). In both cases, Prussia was part of the winning coalition and Austria was part of the losing coalition.

Napoleonic Consolidation. The multilingual HRE was the primary victim of the Napoleonic Wars. In 1805, at the Battle of Austerlitz, Napoleon's forces (including some defecting German states) defeated the HRE. The following year, Emperor Francis II abdicated. Napoleon replaced the HRE with the Confederated States of the Rhine and, in the process, reduced the number of government units in the HRE from over 300 to 16.⁵¹

The Confederated States of the Rhine only lasted for a decade. After Napoleon's disastrous winter campaign in Russia, confederation members began switching sides to become part of the victorious coalition that would defeat Napoleon. At the Congress of Vienna (1814–15), in establishing a post war order, the leaders of the coalition did not want to re-establish the HRE, as German speakers were showing unmistakable signs of their potential collective power. The goal of the Congress of Vienna was a European balance in which no country was powerful enough to act unilaterally. The Vienna Treaties established a German Confederation of 39 predominantly German speaking states. It had only one institution of confederation governance, an assembly of the envoys of the nobility, called the Bundestag, with limited jurisdiction and a requirement of unanimity. Given the competition between Austria and Prussia, the Bundestag's design rendered it incapable of initiating reforms.

Influenced by the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and Napoleonic reforms, some states in the German Confederation drafted constitutions that included civil rights. There was a conservative backlash in the form of the Carlsbad Decrees, issued in 1819 by the Bundestag. The liberal reaction to

⁵¹ It later increased to 36. Ironically, Napoleon's consolidation benefited Germany more than he ever benefited France. Napoleon also did more for the USA, with the Louisiana Purchase, than he did for France. His birthday should be celebrated, with appropriate irony, in both Germany and the USA.

the Carlsbad Decrees was decades of sporadic unrest in various parts of the German Confederation. Although not immediately successful, the unrest initiated an evolution in the public attitude. The nobility lost popular support and subjects across Europe began to think of themselves as citizens. This culminated, 30 years later, in the 1848 Springtime of the Nations.

Kleindeutschland. Could the speakers of different German dialects, divided among dozens of governments, forge a single nation-state? An early proponent of an affirmative answer was the German philosopher Johann Fichte (1762–1814), who championed the idea that states must be ethnolinguistic communities. His belief in the imperative of a German-speaking nation-state was ardently and eloquently expressed in an influential 1808 book, *Address to the German Nation*, written while Napoleon's troops occupied Berlin.

“Those who speak the same language are joined to each other by a multitude of invisible bonds ... they understand each other and have the power of continuing to make themselves understood more and more clearly; they belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable whole.”

Establishing a German nation-state required a resolution of the rivalry between German-speaking Prussia and multilingual Austria. Led by Prussia but excluding Austria, most of the German Confederation formed a German speaking customs union in 1834 (*Zollverein*).⁵²

Springtime of the Nations. In 1848 a series of liberal revolutions broke out across Europe, including France, Austria, and the German Confederation. In the German Confederation, the revolution stressed both German nationalism and opposition to autocratic rule. The middle class demanded political rights with a lower property qualification, liberal policies, German unity, and a constitutional monarchy. The working class demanded better working conditions and universal male suffrage.

⁵² This is an interesting parallel with the establishment of the EU customs union in 1968. The difference, of course, is the linguistic congruence in the case of the Zollverein. Congruence within the *Zollverein* presaged the subsequent political unity of Germany. The lack of linguistic congruence may presage an EU failure and has certainly inhibited “ever closer union.”

The combined strength of the middle class and working class succeeded in replacing the Bundestag with a parliament. A parliamentary compromise was reached, after 230 sessions, but it was between the conservatives and middle-class. It rejected the goals of the working class. The compromise was expressed in the Imperial Constitution of 1849. It provided for a bicameral parliament, adopted the “Lesser Germany” (Kleindeutschland) model, and established a constitutional monarchy. A provisional power replaced the German Confederation and the title of Emperor was offered to the Prussian King, Frederick Wilhelm IV. It was anticipated that he would accept the offer, as the proposed constitution decided the competition with Austria in favor of Prussia.

Under intense pressure from the nobility and much to the surprise of the middle-class, Frederick Wilhelm IV declined the crown because of the constitution’s limits on hereditary power and because it would require a separate constitution for Austria. Friedrich Wilhelm IV dreamed of a reconstituted HRE, not a Kleindeutschland. This sent a clear signal to the conservatives that their coalition with the middle-class should be abrogated. The earlier split, when the middle-class abandoned their working-class allies, now showed its significance. Division of the opposition permitted the Prussian military to suppress both the more radical working class and the liberal middle class. The Frankfurt Parliament was dissolved. The German Confederation was reestablished.

“We cannot conceal the fact that the whole German question is a simple alternative between Prussia and Austria ... and the Prussian monarchy is now wholly German, that that of Austria cannot be.”

Johann Gustav Droysen, Speech to the Frankfurt Assembly (1848)

Bismarck’s Germany. In the decade after becoming the Minister President and Foreign Minister of Prussia in 1862, Otto von Bismarck engineered and won three wars that united a monolingual Germany. Bismarck’s first war, in 1864, was jointly with Austria against Denmark over control of Schleswig-Holstein-Lauenburg. The joint victory over Denmark led to the Gastein Convention and the administration of the acquired territory by Prussia and Austria. Prussian was given control of Schleswig and

Lauenburg. Austrian was given control of Holstein. However, Holstein was sandwiched between Prussian Schleswig to the north and Prussian Lauenburg to the south.⁵³ The relationship of the acquired territories to the German Confederation was not established. Joint governance by the two rivals was inevitably contentious. This may have been intentional on Bismarck's part and, unsurprisingly, led to Bismarck's second war.

In 1866, Prussia asserted that an Austrian attempt to reconcile the bilateral Gastein Convention with the rules of the German Confederation was a breach of the agreement. Using this pretense, Prussian troops entered Holstein, which led to the outbreak of the Austro-Prussian War. Prussia's victory after only seven weeks of fighting established it as the leader of the German-speaking people.⁵⁴ In 1867, the German Confederation was replaced by a Northern German Confederation under Prussian leadership.

The third and final war of German unification was against France, in 1870, to bring the independent German-speaking states of Baden, Württemberg, Bavaria, and Hesse-Darmstadt into the Prussian fold.⁵⁵ During the shelling of Paris, with victory imminent, King Wilhelm I of Prussia was crowned Emperor of Germany by the German Princes assembled at Versailles. The unification of Germany, based on the Lesser Germany model, established a monolingual nation-state using the nation-first model. The German nation-state was only slightly over-inclusive. It included French speakers in Metz-Château-Salins, Danish speakers in Northern Schleswig, and Polish speakers in Eastern Prussia.

⁵³ Prussia was also given transit rights through Holstein to Schleswig and the right to build a canal and a telegraph-line through Holstein. The agreement also established a Navy for the German Confederation and designated its headquarters at Kiel, in Holstein, but under Prussian sovereignty. In short, it was a mess.

⁵⁴ This war also allowed Italy to free Venice from Austrian control and add it to the Kingdom of Italy.

⁵⁵ This war also allowed Italy to incorporate the Papal states, which had been under the protection of France. The war simultaneously completed German unification and Italian unification.

Czechia and Slovakia: (Decomposition). The *aggregation* process used to create Germany is not the only nation-first method. The *decomposition* of a multilingual polity can also produce monolingual states. Among the most recent nation-first creations of monolingual nation-states in Europe, except for the still-evolving organization of the Balkans, was the 1993 breakup of Czechoslovakia into Czechia and Slovakia. The 1968 Constitutional Act on the Czechoslovak Federation set the border for future dissolution. A quarter of a century later, after the fall of communism, a natural line of separation was already set by the constitutionally established internal ethnolinguistic boundary. The split is interesting because, at the moment of the dissolution, it seemed to happen spontaneously. The political class chose to divide the country along a linguistic fault line and the citizens responded with indifferent acceptance.⁵⁶

The respective languages of the two new nation-states are Czech and Slovak, both of which are West Slavic languages and can be mutually intelligible in mundane daily conversations. The Czech language is now prescriptively regulated by the Institute of the Czech Language, and the Slovak language is similarly regulated by the Ľudovít Štúr Institute of Linguistics of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. Given the different identities and regulatory bodies, further divergence is inevitable.

“A language is the place from where we see the world and where we draw the limits of our thinking and feeling.”

Vergílio António Ferreira, Portuguese author and professor (1916–1996)

5.3 Europe’s Unexceptional Exceptions

Not all of Europe’s nation-states achieved the ideal of combining one nation, one state, and one language. Europe’s three *unexceptional* exceptions

⁵⁶ The history of Czechoslovakia over a longer timespan shows that coercion and violence were required. The violent expulsion of German speakers after World War II is the most famous example.

are Luxembourg, Switzerland, and Belgium.⁵⁷ It is not a coincidence that all three are neighbors on the fault line between Europe's Germanic and Romance language communities.

Despite the linguistic fault line running through them, all three have achieved *de facto* linguistic congruence. They are exceptions because they are multilingual but unexceptional because they have monolingual congruence below the surface (Switzerland and Belgium) or the linguistic congruence of a unitary trilingual community (Luxembourg). Their significance lies not in their overall multilingualism but in the fact that they still achieved congruence between unitary language communities and the institutions of their governance.

5.3.1 Luxembourg: Equal Sets Congruence. With a population of approximately 600,000 and an area of 2600 km², tiny Luxembourg is a case in which three languages (German, French, and Luxembourgish) establish trilingual linguistic congruence. In mathematical terms, Luxembourg's language communities are equal sets.⁵⁸ There is still the essential congruence between a single (trilingual) demos and a single polity.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Other EU member states also have more than one official language. Ireland has English and Irish, but 93% consider English their mother tongue. In Malta, 97% consider Maltese their mother tongue, although English is also an official language. In Finland, only 5% consider co-official Swedish their mother tongue. In Cyprus, the North speaks Turkish and the South speaks Greek. In each part there is congruence with a single language and, due to Turkey's invasion in 1974, very little cross community contact.

⁵⁸ Luxembourg citizens are trilingual in the same three languages: Luxembourgish 90% (77% native and 13% second language), German 92% (4% native and 88% second language), and French 96% (6% native and 90% second language). Thus, Luxembourg has linguistic congruence.

⁵⁹ A similar situation is found in Paraguay, where 90% of the population speaks Guarani and 87% speaks Spanish. This translates to 73% bilingualism. Unlike wealthy Luxembourg, Paraguay ranks in the lower half of the world's countries on the basis of per capita GDP. Paraguay shows that complementary bilingualism is not just for affluent countries.

Luxembourg is instructive because it demonstrates that a country can achieve trilingual congruence. Bilingual congruence, with only one additional language, will be 50% easier. Here is some relevant background:

(1) Luxembourgish (Letzeburgesch) is the primary oral language. It is the default choice in less formal situations, such as daily encounters, emails, and text messaging. Its unified written form was first recognized in 1975. Luxembourgish had no official status until 1984, when it became the sole *national* language. Luxembourgish invokes a Luxembourg identity. This reflects a desire to be distinguished from the neighboring giants, France and Germany. Along with German and French, Luxembourgish is one of the three *official* languages of Luxembourg.

(2) French is a prestige language that primarily occupies specific domains. For example, French is the language of the legal system. Laws are enacted in French. This reflects the historic importance of French in the courts of Europe and in international relations, as well as Luxembourg's adoption of the Napoleonic Code. However, in Parliament, laws are generally introduced in German and debated in Luxembourgish.

(3) Newspapers are predominantly printed in German, but with French interspersed. French is more common in advertisements for luxury goods, wedding and birth announcements, and stories with a European or cultural focus.

(4) The broadcast media predominantly uses Luxembourgish. News, however, is often presented in German or a mix of German and Luxembourgish.

(5) Government primarily writes in French or German, and only occasionally in Luxembourgish. However, a citizen's use of Luxembourgish is always accommodated by a response in Luxembourgish. Luxembourgish predominates in informal government communication.

The key to Luxembourg's successful trilingualism is its school system. Teachers must be proficient in all three languages. The students are taught all three languages as subjects and all three languages are used as languages of instruction.

Primary education has four two-year cycles. The first cycle, for ages 3 to 5, teaches in Luxembourgish and introduces French. In the second through fourth cycles, for ages 6–12, literacy is taught in German. German is also the language of instruction except for French lessons. Spoken French is taught in the second cycle. Written French is added in the third cycle.

Languages in secondary education vary depending on the system. German continues as the language of instruction in early secondary school, except that French and Mathematics are taught in French. The language of instruction shifts to French in the fourth year, in *classical* secondary schools.⁶⁰ In *general* secondary schools, German continues to be the primary language of instruction. Students who are tracked to a vocational education are taught in German.

Luxembourg is an exceptionally wealthy country with a long history of multilingualism. Its citizens' unique trilingualism is unnecessary for linguistic congruence in any other country. In addition, the cognitive load of three or more languages displaces other educational goals. Luxembourg has a high dropout rate in its lower socio-economic and immigrant communities and directs a larger than average percentage of students to vocational education. Finally, it is more difficult for immigrants to assimilate into a trilingual community. This is significant in a country in which nearly half of the population is foreign born. The point is that unitary trilingualism is possible, so a much less difficult policy of complementary bilingualism is practical.

“The boundaries between the Alemannic and the Burgundians have remained remarkably stable over the centuries and up to the present day, generating ‘a difference in character and customs so marked as to appear to be two strains of civilization.’”

A. Siegfried, *La Suisse démocratie-témoin* (1940)

⁶⁰ English is taught from the second year except for pupils learning Latin. They start English a year later. Students who wish to do so can even learn a fourth language (Italian, Spanish or Portuguese) starting in the fifth year. Luxembourg's plurilingualism is remarkable. In comparison, complementary bilingualism is a radically easier way to establish congruence – even global congruence.

5.3.2 Switzerland: Congruence by Segregation. Switzerland is the country most often cited as an exception to Europe's monolingual nation-state model. However, the Swiss live in monolingual communities and language rights are territorial, not personal. If you move to a different part of Switzerland you must use its official language when dealing with the government. Switzerland is linguistically segregated, with monolingual congruence behind a veneer of multilingualism. Citizens rarely relocate to a different language's territory.

"Switzerland may be quadrilingual, but to all intents and purposes each point of its territory can be viewed as unilingual."

Francois Grin, *Multilingualism and Government* (2000)

Most Swiss are either German speakers 2/3 or French speakers 1/4. Less than 10% are native speakers of Italian (8.4%) and Romansch (0.7%). Of Switzerland's 26 cantons, 22 have one official language (17 German, 4 French, and 1 Italian). Most government functions are performed by monolingual cantons or by monolingual districts and municipalities in the four multilingual cantons.

Of the four multilingual cantons, three are bilingual in German and French: Berne (Bern), Fribourg (Freiburg), and Valais (Wallis). Running through these three cantons, the linguistic fault line is commonly referred to as the *Röschti graben*.⁶¹ Congruence, in these cantons, is achieved with monolingual districts and municipalities. In Valais (Wallis), there are six French-speaking districts (Lower Valais) and eight German-speaking districts (Upper Wallis). In the Canton of Fribourg (Freiburg), the French districts are in the West and the German districts are in the East.

"A German Swiss who settles in French-speaking Switzerland has to educate his children in French and cannot demand a German education for them by arguing that the country is multilingual."

Uli Windisch, *Beyond Multiculturalism: Identity, Intercultural Communication, and Political Culture – The Case of Switzerland* (2004)

⁶¹ *Röschti* is a German dish made with grated potatoes. A *Graben* is a trench or other division

Similar internal linguistic territoriality exists in Berne (Bern). Jura bernois is the name of its Francophone area. At the risk of including too much information, the history of Francophone Berne and the birth of the Canton of Jura is instructive concerning the interaction between linguistic and religious cleavages. The *Catholic* and *Francophone* Jura region, which had previously not been a part of Switzerland, was added to the *Protestant* and *German* speaking Canton of Bern at the Congress of Vienna (1815).

In 1979, a Francophone and Catholic Canton of Jura was created by separating out a portion of Bern (Berne). However, not all of Francophone Bern joined the new Canton of Jura. The areas that remained in Bern (Berne) were Francophone but Protestant. They are called Jura bernois, which should not be confused with the Canton of Jura.

In Jura bernois (Bern) Protestant religious congruence seems to have had greater salience than linguistic differences. It is also possible that the greater wealth and political importance of the more urban Bern tipped the balance. This balance, however, proved unstable. Religion has become less salient relative to language. By 1994, the Francophone's remaining in Bern (Jura bernois) had become a disgruntled language minority and, a decade later, a federal commission proposed that Jura bernois be removed from the German speaking Canton of Bern and added to the French speaking Canton of Jura. On March 28, 2021, part of Jura bernois (Moutier) voted to leave Bern and join Jura. This change is scheduled to occur in 2026.

Even the trilingual Graubünden (Grisons) Canton is largely segregated by language. Italian speakers live in the South, in four of the canton's districts (Moesa, Bernina, the municipality of Bivio in Albula, and the municipality of Bregaglia in Maloja). Many of the residents in these districts commute for work to the adjacent Canton of Ticino, where Italian is the sole official language. As Italian speakers increasingly relocate to Ticino, German influence is increasing in Graubünden (Grisons). German speakers are three-quarters of the population and Italian speakers are 14%.


5.3.3 Belgium: Incomplete Congruence Problems. Like Switzerland, to achieve linguistic congruence Belgium combines monolingual territoriality

with devolution. It is able to do this because its language communities are largely self-segregated. Dutch (Flemish) speakers live in the North (Flanders) and French speakers live in the South (Wallonia). A small German-speaking population (<1%) lives in an area called Ostbelgien (East Belgium) that was added to Belgium after World War I. It is an enclave within the Francophone Liège Province, abutting Germany. German speakers do not have the right to use German in dealing with the Belgian government.

“This line drawn in the Fifth Century has undergone little change in the course of ages ... the separation between Walloons and Flemings has remained more or less apparent down to the present.”

Leon Van Der Essen, *A Short History of Belgium* (2012)

Devolution of Competencies. Like Switzerland, Belgium also supports linguistic congruence with devolution. Its devolution was from a unitary federal system to linguistically segregated “Region” (territorial) governments and “Community” (cultural) governments. The separation of Flemish and Walloon governance began in 1921 and was accomplished in six state reforms, the last constitutional reform was in 2011.



(1) The Administrative Language Act of 1921 and its successor in 1932 established a policy of territorial monolingualism. Administrative bodies were required to use the language of the majority, as determined by census data. Minorities of greater than 30% were given services, to facilitate their interaction with the government.

(2) In 1962, Belgium abandoned the use of census data in establishing the boundaries of its territorial monolingualism. Municipalities were assigned to one of four language categories, including a bilingual Brussels. The Brussels Capital Region (BCR) was limited to 19 municipalities. Voeren (Fourons) was transferred from Wallonia to Flanders and Comines-Warneton (Komen-Waasten) was transferred from Flanders to Wallonia. In each case creating a linguistic enclave.

(3) In 1970, the First State Reform constitutionalized three Cultural Communities with cultural and language competencies, including control of broadcasting. This was desired by the Flemish, so that they could determine the future of their culture and language.

(4) The Second State Reform, a decade later, established two Regions (Flemish and Walloon) based on language use, each with jurisdiction over “territorial” matters. The Regions were desired by Walloons, as a way to increase economic self-determination. A BCR Region government was deferred. The Flemish combined their Region and Community governments. The Walloons did not.⁶² The two language Community governments were renamed, dropping the term “cultural” to reflect the broader jurisdiction of matters pertaining “to the person.” Communities and Regions were given Councils (later changed to Parliaments) and government structures.

(5) The Third State Reform, in 1988, added the BCR as the third Region. The BCR was given separate French and Dutch Community

⁶² The Walloons did not combine their Community and Region because of the large Francophone community in the BCR and the presence of a German Community within the Walloon Region.

Commissions (VGC and COCOF) and a third Common Community Commission. Additional competencies, most notably education, were given to Communities and transport and public works devolved to the Regions.

(6) The Fourth State Reform, in 1993, Amended Art I of the Constitution to reflect that the Communities and Regions were the basic units of governance. The responsibilities and resources of the Communities and Regions were further expanded. Only the full extent of devolution remained to be decided. This reform also provided for the direct election of Community and Region parliaments. Brabant, 200 years after its boundaries were established during a period of French rule, was split into Flemish Brabant and Walloon Brabant.

(7) The Fifth State Reform, in 2001, transferred more competencies, including agriculture, fisheries, and foreign trade to the Regions. The Regions also became responsible for local and provincial governments, as well as a dozen regional taxes (the Lambermont Accord). Brussels institutional operations were sorted with consociational accommodations that mirrored the federal consociationalism, including guaranteed Flemish representation in the BCR Parliament (Lombard Accord).

(8) The Sixth State Reform, in 2011, transferred further competencies, including employment and economic matters, to the Regions. Additional competencies concerning health, elderly care and family policies devolved to the Communities. The Senate became an assembly of regional parliamentarians and its role circumscribed. Funding for the BCR was set at 0.1% of Belgium GDP.

Devolution, as completed in 2011, is so extreme that the jurisdiction of the Region and Community governments extends to foreign relations and international treaties that are within the scope of their extensive competencies. Thus, depending on the configuration of the Council of the EU (ministers), representation from Belgium can include multiple Region and Community officials, rather than having a single

representative from the federal government. No other EU member state does this.⁶³

However, unlike Switzerland, Belgium has a bilingual capital region and 27 municipalities with large linguistic minorities where linguistic congruence by further devolution is not possible. In these mixed constituencies, consociational limits on majority rule and the use of the personality principle are both employed in an attempt to sufficiently reduce friction so that ethnolinguistic detente is possible. However, ethnolinguistic conflict in these departures from congruence often precipitates wider ethno-linguist conflict. The Byzantine structure makes governance in Belgium expensive, inefficient, and factional.

Cohabitation Strategies. Belgium facilitates the political cohabitation of its French (Wallon) speaking and Dutch (Flemish)-speaking citizens, both federally and in the bilingual Brussels Capital Region (BCR), in two ways: (1) anti-majoritarian (consociational) rules and procedures and (2) use of the “personality principle.”

Examples of anti-majoritarian rules and procedures include the following:

(1) Ministers in the federal government are evenly divided between French and Dutch speakers, even though 60% of Belgians speak Dutch (Flemish) as their mother tongue. Decisions are made by cabinet consensus, which causes long delays and gives a veto to the Francophone minority.

(2) Belgium’s federal parliament is divided into two language caucuses, French and Dutch, with requirements for a dual quorum and a dual majority vote on sensitive legislation. In addition, an “alarm bell” procedure

⁶³ In October 2016, Francophones in Wallonia, temporarily blocked the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada. In July 2024, the Flemish government refused to approve the legally required National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) by a June 30 deadline, a move that prevented Belgium from submitting its own plan.

allows a super majority of either the French or the Dutch parliamentarians, even when it is a minority of the Parliament, to defer an issue to the evenly divided executive branch in an attempt to negotiate a compromise.

(3) In the BCR, the Dutch-speaking minority is protected by anti-majoritarian requirements similar to those used at the federal level, although they are less than 10% of the BCR population. In addition to anti-majoritarian procedures, the personality principle is also recognized. French and Dutch (Flemish) have equal status in the BCR. For example, every street has two names: one Dutch and the other French. This imbalance offends a part of the Francophone super majority. Francophone taxi drivers have been known to feign confusion, when a visitor uses a Dutch name.⁶⁴

Language “Facilities” in 27 Municipal Governments. Other exceptions to Belgium’s historic segregation are 27 *border* and *rim* municipalities. There are six rim municipalities on the periphery of the BCR and 21 border municipalities along the primary (East-West) linguistic border between Flanders (North) and Wallonia (South). In these constituencies, a limited form of the personality principle is used in an attempt to mitigate conflict.

The personality principle is incompletely expressed in the 27 rim and border municipalities by the provision of government “facilities” for speakers of the second most common language.⁶⁵ Education in the second language is provided through the elementary grades, but not at the secondary level. As a result of a perception of second-class status for the *de jure*, but not necessarily *de facto*, linguistic minority, the rim and border municipalities are a reservoir of friction from which conflict between French and

⁶⁴ The author experienced this interesting phenomenon on his first visit in Brussels.

⁶⁵ Some of the BCR rim municipalities, which are in Dutch-speaking Flanders, have or may have become majority Francophone. Their governments remain Dutch speaking, with facilities for their French speaking *majority*, as census data, since 1962, does not change the fixed linguistic hierarchy.

Dutch speakers periodically emerges to divide all of Belgium along its linguistic seams.

“Every kingdom divided against itself will be ruined.”

The Bible, Matthew 12:25

Dysfunction From Incomplete Congruence. Belgium’s undemocratic and absurdly complex governance is a result of its lack of complete congruence. It is Europe’s most dysfunctional nation-state. Ethnolinguistic division immobilized Belgium’s federal government for approximately two of the five years between 2007 and 2011. In 2010–11, Belgium had no functioning federal government for a year and a half—a world record for failure to form a new government after an election.

Eight years later the split reemerged, nearly beating the old record for failure to form a government. Ten months after Belgium’s 2019 federal elections, a caretaker federal government was formed on an emergency basis for a further six months. This was compelled by the need to respond to the COVID-19 crisis. When the sixth month ended, in September 2020, the caretaker government of Prime Minister Sophie Wilmès was extended for an additional month as part of the 12th attempt to form a governing coalition. It succeeded. Ironically, the new prime minister is Alexander De Croo. He was the leader of the Liberal Party which precipitated the record-setting 2010–11 crisis by withdrawing its support for Prime Minister Yves Leterme.⁶⁶

“Far from being a model to reproduce, the Belgian example is pertinent in the sole measure that it is used to prevent similar developments in other federations.”

C. Van Wynsberghe, *The Belgian “Example”, Weakness of the Federal Formula as Implemented in Belgium* <https://dial.uclouvain.be>

⁶⁶ The government collapsed, in 2010, after a seven-year-long dispute, from 2003 to 2010, over the boundaries of an election arrondissement (BHV) that combined the bilingual BCR with parts of Flemish Brabant (Halle and Vilvoorde).

In summary, to approximate congruence Belgium has a complex system of linguistically divided Community and Region governments, an anorexic and consociational (undemocratic) federal government, a *de jure* bilingual but overwhelmingly Francophone BCR, and 27 contentious municipalities with linguistic facilities. Only the inability to agree on the fate of the anomalous BCR, an overwhelmingly Francophone enclave inside of Dutch-speaking Flanders, prevents Belgium from dividing – like Czechoslovakia – into two monolingual countries. Belgium's problematic lack of complete congruence is perhaps the best evidence for the importance of congruence.

“... listening to people speak a language you can’t understand is a strange and maddening experience. It can be more than that. It can be the origin of prejudice and hostility. If you are unable to talk to someone, it’s hard to appreciate how much you have in common.”

D. Shariatmadari, *Don’t Believe a Word: The Surprising Truth About Language* (2020)

Chapter 6

Post Colonial Language Rationalization

After World War II, in a dramatic and often violent period of a few decades, European colonialism imploded. The rapid demise of colonialism led to experiments in language rationalization by the new governments in the former colonies. These efforts at achieving linguistic congruence resulted in two forms of rationalization: *indigenous* bilingual congruence and *exogenous* bilingual congruence.

The new governments in the former colonies needed a common language for governance in their multilingual polities. Often there were many indigenous ethnolinguistic groups, so choosing any indigenous language would privilege its native speakers and outrage speakers of all other indigenous languages. Thus, choosing any indigenous language for linguistic congruence was rarely possible.

6.1 Indigenous Bilingual Congruence

There were two former colonies that had an indigenous trade language not strongly associated with any single ethnolinguistic community.

In choosing an indigenous trade language for linguistic congruence, these two governments set the stage for either hegemonic congruence with the chosen language or complementary bilingualism. In both countries, the ultimate result still remains to be determined. A desire to also learn a large international language has created tension between the proponents of combining the indigenous trade language with an international language, such as English (elite bilingualism), and those who prioritize preserving more indigenous languages by combining the trade language with all of the other indigenous languages (complementary bilingualism).

6.1.1 Indonesia: Bahasa Indonesia Congruence. Indonesia's national motto is: "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika." It means: "different, but the same kind." The phrase comes from a 14th Century poem celebrating tolerance between Buddhists and Muslims. Perhaps this helps to explain why Indonesia was able to appreciate the value of bilingual congruence.

With thousands of islands, hundreds of languages, and many different ethnic, racial, and religious communities, Indonesia is exceptionally diverse in both geography and demography. To overcome these obstacles to unity, newly independent Indonesia used a powerful tool—a common language. It needed linguistic congruence but rejected both the colonial language (Dutch) and, at least so far, the monolingualism of the European nation-state model.

"Bahasa" means language and "Bahasa Indonesia" means the language of Indonesia. Riau Malay, a regional trade language, was chosen to be the Bahasa Indonesia of the newly independent country. It was the first language of only 10% of Indonesia's population. Javanese, in contrast, was dominant – spoken by the Jakarta elite and almost half of the population. The decision to use a small trade language, rather than Javanese, was inspired. Bahasa Indonesia did not reinforce the power of Jakarta, so there was no backlash.

As with all trade languages, Riau Malay had lost some of the unnecessary complexity, irregularity, and adornment that otherwise become attached to natural languages. This made Bahasa Indonesia relatively easy to learn, which was a crucial advantage.

In his 2019 book *Upheaval: Turning Points for Nations in Crisis*, Pulitzer Prize winner Jared Diamond wrote:

“Today, I share with Indonesians their appreciation for the advantages of the wonderful Bahasa Indonesia as their national language. It’s easy to learn. Only 18 years after Indonesia took over Dutch New Guinea and introduced Bahasa there, I found it being spoken even by uneducated New Guineans in remote villages.”

In implementing the decision to adopt Bahasa Indonesia, the government faced additional obstacles: (1) low literacy levels; (2) poor schools, if any, in many areas; (3) poor infrastructure for transportation and communication; and (4) little common history except for Dutch colonialism and Japanese occupation.

Bahasa Indonesia overcame all of these obstacles. The superordinate goal of learning a unifying language created solidarity and demonstrated the cohesive effect of becoming a unified linguistic community. Bahasa Indonesia allows Indonesians to travel anywhere in their country and communicate as fellow citizens.

“Tanzania is often castigated for the failure of its socialist experiment, but it is seldom given credit for success in national integration on the mainland. KiSwahili is part and parcel of that integrative triumph.”

Ali A. Mazrai and Alamin M. Mazrai, *The Power of Babel: Language and Governance in the African Experience* (1998)

6.1.2 Tanzania: KiSwahili Congruence. Indonesia is not the only former colony that achieved post-colonial linguistic congruence with an indigenous trade language. Tanzania did the same, using KiSwahili. The prefix “Ki” is functionally equivalent to “Bahasa.” Like Riau Malay, KiSwahili was the first language of only approximately 10% of the population. Tanzania’s population of 35 million uses 125 languages. KiSwahili is particularly important in the fast-growing cities, where the

speakers of all of the indigenous languages use it to engage socially and economically.

6.1.3 Diglossia or Complementary Bilingualism? Did Indonesia and Tanzania choose complementary bilingualism, or are they on a path to state-first monolingualism? When France mandated universal education in standard French, it created a hierarchical relationship between standard French and all of the other indigenous languages and dialects. This relationship is referred to as diglossia. In cases of diglossia, over time there is a shift to more prestigious languages and a decline in the use of the less prestigious languages. Are diglossia and language shifts occurring in Indonesia and Tanzania? If so, they have not established complementary bilingualism. Complementary bilingualism, especially 2 MT Bilingualism, preserves linguistic diversity and avoids diglossia.

Indonesia's Experience With Bahasa Indonesia. The 700+ languages of Indonesia (bahasa nusantara) include 13 languages that have at least a million speakers. These 13 languages are used by 70% of the total population. Many of the remaining languages are endangered, including approximately 450 with fewer than 1,000 speakers each.

Until 1953, local languages could be used as the language of instruction in elementary schools. This was a *de facto* policy of complementary bilingualism, with Bahasa Indonesia regarded as the unifying language (bahasa persatuan). From 1953 to 1975, the use of local languages was restricted to the first three years of schooling. This could be seen as a rebalancing of complementary bilingualism to accelerate the learning of Bahasa Indonesia.

However, in 1975 Bahasa Indonesia became the language of instruction at all levels. This replicated French education from the 1880's. Recently, after an increase in local autonomy, the teaching of some local languages has been included in the curriculum in some regions—but as a subject and not as a language of instruction. English is a mandatory part of the curriculum. This puts indigenous complementary bilingualism into

competition with an elite exogenous bilingualism using a combination of Bahasa Indonesia and English.

Indonesian students are taught multiple languages,⁶⁷ but most indigenous languages are not taught in the education system and only Bahasa Indonesia is used as a language of instruction. Not surprisingly there has been a decline in the use of most indigenous languages, which sometimes correlates with a small increase in the use of a few of the larger indigenous languages in those communities where a larger indigenous language is taught as a mandatory subjects.

Does Indonesia have *incomplete* complementary bilingualism, with Bahasa Indonesia used as a *bahasa persatuan* and a few other indigenous languages being protected, or will the emerging diglossia continue, with Bahasa Indonesia and English being privileged as, respectively, the national and international languages and most indigenous languages declining? Does the current policy reflect local preferences, which should be respected? Are the preferences different in the cities than in the rural areas? Should Indonesia have an explicit national policy of complementary bilingualism to protect more indigenous languages? Is trilingualism possible with a third language for international communication? The answers to these questions can only emerge with time and the effects of changing government policies.⁶⁸

Global complementary bilingualism, especially if led by the UN, would resolve Indonesia's problem. All indigenous languages, including Bahasa Indonesia, would complement the UN choice of a language for global congruence.

⁶⁷ In religious schools, Arabic is often added.

⁶⁸ In January 2025, upon joining the BRICS+ coalition, Indonesia added Portuguese to its list of "priority languages." Its other eight priority languages are Arabic, Chinese, English, French, German, Korean, Japanese and Russian. The expansion of the priority category obviously dilutes the significance of prioritization. The goal, clearly, is to increase its capacity for economic integration with the leading economies. 2 MT Bilingualism would do this with maximum efficiency at minimum cost.

Instead of inculcating a sense of accomplishment and opening windows to education, English became a frustrating barrier to my students.” (Arguing for the extension of Kiswahili to secondary school.)

Deo Ngonyani, *The Failure of Language Policy in Tanzania Schools* (1996)

Tanzania’s Experience With KiSwahili. In 1962, KiSwahili was designated as the official language of Tanzania. In 1967, it was adopted as the language of governance. In 1968, it became the language of instruction in primary schools, with English being pragmatically retained for secondary education and university study. In 1984, KiSwahili was designated as the language of the social and political sphere, as well as for adult education. In 2015, the Tanzania Ministry of Education and Vocational Training announced that KiSwahili would replace English in the secondary schools for the mandatory forms (1–4).

While primary education and the secondary schools’ mandatory forms are taught in KiSwahili, the secondary schools’ competitive levels, forms 5–6, are taught in English. Passing Form 6 is mandatory for continuing to university-level study, so English proficiency is a prerequisite for post-secondary education. This is elite bilingualism. Except for KiSwahili, indigenous languages are not languages of instruction.

A policy of complementary bilingualism would require the use of diverse indigenous languages, in the area where each is predominant, as languages of instruction in the elementary-level grades⁶⁹ and as an academic subject for older students. KiSwahili would be a primary school subject and the language of instruction in the secondary-level grades. English would be an elective foreign language. But, given the strong support for English, especially in private schools, such a policy implies a trilingual education, which might be too expensive for Tanzania—at least for now.

⁶⁹ Such a policy would have the additional benefit of increasing the pool of potential teachers, making teacher training less arduous for future teachers and less expensive for the community.

In cities, a *shift* to KiSwahili is replacing other indigenous languages. In rural areas, a language *drift* is being experienced. Other indigenous languages are adopting loan words from KiSwahili and experiencing “KiSwahilization” of their grammar and pronunciation. In short, there is both language shift, primarily in cities, and language drift, primarily in rural areas.

The unanswered question is whether choosing KiSwahili as the sole language of instruction is a *de facto* policy of state-first monolingualism. Can and should Tanzania have an explicit policy of complementary bilingualism? The answer should depend on the desire of each indigenous language community. As in Indonesia, the other former colony with an indigenous common language, a choice has emerged between preserving maximum linguistic diversity or adopting elite bilingualism with English.

The KiSwahili-English combination undermines the preservation of diversity by promoting diglossia between KiSwahili and all other indigenous languages. Many parents prefer the Kiswahili-English combination as a better option for securing their children’s economic future. Others fear that English will remain an elite language that institutionalizes elite closure, while a diglossic shift to KiSwahili eliminates other indigenous languages.

As with Indonesia, the future course of language rationalization is uncertain. Also as with Indonesia, a global language rationalization policy of complementary bilingualism, perhaps led by the UN, would resolve Tanzania’s language policy quandary.

6.2 Exogenous Bilingual Congruence

Most former colonies did not have a convenient trade language, like Riau Malay or KiSwahili. Choosing any indigenous language was impossible because the privileging one language community would disadvantage and alienate all of the others. In these countries, as determined by their new governments, the least divisive option was to continue using the former colonial language of administration as the new language of governance.

There were other significant benefits in using the colonial language: it provided efficient access to colonial records, avoiding the need to translate them into multiple languages, and provided membership in a global linguistic network. However, as the colonial European language had been used for administration but not for governance, most of the population had little or no facility with the former colonial language.

Knowledge of the former colonial language was a marker of elite status. This resulted in elite bilingualism and elite closure. Because money for education was usually in short supply, wider dissemination of the elite language was slow. However, with sufficient resources allocated and an explicit policy of complementary bilingualism, elite bilingualism can be remedied by making the exogenous common language both a mandatory subject and a language of instruction. Indigenous languages, in the communities where they are predominant, will be languages of instruction, at least in the elementary schools, and will also be taught as academic subjects.

In establishing a policy of exogenous complementary bilingualism, it should always be kept in mind that elite bilingualism is a potential problem. This will be less of a problem if the exogenous common language is not the former colonial language. A universally exogenous language, as part of a regional or global language rationalization policy of complementary bilingualism, would solve the language rationalization policy problems everywhere.

“The Conference of Parties meeting in Paris in 2015 showed an Indian evolution to a new stance ... an India actively shaping the global agenda emerged.”

A. Ayers, *Our Time Has Come: How India is Making Its Place in the World* (2018)

6.3 India: Elite Multilingualism

Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India is attempting to use Hindutva hegemony as the foundation for political order and collective

action. This attempt is increasing tensions between the 80% of the population that is Hindu and the 20% that is not. It would be better to recognize the linguistic foundation of political order and adopt 2 MT Bilingualism with a common language that is neither Hindi nor English.

“There is one angle of the world language question that has seldom if ever been mentioned. It is the use of the world language for the solution of the internal problems in countries having large and numerous linguistic minorities, or in which many languages are at present official.”

Mario Pei, *One Language for the World* (1958)

Linguistic Congruence Fails. India has scores of indigenous languages. Hindi is the largest. It is the native language of 4 out of 10 Indians. Bengali is second, but with only one-fifth as many native speakers. India has 29 languages with over a million native speakers. This contrasts dramatically with the linguistic situation in the three empire-states. In China, Putonghua is the language of congruence. Russian is similarly hegemonic in Russia, as is English in the USA.

At India's formation, Article 343 of the 1948 Constitution stated that the Union would adopt Hindi as its common language in 1965, using the Devanagari script. In 1963, the looming prospect of Hindi hegemony moved language policy to the top of the political agenda. As India's federal government prepared for the transition, non-Hindi speakers objected to Hindi hegemony. An ambiguous compromise was reached, according to which English “may” be used for official purposes after 1965.

The ambiguity was resolved differently in the minds of the Hindi-speaking plurality and the non-Hindi-speaking majority. Hindi's proponents interpreted the word “may” as providing the government with the authority to retain English but not as a requirement. The non-Hindi-speaking majority interpreted the word “may” as establishing a legal right to use English.

As the 1965 deadline approached, rioting broke out over the ambiguity and the deadline was deferred. In 1967, a new compromise gave

English potential permanence by providing that it would retain its role as an alternative to Hindi, unless and until the legislative branches in each state where Hindi was not the official language endorsed the end of the English option.

As English is only spoken fluently by an elite minority, support for the English alternative to Hindi was not an endorsement of English as much as it was an expression of fear of linguistic hegemony by an indigenous language and both the consequent risk of Hindi induced diglossia and the privileging of its native-speakers. In some cases, especially in Tamil Nadu and other Dravidian-speaking areas in the South, linguistic concerns were combined with resistance to the federal government based in the North. In other cases the language issue was a proxy for religious concerns. For example, Muslims wanted to preserve both Urdu and the Arabic script, despite the overwhelming similarity of Hindi and Urdu as spoken (Hindustani). Similarly, the Sikh religious community was concerned about the risk of language shift and wanted to protect the Punjabi language and Gurmukhi script.

Religious Hegemony vs Linguistic Congruence. Having been re-elected to an unprecedented third term in 2024, but without the single party majority in Parliament that he previously enjoyed, there is an opportunity for Modi to make a “Nixon goes to China” style breakthrough on language rationalization. President Nixon’s consistent record of being strongly anti-communist enabled him, without domestic political consequences, to make his historic trip to Beijing in 1972. Similarly, a popular Hindutva prime minister may be able to resolve India’s language rationalization stalemate without imposing Hindi hegemony. The optimal solution for India’s linguistic congruence is neither Hindi nor English. Nor is it a combination of both. A English-Hindi combination would formalize the current elite bilingualism, while not protecting any of India’s many indigenous languages. The only solution is 2 MT Bilingualism, pairing a single exogenous and easily learned language with each of India’s indigenous languages.

While India is not yet an empire-state, it has the potential to become the fourth. Linguistic congruence is the missing element of an Indian empire-state.

India intends to take its place alongside the three empire-states, achieving international agency proportional to its population. The key step will be the establishment of complementary bilingualism. If the world's most populous country acts first, with any choice except Hindi or English, its decision could tip the first domino in the establishment of global 2 MT Bilingualism.

“Language maintenance has been very little researched so far, but deserves much more attention in future linguistic investigations, since it appears to be the most crucial aspect of the language acquisition process.”
Herdina and Jessner, *The Dynamics of Third Language Acquisition* (2000)

Chapter 7

2 MT Bilingualism for 21st Century Governance

The post colonial efforts to rationalize language use in the former colonies have implicitly established a bilingual model. Unfortunately, these models do not fully address the problems of diglossia and elite bilingualism. Both of these problems can be solved with a policy of 2 MT Bilingualism. Only 2 MT Bilingualism can equitably, efficiently and effectively protect any number of indigenous languages – protecting them from both exogenous threats and threats from dominant endogenous languages.

7.1 The Optimal Form of Complementary Bilingualism: 2 Mother Tongues

Any language rationalization policy needs to consider three things: acquisition, maintenance, and transmission between generations. Monolingual acquisition benefits from the ability of young children to learn a language. Monolingual maintenance is accomplished by family and community use of the language. Monolingual transmission is accomplished as the counterpart of acquisition. Bilingualism can avail itself of the same advantages, but only in a 2 MT Bilingual family and community. Learning a foreign language has none of these advantages. Thus, a language rationalization

policy based on the learning one of many foreign language is vastly less likely to be successful than a policy of 2 MT Bilingualism.

7.1.1 Complementary Bilingualism is Natural. Almost everyone needs and will benefit greatly from 2 MT Bilingualism with an easily learned and universally exogenous language: 1) parents who want their children to benefit from learning an international language need 2 MT Bilingualism, 2) parents who prioritize their children's linguistic and cultural heritage need 2 MT Bilingualism, 3) people from more than 6,500 relatively small language communities need 2 MT Bilingualism to fully access global resources.

The author's insight into complementary bilingualism included both family member plurilingualism and growing up in multi-ethnic and multilingual Hawai'i. It is worth a quick look at each of these experiences to show that complementary bilingualism is, in fact, a natural phenomena for both individuals and communities.

Individual Plurilingualism: 2 MT (Mother Tongue) English and Japanese. One of my brothers moved to Japan to teach English. He married a Japanese woman and they have two children. The children grew up speaking English with their father and Japanese with their mother. They attended primary schools in both Japan and Hawai'i.⁷⁰ The son also attended high school at a boarding school in Indiana and took college courses in Hawai'i before graduating from Sophia University in Tokyo. The daughter studied English Literature at Doshisha University in Kyoto. She works as a translator. Both are comfortable in either Japanese or English. Transitioning easily between two different languages and cultures, they are a good example of 2 MT Bilingualism.

There is a crucial difference between my niece and nephew's 2 MT Bilingualism, which combines the identity and communication functions,

⁷⁰ They attended elementary school in Hawai'i, while their father attended the University of Hawai'i for his Masters degree.

and learning a *foreign* language. Even in the rare cases of proficiency, learning a *foreign* language does not include an identity function. A foreign language builds a *lingua franca* communication bridge, but even the most successful learner of a foreign language is not a member of both communities.

Community Multilingualism: Hawai'i Creole English. 2 MT Bilingualism can develop spontaneously. Before there was long-distance airline service, pineapple and sugarcane plantations were the foundation of Hawai'i's economy.⁷¹ The plantations sourced their labor from several different countries and housed workers in ethnically segregated camps, in an ultimately unsuccessful effort to inhibit collective labor action. The primary labor sources were China, Japan, Portugal (Azores), Puerto Rico and the Philippines.

The inevitable interaction of these language communities, with each other and with both English speakers and Hawaiian speakers, created a new pidgin that built upon an older English and Hawaiian hybrid. When the pidgin was used by the plantation workers' children as their primary language, it developed into a creole. Though still called "Pidgin," it is a complete language that linguists call Hawai'i Creole or Hawai'i Creole English (HCE).⁷² Because of its identity function, HCE persisted after the end of the plantation economy.

Plantation field workers had limited contact with monolingual English speakers. When hotels replaced the agricultural plantations, tourism changed that. With millions of English-speaking tourists from Canada and the mainland USA arriving every year, as well as tens of thousands of in-migrants from the other 49 states, HCE could easily have been overwhelmed in a shift to English. HCE avoided linguistic death precisely because it expressed a "local" identity in a language that could

⁷¹ The plantation economy was still important in 1967, when the author was a field laborer for Dole Pineapple at its Whitmore Village Plantation, on Oahu, during the summer between high school and college.

⁷² In 2015, HEC was included as a language choice by the US Census Bureau.

not be fully acquired, even after a long residence, unless exposure began as a child. The prosody will not be accurate unless the creole language is learned at a young age.

Hawai'i's state government does not support HCE. The Department of Education is hostile, in the belief that any use of HCE at school undermines the student's acquisition of standard English. Although discouraged in the classroom, HCE rules the hallways and lunchroom. Beyond school, it has primacy in informal discourse among those born in the islands. It is the language of courtship and gossip, to mention two of its principle identity-affirming domains.

The "local" population of Hawai'i is 2 MT Bilingual in English and HCE.⁷³ English and HCE each encode an identity, like the identity bilingualism of my brother's children. Standard English encodes a national (USA) identity and is used in formal domains. HCE encodes a local (Hawai'i) identity. There is also the indigenous Hawaiian language. Hawaiians⁷⁴ are the quintessential locals and Hawaiians who know their indigenous language, along with HCE and English, are examples of identity trilingualism.⁷⁵

"When a language isn't in the data, its speakers aren't in the product, and AI cannot be safe, useful or fair for them... This marginalizes millions of people and increases the technology divide."

Vukosi Marivate, Profesor of Computer Science, University of Praetoria, *The Conversation*, October 16, 2025

⁷³ In rural and low-income communities, standard English is used less often and less completely. In higher-income areas, there is a degree of decreolization, in which standard English has diluted aspects of HCE.

⁷⁴ "Hawaiian" refers to ethnicity. It is not a citizenship designation, like the word "Californian."

⁷⁵ The author has two nephews who qualify.

7.1.2 Maximize Human Potential: Everyone Benefits. Bilingualism also has significant individual benefits.⁷⁶ Complementary bilingualism will help to maximize each individual's human potential, while better preserving all languages and their associated cultures. An appreciation of the individual benefits will increase public support for complementary bilingualism generally and 2 MT Bilingualism in particular.

“... languages with more speakers tend to be more efficient from an information theoretical perspective....”

T.M. Waring and Z.T. Woods, *Long-term gene culture co-evolution in the human evolutionary transition*, Proceedings of the Royal Society. Biological Sciences June 2, 2021

The 10 most common languages (Putonghua, English, Hindi-Urdu, Spanish, Russian, Arabic, Bengali, Portuguese, Bahasa Indonesia, and French) are spoken by more than two and a half billion people. The top 25 languages account for more than half the world's population. The 500 “safe” languages are spoken by 90% of the world's population.

“It is hardly possible to overrate the value ... of placing human beings in contact with persons dissimilar to themselves, and with modes of thought and action unlike those with which they are familiar.”

John Stuart Mill, *Principles of Political Economy* (1866)

People who do not know one of the 500 safe languages are severely marginalized. These 800 million people are often isolated from other language communities. Their languages often lack a standard dialect or written form. Not speaking one of the top 25 languages, a circumstance affecting 4 billion people, also limits the ability to fully benefit from the global exchange of information and ideas.

⁷⁶ E. Bialystok, et al, *Bilingual Minds*, in Psychological Science in the Public Interest 10(2) (2009) and *Bilingualism: Consequences for Mind and Brain* in Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10(4) (2013).

Please pause and reflect on these staggering statistics. Half of the world's population needs bilingualism to fully participate in the modern world while retaining their birth languages and associated cultures. This sad statistic reflects one of the largest human development issues of the 21st century and it is being ignored. 2 MT Bilingualism is the corresponding opportunity to increase human development and reduce both inequality and isolation – as well as facilitating regional and global collective action.

“In 3 eye-tracking studies we show that 7-month-old infants, raised with 2 languages from birth, display improved cognitive control abilities compared with matched monolinguals.”

Agnes Kovacs and Jacques Mehler, *Cognitive Gain in 7-month-old Bilingual Infants*, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106 (16) (April 21, 2009)

(1) Lifelong Cognitive Benefits. The cognitive benefits of bilingualism are found in babies,⁷⁷ the elderly, and everyone in between. A study at the International School for Advanced Studies in Trieste, Italy, found that seven-month-old babies from bilingual homes were better at anticipating change, as measured by a faster switching of their anticipatory focus.

At the other end of the age spectrum, a study of elderly bilinguals by the University of California (San Diego) found that bilingualism delayed the onset of cognitive decline and Alzheimer's. These benefits have also been documented in India.⁷⁸ Cognitive reserve, the capacity to both resist cognitive decline and compensate for its effects, is increased

⁷⁷ The benefits may even begin to accrue *in utero* When exposed to more than one language before birth, newborns have a distinct brain response to speech sounds. They show greater sensitivity to a range of sounds and changes in pitch. Dr. Natàlia Gorin-Careta, Institute of Neurosciences, University of Barcelona. neurosciencenews.com (May 22, 2024).

⁷⁸ S. Alladi, et al., *Bilingualism Delays Age of Onset of Dementia, Independent of Education and Immigrant Status*, in *Neurology* 81(22) (2013).

by bilingualism as effectively as by increased education.⁷⁹ The better the second language skill, the greater the delay in the onset of symptoms and the longer the individual's lifespan. Consequently, both quality of life and length of life are improved.

(2) A More Nuanced Understanding of Words. Children learning two languages follow the same path (milestones) at virtually the same rate as those restricted to a monolingual education. However, studies suggest that exposure to two lexical inventories gives bilingual children a better appreciation for the nuances of word meanings in both languages.

(3) Enhanced Dual Processing and Inhibition of Distraction. Bilinguals are better at focusing (inhibition of distraction), switching between tasks (dual processing), and retaining information while performing tasks (dual processing). These are gains to the brain's executive control. Bilingualism improves executive control because bilinguals practice executive control in using two languages (code switching).

(4) Greater Creativity. If all of its other benefits are not enough, the interplay between two languages appears to induce greater creativity and enhance problem-solving.

"Some new parents trust ill-informed nurses, doctors, teachers, school administrators, family members, and even cabdrivers, following the mistaken advice to speak only one language to their children. In the process, they deprived their children not only of exposure to another language and culture that would enrich their lives but also of the cognitive, neural, social, and economic advantages."

V. Mariam, *The Power of Language* (2023)

This does not mean that bilingualism is a shortcut to producing superstar students. The scope and degree of the benefits need further study. The point is that parents should demand an early and effective bilingual

⁷⁹ T. Gollan, et al. *Degree of bilingualism predicts age of diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease in low-education but not in highly educated Hispanics*. *Neuropsychologia*, Volume 49, Issue 14, December 2011.

education for their children because (1) it can improve their children's academic and cognitive performance, (2) second-language acquisition is more successful when started early, and (3) the benefits of bilingualism will continue throughout the child's life. Bilingualism is not only for school-age children. Adults also benefit.⁸⁰ People of all ages should study and practice a second language. It is never too late to start or to refresh an earlier bilingual capacity. Fluency is not necessary for benefits to accrue.

7.1.3 The 2 MT Advantage: Acquisition, Maintenance and Transmission. 2 MT Bilingualism is a policy for both community multilingualism and individual plurilingualism. It is the easiest way to achieve the bilingual congruence that both preserves unlimited diversity and provides a common language.

In addition to acquisition, it is necessary to consider bilingual language maintenance and the two languages' transmission to subsequent generations. While it is important for the selected language to be easy to acquire, it is absolutely *essential* that it be easily maintained and transmitted between generations. Maintenance and transmission is why 2 MT Bilingualism is key to a successful language rationalization policy irrespective of the language choice.

"You have to use both languages all the time. You won't get the bilingual benefit from occasional use."

Ellen Bialystock *The Bilingual Advantage*
New York Times (May 30, 2011)

Maintenance After Acquisition. People are unlikely to migrate to a community that uses a language they do not understand, except under extreme pressure. Despite the proximity of multiple countries and the unifying elements of the EU, such as the Euro Zone, Schengen Area, and

⁸⁰ T. H. Bak, et al., *Does Bilingualism Influence Cognitive Aging*, *Annals of Neurobiology* 75(6) (2014).

aquis communitaire, only 2% of the EU's citizens live in a country other than their birth country. Consequently, after learning a foreign language, there is little opportunity to use it. The result is that foreign language skills atrophy and are not passed on through family bilingualism.

After imperfectly learning one of the four elite European languages (English, French Spanish and German), an exceptionally difficult and correspondingly uncommon accomplishment even in Europe, students have a limited opportunity to practice it. On the other hand, a language rationalization policy of 2 MT Bilingualism, with an easily learned and universally exogenous choice, will allow everyone to practice the common language every day, even if they never leave their birth country, as well as permit them to travel and work anywhere without encountering a linguistic barrier.

Being part of a global community will be crucial for generations who must live with the consequences of our current failure to provide effective and equitable collective action to resolve global problems. For example, global warming will create tens of millions of climate migrants. Their assimilation will be much easier if there is a global policy of 2 MT Bilingualism that allows them to integrate more quickly into a new community.

Intergenerational Transfer. In school, both 2 MT languages will be taught in the same manner—as both a subject and as a language of instruction. This will somewhat resemble the situation in Luxembourg, described in Chapter 5. It will, however, be much easier, because (1) a policy of 2 MT Bilingualism will add only one, rather than two, languages, and (2) learning a schematic language (next chapter) is much easier than learning a second natural language.

“It is hard to believe that there can be...true and lasting development ... when so many people do not know their constitutional and legal rights, cannot understand the developmental goals of their governments and therefore cannot actively exercise their basic democratic rights, simply because they are written in foreign languages.”

Paulin Djité *Language Problems and Language Planning* (1990)

7.2 Unbounded Community With Unlimited Language and Cultural Preservation

Complementary bilingualism is a simple concept, but the impact will be profound. Because a common language is a necessary (if not always sufficient) condition for the creation of a community, complementary bilingualism is both a way to preserve cultural diversity and the initial step in the creation of a regional or global community that can organize the necessary collective action for dealing with regional and global problems.

7.2.1 Preserving Smaller Cultures. Ethnologue's 16th Edition lists 6,909 languages: 2,110 in Africa, 2,322 in Asia, 1,250 in the Pacific, 993 in the Western Hemisphere, and 234 in Europe.⁸¹ Of these, approximately 500 are near extinction and a similar number are safe. That leaves almost 6,000 languages with fates yet to be determined. By removing much of the pressure for language shift, 2 MT Bilingualism will allow more languages to survive and even flourish, sustaining greater cultural diversity.

What, if anything, should we do for the six thousand language communities whose languages are not safe? In dozens of books and hundreds of academic articles, linguists and other language mavens grapple with questions such as:

1) How many languages do we need? Does Papua New Guinea need over 800 languages? Does Europe need over 200 languages?

2) Which languages can be saved and which cannot? Is creating a written and oral record of a language enough, or must there be a population of speakers? If so, how many?

3) If there are multiple dialects with no consensus for selecting one as the standard, must we save every dialect? If not, how can we achieve

⁸¹ The number of languages varies among sources because of the subjective nature of distinguishing between a language and a dialect.

sufficient agreement to produce a consensus dictionary and grammar? Who decides and what criteria should they use?

4) Can we put a value on a language? What does it cost to save a language? Who should pay? Who is willing to pay?

The answer to all these questions lies in preserving choice, which should be made as locally as possible. If people want to save a language, no other reason should be necessary. If they do not, no reason will be sufficient. The fundamental question is: “How can people exercise their language preferences and still participate fully in local, national, and international communities?” The only possibility is complementary bilingualism. Linguists who are documenting endangered languages should, of course, continue to do so. My point is that complementary bilingualism can help communities preserve their relatively small languages *in situ*, preserving not only the language but also its associated culture.

7.2.2 Increasing Access to Diversity. I know enough Spanish to read a newspaper (slowly) and it is interesting and enlightening to do so. Like most people, my curiosity exceeds my linguistic competence. One of the most appealing things about 2 MT Bilingualism, to me as an individual, is its promise of comprehensive access to information and viewpoints from cultures all across the globe. Ideally, this will include travel and direct communication.

In a 1964 essay, *The African Writer and the English Language*, Chinua Achebe explained his decision to write in English: it was flexible enough for him to use English to express his African experience and gave him a much larger audience than any African language. He recalled reading Jorge Amado’s *Gabriella* in an English translation. It gave him a glimpse “of the exciting Afro-Latin culture, which is the pride of Brazil and is quite unlike any other culture.” He noted that there were hundreds of other Brazilian writers, but “the vast majority will be closed to the rest of the world forever, including no doubt the work of some excellent writers.”

He concluded, "There is certainly a great advantage to writing in a world language." Anyone who has read Mr. Achebe in English is grateful for his plurilingualism. With global 2 MT Bilingualism we would have access to thousands of comparably gifted writers and a correlative capacity to better understand their respective cultures.

Mr. Achebe's preference for English has been criticized by some who wish to elevate the indigenous African languages and are concerned that elite bilingualism is detrimental to the prestige and development of indigenous languages. Neglect of indigenous languages can lead to diglossia and language shifts. Among these, the Kenyan writer Ngugi Wa Thiongo was one of the most outspoken.

"...the bullet was the means of physical subjugation. Language was the means of spiritual subjugation."

Ngugi Wa Thiongo, *Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature* (1986)

Mr. Achebe's response to Mr. Thiongo was to point out that his native Igbo language has six major dialects and its unification was the product of missionary interest in translating The Bible. Missionaries created Union Igbo by assembling six Christian converts, one from each dialect community, and combining the dialects "in a strange hodge-podge with no linguistic elegance, natural rhythm or oral authenticity." 2 MT Bilingualism would help Igbo speakers preserve all six dialects, if they chose to do so. Thousands of other indigenous languages would benefit similarly.

Mr. Achebe's disdain for what he sees as an imposed (colonial) Union Igbo resonates with Mr. Thiongo's decolonizing position. Mr. Thiongo, writes in his native Gikuyu language but has been translated into English, in some cases by Mr. Thiongo himself. In service to his art, he is also practicing elite bilingualism. 2 MT Bilingualism with an easily learned and universally exogenous language would allow writers to avoid elite bilingualism.

Unquestionably, complementary bilingualism will increase the audience for writers from smaller language communities. This will benefit both the writers and their expanded audiences. In addition, all of the members of the small language communities will have access to global discourse, and other language communities will gain access to their ideas. At the same time, language shift and drift will be minimized.

“In fact, every political order conceived as a lasting institutional arrangement aspires to evoke and nurture the belief in its legitimacy.”

Christina von Haldenwang, *Measuring Legitimacy*
– *New Trends, Old Short Comings* (2016)

7.3 Strengthening Polities: Three Types of Legitimacy

Increasing legitimacy is crucial for any SV polity because it greatly reduces the costs of governance. The greater the legitimacy, the more readily people comply with laws and policies. In contrast, governance without adequate legitimacy is more despotic or chaotic. Linguistic congruence increases three types of legitimacy: *process* legitimacy (democracy), *outcome* legitimacy (growth), and *affective* legitimacy (identity).

Our medial prefrontal cortex generates a theory of the mind that helps us understand others. Mirror neurons, primarily in the parietal frontal mirror system and the limbic mirror system enable us to simulate and internalize their emotional experience. The total system (ToM Network), which also includes the temporoparietal junction, precuneus, and the posterior superior temporal sulcus, has particularly strong connections with the areas of the brain associated with language.

We can empathize with others because our brains evolved for us to do so. The ability to connect is critical for any social species. Because we are the only species with a fully developed language capacity, we can form societies with millions of members and cooperate with other, both larger and smaller, societies. There is no upward limit – as there is with other social animals. A shared language improves our access to the mental and emotional state

of our interlocutors through richer and more precise communication. This results in cognitive alignment that is essential for empathic understanding.

A common language does not automatically produce empathy or sympathy, but it creates the opportunity for them to be more fully experienced. Conversely, the lack of a common language limits the opportunity to non-verbal communication. Individuals or cultural groups in direct contact without a common language often misinterpret emotional cues and misunderstand values. This blocks empathy and sympathy. Linguistic barriers promote a different aspect of our evolutionary heritage – our propensity to create an “us – them” dichotomies and to dehumanize the “other.” Tolerance, cooperation and emotional access are higher in linguistically aligned groups.

“Language has served as a catalyst in creating strong relationships and social organization within as well as beyond kin groups, ultimately giving rise to tribes, villages, empires and states.”

J.C.J.M. Van Den Bergh, *Human Evolution
Beyond Biology and Culture* (2018)

7.3.1 The Cohesive Effect of a Common Goal. Establishing 2 MT Bilingualism will be a superordinate goal that increases affective legitimacy *from the moment the policy is announced*. It is not necessary to fully achieve linguistic congruence for the positive effects to emerge. Working toward a common goal immediately strengthens a common identity, decreases suspicion and increases trust. An immediate effect is crucial because the nation-states, region-states, India and the world need greater unity now.⁸²

The immediate effect of a superordinate (overriding) goal is best appreciated with an example of how working to achieve superordinate goals increases cohesion and cooperation. A University of Oklahoma study on

⁸² The rapid adoption of Bahasa Indonesia, as noted by Jared Diamond in an earlier quote, strongly suggests that substantial acquisition can take less than a single generation.

group formation and intergroup dynamics recruited 22 boys to spend three weeks at a summer camp. Behind the facade of a summer's idyll, an experiment in socialization was conducted (Sherif, Muzafer, *Experiments in Group Conflict*. Scientific American vol. 195, 1956).

The boys were split into two groups and arrived at the camp separately. Initially, they were kept apart and were unaware of each other. During a six day group formation period, each group engaged in activities designed to foster a group identity and group cohesion. Each group lived in a single dormitory, chose a name (Eagles and Rattlers) and designed a shirt that displayed the group's name. Late in the first week, the groups were moved close enough to become aware of each other but not close enough to interact. Mere knowledge of another group's proximity created feelings of territoriality. Each group spontaneously expressed negative feelings about the unseen others.

Over the next five days, a conflict phase, the groups participated in intergroup, zero-sum competitions. As expected, competition increased each group's solidarity as well as antipathy toward the other group. By the end of the conflict phase the boys sometimes engaged in aggressive behaviors that required staff intervention. The Eagles burned a Rattlers flag. The Rattlers retaliated by trashing the Eagles' cabin. Hostility and conflict can easily be promoted with competition between groups that have distinct identities.

The next two days were a cooling off phase, during which the boys were asked (interviewed) by the camp staff (experiment monitors) about their impressions of each group. Unsurprisingly, the members of each group had a high opinion of their own group and a low opinion of the other group.

In the final week, the two groups were combined. Initially, the combination engaged in neutral activities, like watching a movie together. There was no reduction in the polarization from participation in neutral shared activities. Subsequently, situations were contrived in which mutually desired results could only be achieved if the boys worked together or compromised. By the end of the final week, the original groups had

lost most of their salience and a general camaraderie emerged. Working together to achieve superordinate goals replaced hostility with cooperation and solidarity.

Applying the lessons of the Robbers Cave Study to 2 MT Bilingualism is straight-forward. A superordinate goal of establishing direct communication with a common language is the easiest and perhaps the only way to initiate the creation of a global community. Linguistic congruence is the key to the creation of region-states that can aggregate nation-states, in order to balance against the disproportionate agency of the empire-states. It will have equivalent benefits in multilingual and multinational India and in nation-states with significant ethnolinguistic diversity.

“Democratic participation cannot be effectively institutionalized if people cannot talk to each other, nor can opportunities be equalized among citizens from all linguistic groups or feelings of solidarity develop, across ethnic boundaries.”

Philippe Van Parijs, *The Linguistic Territorial Principle* (2011)

7.3.2 Process Legitimacy: Persuasion Not Coercion. It took decades of effort, usually bloodshed and always coercion to achieve the territorial monolingualism that provided the European nation-states with linguistic congruence. Despite the great cost, the payoff was also great. Linguistic congruence was an essential condition for legitimate and effective democracy.

A successful democracy requires much more than free and fair elections. Elections are merely a tool with which citizens periodically expresses a collective opinion about the job performance of incumbents and the relative appeal of challengers. Between elections, only linguistic congruence permits⁸³ the continuous civil dialogues which are a prerequisite to democratic governance.

⁸³ Permits, but does not guarantee. The current dysfunction in the USA clearly establishes that a common language is not always sufficient for democracy to flourish. The

“Among people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary to the working of representative government cannot exist.... The same books, newspapers, pamphlets, speeches, do not reach them. One section does not know what opinions, or what instigations, are circulating in another.”

John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861)

Consider the definition of democracy in Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address: “government of the people, by the people, for the people.” Without linguistic congruence, there is not “the (singular) people.” Majority rule only makes sense if it is the majority of a community that recognizes itself as “us.” When elections are held, being outvoted by “others” is experienced as tyranny rather than democracy. A common language is necessary to avoid the feeling that you are governed by others.

Even if the individual member states in a region-state are not democracies, the collective polity must be democratic. Region-states must be democratic because the aggregation of nation-states in the 21st Century must be consensual. Nation-states will only consent to political aggregation if the collective entity operates democratically. Coercion is neither desirable nor feasible. A region-state democracy, like any other democracy, requires linguistic congruence. Anything else will be experienced as tyranny. This is why nationalists in Europe can so easily complain about the EU’s democratic deficit.

“Democracy is inextricably bound with language and one wonders how it can be managed without a community of communication. Achieving meaningful, plurilingual democracy is a challenge that has not yet been taken up. It is perhaps the greatest obstacle to overcoming the EU’s democratic deficit.”

Susan Wright, *Community and Communication: The Role of Language in Nation State Building and European Integration* (2000)

other two empire-states are even less democratic. By establishing 2 MT Bilingualism, polities can increase their legitimacy even before becoming democratic.

The EU acknowledges that it has a serious *democratic deficit*. Until there is linguistic congruence between EU institutions of governance and a European demos, the EU democratic deficit will greatly retard “ever closer union.” Like Belgium, discussed in detail in Chapter 3, the EU will be at perpetual risk of splintering.

Once there is region-state linguistic congruence, political parties will be able to compete everywhere in a single language that encodes the regional identity. Political parties can organize and campaign across a multilingual region, not just form into post-election coalitions of nation-state parties whose primary agenda is success in nation-state elections or the provision of well paying sinecures for the political elite. Media can reach all citizens simultaneously and with a single message, promote broader conversations, and employ a common narrative. Candidates for a region-state office, such as for the presidency of the EU Commission, can debate in a common language. A directly elected Commission president who can speak to all Europeans in a common language would legitimize the EU in a powerful manner. Lack of linguistic congruence distances a regional government from its citizens, and distances citizens from different ethno-linguistic groups on matters of common concern.

“The relationship between linguistic variables and economic variables is the focus of a growing body of academic literature on multilingualism.”

European Parliament, *European Strategy for Multilingualism: Benefits and Costs* (2016)

7.3.3 Outcome Legitimacy: Economic Performance. No government can unilaterally determine the performance of its economy, but an improving economy increases the legitimacy of any government and economic failure decreases legitimacy. As increasing legitimacy makes governance easier, a growing economy is important for successful governance.

It is not controversial to note that a common language, even a *lingua franca*, substantially increases trade. In February 2009, the European Economic Review published a study by Jan and Janko Fidrmuc that

looked at the economic influence of a common language (English) on EU trade. They reached the following conclusions:

1) The availability of a dominant *lingua franca* (English) increases EU trade by 30% and is a main driver of international trade in Western Europe.

2) If EU countries increased their English proficiency by 10%, trade among them would increase by 14%.

3) If the other EU countries matched the success of the Netherlands in learning English it would increase their EU trade by 70%.

4) In the newer EU member states and candidate countries, the input of English is even greater. Trade is 74% higher than it would be without the current capacity in the dominant *lingua franca*.

5) Gains from a common language are equal to the gains from a common currency.

“If we consider the character of these newer nationalisms which, between 1820 and 1920 in almost all of them ‘national print-languages’ were of central ideological and political importance.”

B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (1983)

7.3.4 Affective Legitimacy: Patriotism Without Nationalism. The ultimate goal of an SV polity is civic solidarity. It is the hardest to accomplish because it cannot be done through economic policies, treaties or legislation. Only the people themselves can forge a civil community. It is not driven by pocketbook calculations or by the counting of the contents of ballot boxes, it is driven by mutual respect, empathy and solidarity. It requires affective legitimacy.

How easily civil solidarity can evaporate was demonstrated in the EU in the early summer of 2011. A serious outbreak of food borne illness in Germany affected almost 4000 people and killed over 50. On May 26, 2011, Germany blamed Spanish cucumbers, excluded them from

the German market, and notified other EU countries. The next day, the European Commission repeated the charge and specified two Andalusian farms as the source. The farms were closed and the sale of all Spanish produce was adversely affected. The losses to Spanish agriculture amounted to around \$200 million per week. The source of the infection was later determined to be in Lower Saxony, Germany. The inevitable result was hard feelings and charges of German condescension and bullying. Similar charges were made by Greeks, during the Euro Crisis.

“There can be no doubt that a tribe including many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience courage and sympathy, were always ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice themselves for the common good would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural selection

Charles Darwin *The Descent of Man* (1871)

Trade and finance do not require a civil community or any community, although a community is a more efficient economic space. However, both political and civic solidarity require direct and sustained communication. For the multi-state and multi-national EU, “ever closer union” now requires linguistic congruence that does not sacrifice diversity. The same is required for a successful AU and, in both cases, is only possible with complementary bilingualism.

Ritual and Symbolic Use of Languages. Politics (states) use symbols to represent themselves. Politically, there is always a flag. The same is true for other societies, as with “the cross” for Christianity. Symbols can be enhanced with the addition of a linguistic dimension, as in the case of oaths and songs, such as the Pledge of Allegiance and the Star-Spangled Banner in the USA, as well as with recitation of common prayers in a religious community. Critically, a common language is required.

Part IV

Improving Multi-State Governance

“The strong do as they will. The weak suffer as they must.”

The Melian Dialogue in Thucydides *History of
the Peloponnesian War* (circa 416 B.C.)

Chapter 8

Regional SV: Language Rationalization and Geopolitics.

In the 21st Century, the desire of the three empire-states for both autonomy and hegemony – either regional or global – has made high politics (defense and foreign relations) by regional organizations (EU, AU) essential, because their nation-state members cannot individually compete with or balance against the empire-states.

“Neither the United States nor its allies are eager to concede the obvious – that Washington is unlikely to use nuclear weapons first or even at all, save as a response to an attack on the American homeland.”

F. J. Garner, Dir. of H.A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins University in *Foreign Affairs* magazine (August 5, 2022)

8.1 High Politics: The Essential Regional Competence

High politics is an essential competence (authority and responsibility) for any sovereign state. After World War II, as Europeans focused on rebuilding their economies, their high politics was substantially outsourced to the USA. The Cold War dichotomy required a single “leader of the free world” to orchestrate the containment of communism. The substantial savings from outsourcing its high politics was sufficient to make a degree

of suzerainty acceptable – as long as the individual European nation-states were permitted to have a significant, if not decisive, voice.

In the 21st Century, the USA is less committed to Europe's defense and Europe is less willing to defer to the USA on matters of high politics. EU high politics has become a necessity, but it is not as easy to coordinate high politics as it is to coordinate economic policies. Nationalism is challenging the further integration required for high politics.

“The middle powers must act together, because if we are not at the table, we're on the menu.”

Canada PM Mark Carney, World Economic Forum January 20, 2026

8.1.1 Collective European Security. Article 47, Subsection 7 of the Lisbon Treaty established a mutual EU defense pact. In the event of armed aggression against any EU member, all other members committed to assist with *all the means in their power*.⁸⁴ Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Maastricht Treaty) extended the mutual obligation to support fellow EU members in the event of terrorism or a natural or man-made disaster.

One of the most difficult aspects of organizing a European security regime is the integration of its military forces. An efficient and effective organization is not possible without a restrictive language policy. NATO uses two, English and French. Fluency in either English or French is required, combined with a working knowledge of the other language. This is *elite reciprocal* bilingualism for Anglophones and Francophones, it is subordinating plurilingualism for all others.

Europe can use 2 MT Bilingualism to increase its capacity for high politics. There is already a successful military model of bilingual language rationalization in the *reciprocal bilingualism* of the Belgian Armed Forces.

⁸⁴ NATO is ambiguous about the degree of mutual support, Art. V refers to “such action as it deems necessary.”

2 MT Bilingualism would be even more effective for the far more linguistically diverse regional defense forces needed in both Europe (EU) and Africa (AU).

“Countries will have to earmark forces for joint action and train them together. They must be able to make hard decisions together – or suffer the consequences. After a transition period, collective security must be truly collective.”

Leslie H. Gelb, *Lest Foreign Wars Engulf Us* (1993)

Belgium's Military: Reciprocal Bilingualism. Belgium had problems, particularly during World War I, with primarily French speaking officers leading troops that primarily spoke Dutch. A bias towards promoting Francophone officers persisted, until the 1970's. Today, at induction, the language preference of a soldier is presumed to match that of their community of origin, unless they otherwise specify. Basic training is in that language and soldiers serve in monolingual units. Orders and commands are given in the soldier's first language.

Non-commissioned and commissioned officers are required to be fluent in either French or Dutch and to have a working knowledge of the other language. Fluency in both French and Dutch is required for Majors and above. The percentage of officers who are native speakers now matches the community, with 40% native French speakers and 60% native Dutch speakers. (There are no provisions for the soldiers whose native language is German, but they are often bilingual in French, as the small German community is an enclave within Francophone Wallonia).

Belgium's policy of reciprocal bilingualism demonstrates the feasibility of complementary bilingual congruence for a military's language rationalization. However, reciprocal bilingualism will not work for the AU or the EU. A policy of 2 MT Bilingualism will work, as it has the capacity to accommodate any amount of linguistic diversity. It will work even better than Belgium's reciprocal bilingualism because it will linguistically unify military forces across all ranks.

“450 million Europeans should not be begging 340 million Americans to protect Europe from 140 million Russians who cannot take on 38 million Ukrainians.”

European Defense Minister Andrew Kublius May 26, 2025

8.1.2 The EU: Russia Focused High Politics. Europeans want European high politics, including a robust EU security regime. In a 2022 Eurobarometer survey titled *Europeans Self-Defense and Energy Autonomy As Key Priorities*, 81% of EU citizens favored a common European defense and security policy. Europeans do not want NATO suzerainty and do not want their future to be dependence on the goodwill of the USA. At least two thirds of respondents in each country supported this viewpoint. A larger 85% think that defense co-operation at the EU level should be increased and an even larger 93% agreed that members should jointly defend the EU's territory. So far, the EU has adopted the rhetoric of regional high politics, but lacks actual capacity.

“Where we have not [federated], on defense, on industrial policy, on foreign affairs, we are treated as a loose assembly of middle-sized states to be divided and dealt with accordingly.”

Mario Bragi, former Italian PM and ECB Chief, February 2, 2026

It is one thing to support the concept of EU high politics, but quite different to put it into practice. It cannot happen in 24 languages. It can only happen with a policy of complementary bilingualism – ideally 2 MT Bilingualism. The value of linguistic congruence for high politics is starkly revealed by the disparity between Russian high-politics and Europe's largely rhetorical high-politics.

According to the World Bank, the 2022 GDP of the EU (\$24.3 trillion in PPP) was over four and a half times that of the Russian Federation (\$5.33 trillion).⁸⁵ The population of Russia is about 150 million, one-third

⁸⁵ In 2022, the USA spent \$877 billion on defense, about twice what the EU spent, despite that fact that the EU shares a border with a hostile Russian empire-state.

of the population of the EU. Prior to the invasion of Ukrainian, the EU members spend 225 billion (dollar equivalent) for defense, three times as much as Russia's 70 billion (dollar equivalent). With triple Russia's population, an economy four times as large, and a defense budget three times as large, the EU in 2022 was dependent on the USA led NATO, leaving Europe's fate in the hands of two empire-states: Russia and the USA.

"The decisive bottleneck is therefore neither money nor technology. Implementation of the programme depends on political prioritization and leadership, industrial coordination, and the willingness to leave behind the inefficient and costly fragmentation of European defence."

Achieving European Defense Autonomy, Kiel Institute
for the World Economy. May 2026.

A combination of factors has created a sense of urgency (but limited action) for the EU to become more self-reliant and less dependent on the USA: 1) Russia's two invasions of Ukraine, 2) President Trump's declaration that NATO was obsolete (later walked back) and a bipartisan Congressional complaint about insufficient European defense spending, 3) the shifting of the USA's military focus to Asia and the Pacific, 4) massive and continuing deficits in the USA federal budget that will eventually require significant spending reduction, including a reduction in its subsidy of Europe's defense, and 5) political stalemate in Washington that erodes the leadership capacity of the USA.⁸⁶

"'You didn't pay? You're delinquent?' ... No, I would not protect you. In fact, I would encourage them (Russia) to do whatever the hell they want."

Presidential candidate Donald Trump February 10, 2024

It is the height of folly for the EU to fail to establish self-reliance in security and foreign affairs. Yet the EU cannot seem to wean itself from reliance on an external source of security. Nor, in the absence of USA

⁸⁶ The Republican caucus in the House of Representatives is split over continuing to provide military aid to Ukraine.

leadership, can the EU coordinate its foreign policy beyond the issuance of anodyne press releases that reflect the lowest common denominator.

The European response to the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has been surprisingly robust. The EU, in general, and Germany, in particular, finally show a serious interest in increasing defense budgets. But nothing short of a war of aggression on its doorstep, it seems, can bring the EU together. Even then, the European response was often been led by its members who are on the frontline with Russian. *Ad hoc* reactions, even if they are more robust than expected, are not a common defense strategy or foreign policy.

“US officials, meanwhile, were reported by Reuters last December to have told their European counterparts that they must assume primary responsibility for Europe’s defense by 2027.”

E. B. Kapstein, Princeton University and RAND Corporation,
et al. *Europe’s New Defense Core*, April 10, 2026

8.1.3 The AU: Regionally Focused High Politics. During the Cold War, the USSR and the USA used African nation-states and political movements as proxies. As a result, weapons poured into the continent. This was extremely destabilizing and the ensuing chaos severely hampered economic development, to say nothing of the opportunity cost incurred by using limited capital for destruction rather than production. Similar intra-continental polarization could result from the increasing competition between China and the USA.

To prevent this from occurring, the African Union needs to accelerate the development of its African Peace and Security Architecture.⁸⁷ Whether Africa’s internal security is established at a regional or continental level, or both, the linguistic congruence of its security forces is essential. The Belgian model of reciprocal complementary bilingualism is not possible for a force composed of soldiers from scores of language communities. Only comple-

⁸⁷ The African Peace and Security Architecture has five pillars: the African Standby Force, the Peace and Security Council, the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, and the Peace Fund.

mentary bilingualism can accomplish the necessary linguistic congruence. If the AU takes the highly beneficial step of adopting 2 MT Bilingualism at the continental level, it will greatly improve the current and potential effectiveness and efficiency of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

8.2 Regulating Global Capital and Corporations as High Politics

While governments try to limit the influence of other governments, they are shockingly open to being influenced by global capital. Fewer and larger polities, such as the potential region-states in Europe, Africa, Latin America and South East Asia, could more easily coordinate their policies for greater equity in global taxation and the regulation of global capital.

Global capital and corporations are more powerful than most countries and their regulation should be considered an aspect of high politics. Instead of only using Adam Smith's invisible hand as a means of establishing prices and making market defined allocations, global capitalism promotes the mindless production of nonessential and disposable commodities for the sole purpose of the endless accumulation of capital. At its most dangerous, under regulated capitalism produces harmful effects, such as global warming, and uses its economic power to prevent an adequate political response.

"Transnational corporations have become the dominant force directing our world. Humanity is accelerating towards a precipice of over consumption and the large transnational corporations are the primary agents driving us there."

Jeremy Lent, *Five Ways to Curb the Power of Corporations* (Open Democracy, July 22, 2018)

Fossil Fuel Dependent Corporations Dwarf Most Governments. If you list countries and corporations together, ranked according to revenue, 69 of the top 100 are corporations and only 31 are countries.⁸⁸ 157 of

⁸⁸ This data was provided by Global Justice Now (2018.) The specifics vary by source and date, but the annual shuffling of positions does not change the basic fact.

the top 200 are companies. Each of the top six corporations has annual revenues in excess of the annual tax collection of India.

Twenty-one of the top 100 are almost exclusively dependent on the production or burning of fossil fuels. The total annual revenue of these twenty-one companies is more than the annual revenue of the USA government. This list only includes the largest businesses which are highly dependent on generating the atmospheric pollution that causes global warming. A comprehensive list, including both smaller and more diversified corporations, would yield far larger total figures. Their collective influence makes it much harder for governments to respond appropriately to global warming.

“... the combined profits, taxes, and royalties generated by the oil and gas industry over the past few months would be enough to capture every single molecule of CO₂ produced by their activities and re-inject them back underground. So why are we only talking about transforming society and not about obliging a highly profitable industry to clean up the mess caused by the products it sells?”

Professor Myles Alan, Oxford University, *World Close to ‘irreversible’ climate breakdown, warn major studies*, The Guardian October 27, 2022

Insanity: UN Report on Petro-States. The energy plans of the petro-states contradict their climate policies and pledges. The world’s fossil fuel producers are planning expansions that would blow the planet’s carbon budget twice over. Experts called the plans “insanity” which “throw humanity’s future into question.”⁸⁹

Current plans would lead to 460% more coal production, 83% more gas, and 29% more oil in 2030 than it is possible to burn if global

⁸⁹ The fourth edition of the Production Gap Report examines the difference between planned fossil fuel production and the levels of production consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C or 2°C. The report is a collaboration among research and academic institutions, including more than 80 experts from 30 countries. It is peer-reviewed, with guidance and support from the UN Environment Programme, and is reviewed under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

temperature rise is to be kept to the internationally agreed 1.5° C. The plans would also produce 69% more fossil fuels than is compatible with a far riskier 2° C target.

“Since the 1960s, despite enormous growth in pretax corporate earnings, global corporate tax revenues have been in decline; globalization and the rise of the digital economy have accelerated this trend.”

Joseph E Stiglitz, Prof. of economics, Columbia University, *The International Tax System is Broken*, in Foreign Affairs July 3, 2024

Nation-States are Useful to Global Capital. Competition among nation-states for global capital allows global capital to avoid taxes, minimize regulations, and off-load externalities. Global capital does not even need to collude. It is unified by the reflexive externalizing of costs onto society, and the rabid avoidance of both taxes and government oversight. Capital easily out maneuvers the individual nation-states at the expense of global equity and our children’s future.

A good example of global capital’s ability to manipulate nation-states *but not region-states* is Apple’s locating the monetization of its *intellectual property* to corporate tax friendly Ireland. Apple used a practice called the *double Irish structure*⁹⁰ to take advantage of a difference in tax law between Ireland and the USA.⁹¹ Only because the EU acted was this practice even challenged. Still, Apple beat the EU in court – a win worth 14.5 billion dollars. The EU was subsequently able to force Ireland to close the loophole in 2020, demonstrating the critical need for nation-states to aggregate into region-states.

⁹⁰ Two subsidiaries, ASI and AOE, incorporated in Ireland but managed and controlled from a tax haven (Bermuda), were assigned the right to monetize Apple intellectual property. Because of differences between the corporate tax law in the USA, which used the place of incorporation (Ireland) and Ireland, which used the place of central management and control, (Bermuda) both countries treated ASI and AOE income as foreign earnings.

⁹¹ The USA changed its tax code in 2017 and it now uses a territorial approach, based on the location of sales

“... we will not have the time, nor the means to finance our own strategic autonomy and we will become vassals, whereas we could become the third pole [in the world order] if we have a few years to develop this.”

French President Emmanuel Macron (April 4, 2023)

Chapter 9

Revitalizing the EU and the AU

This chapter looks at the further integration that can be realized by the EU and the AU from the adoption of a language rationalization policy of 2 MT Bilingualism. Ideally, both would choose the same common language. A joint decision would create Eurafrika, a symbiotic relationship between Europe and Africa that could be the Chimerica of the 21st Century. Either the AU or the EU, or both, can tip the first domino for global 2 MT Bilingualism by convincing the UN to make the same choice as its global policy. This would benefit all of the other potential region-states and every multilingual nation-state.

9.1 The EU: Increasing Democratic Legitimacy

The EU has an institutional policy of elite *multilingualism* and a separate policy of citizen *plurilingualism*. It can replace both with a single policy of 2 MT Bilingualism. The result would be an increase in the EU's democratic legitimacy that would promote “ever closer union.”

9.1.1 The Democratic Deficit. The EU is often accused of being an elite run project that is fundamentally undemocratic. The perception of elitism begins with the elite multilingualism of EU institutions. What EU citizens want is a policy of complementary bilingualism for both the

citizens and the institutions. Without complementary bilingualism, the EU can never be truly democratic.

Elite Multilingualism: The EU Institutional Language Policy. The EU asserts that all 24 of its official languages are treated equally in EU institutions. In the real world, achieving equality for 24 languages is absurd. In practice, English is the first among three elite languages. It is followed by French and German. Second and third places are converging and losing ground to elite English bilingualism. Nevertheless, Germans seek equality with French and French seek equality with English. Other member states cannot even aspire to equality.⁹²

“There can be little doubt that size itself can be a group-level adaptation. Larger societies tend to replace smaller societies *unless their larger size is offset by problems of coordination* and internal conflicts of interest.” (emphasis added).

D. S. Wilson, *Darwin's Cathedral:
Evolution, Religion and the Nature of Society* (2002)

When Denmark joined the EU in 1973 it suggested that the EU have two official languages, French and English, but that Anglophones could only use French and Francophones could only use English. The loudest objections came from the French and the British. While the cleverly ironic suggestion was rejected, the Danes succeeded brilliantly in showing that the two dominant language communities were not interested in equality.

“Europe has arrived at a crossroads. Either Europe develops into a political union and becomes a truly global player, or it moves backward as a continent of nation-states that have neither political nor economic clout on a global level.”

Gerhard Schroder, Former German Chancellor 10/10/2011

⁹² This dynamic played out in the prolonged and contentious creation of Europe's unitary patent system and unified patent court which was belatedly established in January of 2022.

The charade of linguistic equality reflects an EU *language policy paralysis*. All of the language communities, even the privileged ones, would be better served by a single and exogenous language that both minimizes and equalizes the linguistic burden of achieving linguistic congruence. That is only possible with a policy of 2 MT Bilingualism.

“It is clear that there is a pressing need to find a way for all Europeans to associate if the European Union is ever to become more than a trading association run in an autocratic way by plurilingual patrician technocrats The difficulty is how to do this Firstly, which languages to promote ... and secondly, how to persuade Europeans to acquire them.”

Susan Wright, *Community and Communication* (2000)

Elite Plurilingualism: The EU Community Language Policy. The Treaty on the European Union (1992) granted the EU a new competence in the field of language education. A full decade later, the EU Council finally used this authority, but in a limited manner. It established an *aspirational* goal of mother tongue + two foreign languages (MT + 2), a policy which *cannot* achieve linguistic congruence.

“44. The European Council calls for further action in this field [education] ... by teaching at least two foreign languages from a very early age....”

Barcelona European Council 15–16 March
2002 Presidency Conclusions

The EU Council left the implementation of the aspirational goal to the member states, who responded by maintaining their long-standing and failed policy of elite plurilingualism. English, Spanish, French and German remain the only options for most students. Often only two or three languages are offered. The consequent choices of Europe’s upper secondary (ICSD level 3) students in 2018, according to Eurostat, were: English 96.1%, Spanish 25.9%, French 22.0%, German 20.4%, Italian 3.1% and Russian 2.7%.⁹³ With English study nearly universal, it is fair

⁹³ The total exceeds 100% because many high school students studied two languages, in response to the EU aspirational goal of MT +2 plurilingualism and the expectations of college admissions offices.

to look at the results as data on the suitability of English for the role of common language in a policy of complementary bilingualism.⁹⁴

“Despite the massive investment in the teaching of English in the education system ... there is still no common language that is widely spoken at a good or proficient level by the vast majority of European citizens.”

European Parliament, *European Strategy for Multilingualism: Benefits and Costs* (2016)

Except for occasional surveys based on unreliable self-evaluations,⁹⁵ there is no quantified data to indicate whether the massive effort to teach English has resulted in a substantial capacity to use English, whether there are trends or whether and to what extent what was learned is retained after leaving school.

“The vast majority of respondents declared themselves as having an elementary or intermediate level of language competence ... (for English) only 20% assess their level as ‘very good.’ The level of language proficiency is not expected to improve considerably in the near future.”

European Parliament, *European Strategy for Multilingualism: Benefits and Costs* (2016)

The closest that the EU has ever come to generating useful data was the *First European Survey on Language Competences: Final Report* (2012) (ESLC). Despite use of the word “first” in the title, this report has never been repeated. There is no significant measure of progress – if any.⁹⁶ The limitations of the 2012 were so severe that it resulted in no policy changes. This is disappointing, since the one thing it did establish was a

⁹⁴ The suitability of English, generally, is discussed in §11.2, *infra*.

⁹⁵ Kruger, Justin and David Dunning, *Unskilled and Unaware of it: How Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments*. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Dec. 1999.

⁹⁶ A self-reporting survey in 2024 reported a small (3%) improvement in proficiency. Special Eurobarometer 540 (2024).

great disparity among members in the results of their teaching of foreign languages.

“The reported results indicated an overall low level of competences in both first and second foreign languages tested.”

The European Survey on Language Competences: School-internal and External Factors in Language Learning (2012)

Perhaps the biggest defect was that it tested students while they were learning the languages. Thus, there was no measure of retention. It was, in effect, a peak measurement. A test of any language policy must also measure its long-term effects – years after the end of formal education. Language attrition is not well studied, but it appears that attrition in the five years after formal education is quite large when the language is not used on a regular basis. A study of former students, a decade after the end of formal education, would be useful. Nevertheless, the limited data is sobering.

“... to circumvent conflicts, European institutions have thus far avoided openly addressing the language question.”

Peter A. Kraus, *A Union of Diversity: Language, Identity and Polity Building in Europe* (2008)

9.1.2 EU Citizens Want Complementary Bilingualism. Despite the willful blindness of EU policymakers, it is widely recognized that both the institutional policy of *elite* multilingualism and the community language policy of MT +2 *elite* plurilingualism have failed. Not surprisingly, they are not what Europeans want. They want 2 MT Bilingualism. The term 2 MT Bilingualism was not used, of course, but the expressed desires of the EU citizens for a common language and language equity was clearly expressed in 2012. That the same question has not been asked since then is reminiscent of the French government’s decision not to ask citizens about language use after the results of the 1794 census.

“A model using more than one common language, such as English, French and German, can simply not guarantee communication between all EU citizens, as they must inevitably have one language in common.”

A. Bastardas-Boada, *Language and identity policies in the global age* (2012)

The two key findings in Special Eurobarometer 386 (EB386), *Europeans and Their Languages*⁹⁷ were:

(1) Complementary Bilingualism. Approximately seven in 10 Europeans (69%) thought that Europeans should have a common language. Europeans’ appreciate the importance of linguistic congruence.

(2) An Exogenous Choice. A large majority of Europeans (81%) thought that all of the official languages spoken within the EU should be treated the same. In other words, the EU should not privilege any European language community. Neither French congruence nor German congruence is an option. Only an exogenous choice can treat all language communities equally.

Only one change is required for the EU to go from its current community policy of MT + 2 plurilingualism⁹⁸ to a consistent community and institutional policy of 2 MT Bilingualism: replace one of the +2 languages with a second MT that provides congruence with a single and universally exogenous language choice. Switching from the current, but merely aspirational, policy of *three* languages (MT +2) to the *two* languages of 2 MT Bilingualism will free up substantial time for students to study other subjects. As EU congruence is achieved with the second MT, those who still wish to acquire a third language may choose a non-European language.

⁹⁷ *Special Eurobarometer 386* (2012) and the *European Survey on Language Competences* (ESLC, 2012) both examine European language skills but differ in scope: EB386 focused on self-reported usage and attitudes toward multilingualism in the general population, while the ESLC evaluates the actual proficiency of 14–15 year old students and the influencing factors.

⁹⁸ The individual’s mother tongue and two *foreign* languages.

“Of the many factors decisively affecting the capacity of the new governments to mount social, political and economic structures that were essential to the building of self governing nations, language was probably the most complex.”

Abdulaziz and Fox, *“Evaluation Report on Survey of Language Use and Language Teaching of East Africa”* (1978)

9.2 The AU: Overcoming Persistent Colonial Legacies

No region has a greater need for language rationalization than Africa. It is needed both for regional unity and for the preservation of more of Africa’s tremendous ethnolinguistic diversity. Africa has over 2,000 indigenous languages. The AU designated all languages of Africa as official and, in 2001, the AU created the African Academy of Languages to harmonize all 2,000 languages and safeguard the endangered ones. Only 2 MT Bilingualism is capable of achieving both of these goals.

2 MT Bilingualism is also needed to maximize the human capital of Africa’s many small language communities, reduce poverty, support democracy, and create more rational political boundaries. This section looks at the rational boundaries problem and at the economic benefits of linguistic congruence in Africa.⁹⁹ As with the EU, the question of which language is the best choice for Africa is best left to those with authority and responsibility. Ideally, both the AU and the EU will choose the same common language.

“There is not much sense in building Africa in sovereign States, independent of each other for we know that it is from our union and from it alone, that we shall draw sufficient strength to assert ourselves in the world.”

François Tombalbaye, former President of the Republic of Chad

⁹⁹ The regional governments’ legitimacy benefits of 2 MT Bilingualism will be the same for the AU as for the EU. Thus, this section focuses on the specific benefits for the AU.

9.2.1 Establishing Rational Political Boundaries. Europeans required hundreds of years of (often violent) cultural, social and political convergence to establish their nation-state boundaries.¹⁰⁰ Africa's post-colonial leaders tried to avoid a similar prolonged, painful, and bloody process by retaining the colonial boundaries after exorcising the European colonial regimes. As colonial boundaries were established for the convenience of colonial governance, any degree of rationality from the perspective of the needs of the indigenous population was merely serendipitous.

Unfortunately, such serendipity was rare. Africa's task, to put it mildly, was daunting. The combined effect of multiple colonial languages, thousands of indigenous languages, and the creation of irrational boundaries is especially clear in the case of The Gambia¹⁰¹ and Cameroon. To varying degrees this compound problem exists in most of post-colonial Africa.

"Africa is one continent, one people, and one nation."

Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first President and founding member of the Organization for African Unity

The Republic of The Gambia. Portuguese slave traders set up shop at the mouth of the Gambia River, a route by which slaves were transported from the interior. After abolishing slavery, the British replaced the Portuguese in The Gambia, but only gained control of the Gambia River and less than 20 km along each bank. Except for a short Atlantic coast, this Anglophone country is entirely enclosed by Francophone Senegal. The metaphor of a tapeworm is often used, as a glance at a map of the two countries will explain.

¹⁰⁰ Given the current circumstances in the Balkans, the task of establishing stable European nation-state boundaries may still be incomplete.

¹⁰¹ Like The Bahamas, The Gambia includes the definite article in its name.

The Gambia became independent in 1965, five years after Senegal. In 1981 a coup attempt led The Gambia's president to request military aid from Senegal. This led to a union called the Senagambia Confederation. The linguistically divided Senagambia Confederation lasted only seven years. Like the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the clear linguistic fault line made the split uncontroversial in both parts of the linguistically divided confederation.

Were it not for the slave trade and European colonialism, The Gambia would not exist. It is a colonial artifact and an anachronism that needs to be part of a larger polity if it is to achieve an adequate scale for a modern economy. The consolidation could be Senegambia, again, or it could be a larger West African polity based on the historic Mali Empire (1235 CE to 1670 CE). Most likely it will be the current Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which is discussed below. Almost anything makes more sense than an Anglophone tapeworm inside of Francophone Senegal.

“... the state system that first grew out of European feudalism and now, in the post-colonial period, covers virtually the entire earth provides the framework in which ethnic conflict occurs. Control of the state and exemption from control by others are the main goals of ethnic conflict.”

D.L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (2nd Ed. 2000)

Cameroon. The 27+ million citizens of Cameroon speak over 250 languages. Its official languages of administration are both French and English.¹⁰² Cameroon also recognizes six other languages: Fula, Ewondo, Igbo, Chadian Arabic, Camfranglais and Cameroonian Pidgin English.

Cameroon (Kamerun) was a German colony from 1884 until 1919. After World War I it was divided by the League of Nations (LON) into a British mandate called Cameroon and a French mandate called

¹⁰² A parallel with Belgium's French and Dutch division is noted but, with 250 indigenous language communities, reciprocal bilingualism is not a solution for Cameroon.

Cameroun. In 1946 these LON mandates became UN trusteeships. French Cameroun gained independence in 1960 and British Cameroon gained independence the following year. The two former trusteeships then joined to become the Federal Republic of Cameroon.

Sultan Ibrahim Njoya of Bamum (c. 1860 – 1933)

Researching this book, I learned of the work of Sultan Njoya of Bamum, now part of Cameroon. I was impressed. He deserves to be remembered.

Sultan Njoya created a unique script for the written expression of the Bamum language (Shū Pamom or Shūmom Bamoun). He also supervised the writing, in that script, of a comprehensive book on the customs and history of Bamum.

Sultan Njoya was an early supporter of literacy in indigenous languages. During his reign, Bamum had forty-seven schools that taught in the Bamum language and a printing press for producing educational materials in the Bamum language.

His creation of written Bamum, support for literacy in the Bamum language and authoritative book on the customs and history of his people are a remarkable legacy. Sultan Njoya deserves to be remembered for both his visionary leadership and impressive scholarship.

In 1972 Cameroon abolished its federal system and power was centralized. Ten semiautonomous regions are now administered by elected regional councils, but these councils are led by presidential appointees. In 1990, after 24 years of one party rule, Cameroon reestablished multiparty politics. This led to the creation of language based parties and pressure for greater autonomy in the Anglophone areas – even for complete secession and the creation of an Anglophone nation-state called the Republic of Ambazonia.

Since 2016, the 25% of Cameroons population which uses English has actively resisted the political dominance of the 58% which uses French. The linguistic divide is also a proxy for other cleavages (ethnic and religious). The primary electoral cleavage is between a largely Anglophone party, the Social Democratic Front, and a largely Francophone party, the Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement. Linguistic congruence with

French seems unlikely. Congruence with English is impossible. 2 MT Bilingualism with any choice other than English or French could help to heal Cameroon's linguistic divide.

"When they coordinate regionally, such as through the East African Community or the African Continental Free-Trade Area, they create a scale that individual economies cannot achieve alone... [and the] current international architecture, built on the assumption that the developing countries will remain rule takers, becomes unsustainable."

Lyla Latif, University of Nairobi.
The Conversation. February 22nd, 2006

9.2.2 Economic Growth: Market Size and Coherence. As with the EU, a common language is necessary for the AU to take full advantage of the economic benefits from the four freedoms of movement (capital, goods, services and labor) that are the heart of regional economic integration. Africa lacks a dominant *lingua franca*, like English in Europe. Consequently, there are two aspects in which the economic benefits of complementary bilingualism for the AU will be greater than for the EU: 1) a much larger increase in intra-African trade, and 2) a huge increase in market size and the consequently greater viability of domestic manufacturing.

Regional Economic Community (REC) and Linguistic Congruence. Africa's search for more rational boundaries for governance is using regional economic communities as the primary mechanism. The AU established the African Economic Community (AEC), composed of eight Regional Economic Communities (REC)¹⁰³ and delegated responsibility for economic convergence to them. The goals of the AEC are similar to the goals of the EU.

¹⁰³ Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC),

The AU's Six Goals

Phase One: Strengthen the seven Regional Economic Communities (REC).

Phase Two: Set a timetable for the liberalization of regional and intra-regional trade, establish uniform customs duties and strengthen the integration of sectors; particularly trade, agriculture, money and finance, transportation, communication and energy.

Phase Three: Each REC becomes a Free Trade Area and, subsequently, a Customs Union.

Phase Four: Coordinate and harmonize tariff and non-tariff barriers among the RECs, establishing a continental customs union.

Phase Five: Establish an African Common Market (ACM).

Phase Six: Establish a Pan African Parliament. Consolidate and strengthen the structures of the ACM, including free movement of peoples and factors of production. Create a Pan African Economic and Monetary Union, African Central Bank and African Currency;

Of the eight REC, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is one of the most advanced. ECOWAS is a good example of an unnecessary linguistic division within a REC. Its 15 nation-state members are divided between an overwhelmingly Francophone subgroup of eight, called the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), and an overwhelmingly Anglophone subgroup of six, the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ).¹⁰⁴ One ECOWAS member, the Lusophone archipelago of Cabo Verde, belongs to neither subgroup. Complementary bilingualism would allow ECOWAS to operate without the internal division between UEMOA and WAMZ.

A lack of linguistic congruence, due to multiple colonial languages, hampers the unity of all but two of the REC. (The IGAD uses only English and the UMA uses only Arabic.) The impact of multiple colonial languages at the AU level is, of course, even more complex than in the case of any individual REC. 2 MT Bilingualism can eliminate all linguistic barriers in Africa. If adopted, it will permit any combination of Africa's nation-states to join together into larger and more economically and politically successful polities with linguistic congruence.

¹⁰⁴ One WAMZ member, Guinea-Bissau, is Lusophone (Portuguese).

“In Latin America, Africa, India and South Asia, and the Middle East, less than 1/5 of trade takes place within each region. Not coincidentally, these countries have grown more slowly than many of their emerging-market peers Without strong commercial ties to nearby nations, workers and consumers are largely left on the ends of global supply chains, relegated to sending out raw materials and bringing in final goods. The lack of neighborhood ties means most imports have little local content ... goods from distant shores compete with, rather than support, local manufacturers.”

S. K. O'Neill, *The Globalization Myth: Why Regions Matter* (2022)

Increasing Intra-African Trade. Trade volume among African nations represents approximately 10% of total AU trade. In comparison, intra-European trade is approximately 60% of the total trade of the EU. Clearly there is much room for improvement in the AU.

In *Language and Foreign Trade*,¹⁰⁵ Jacques Melitz looked at literacy, linguistic diversity, the distinction between direct communication and translation, the role of a *lingua franca* and the impact of network externalities. He found that 1) a common language increases trade, 2) direct communication is three times as effective as translation, 3) if a market has internal language barriers, there will be increased trade with economies outside of the market, and 4) there is less trade between countries with high linguistic diversity.

“By the end of this century, the UN projects that Africa, which had less than one-tenth of the world’s population in 1950, will be home to 3.9 billion people, or 40% of humanity.... by 2050, 40% of all the people under 18 in the world will be African...”

Howard W. French, *Megalopolis: How coastal west Africa will shape the coming century*, *The Guardian*, October 27, 2022.

Africa’s Increasing Market Size and Domestic Manufacturing. On this point, the reference is not the EU but China. The current population in the

¹⁰⁵ European Economic Review, Volume 52, Issue 4, May 2008, Pages 667–699.

AU is roughly equal to China's and demographic trends will make Africa's market size much larger, while China's becomes smaller. The UN estimates that Africa's population can reach 2.49 billion by the year 2050 (over 25% of the global total) and 4.28 billion by the end of the century (40% of the global total). By comparison, China's population at the end of the century is expected to decrease to 767 million and could be as low as 488 million.¹⁰⁶ If this happens, Africa's population will be more than seven times as large as China's! Nigeria alone, in 2100, could have the second largest population in the world – more people than China, but fewer than India.

China's economic rise was possible, in large measure, because of the size of its *unified* government and market. Africa, no matter how populous it becomes, cannot use the path that China used to lift many millions from poverty unless it establishes what China has – linguistic congruence and a unified market. A pan-African market will eventually become the world's largest by a wide margin.

"How good and how pleasant it would be before God and man, yeah to see the unification of all Africans.

Bob Marley

I am not advocating (or opposing) a formal policy of import substitution. I am not an economist and take no position on economic controversies. I simply note that the consolidation of Africa's polities into a single market will justify the shifting of manufacturing capacity to Africa to avoid tariffs and other regulatory costs. A unified Africa polity could use the same incentives and disincentives that China used to transfer technology, find international partners with the necessary intellectual property and expertise, and attract capital with a long term commitment.

¹⁰⁶ A population of 488 million is the UN's low estimate, in which the total fertility rate is projected to be 0.5 births below that of the medium estimate. Trends in China, South Korea and Japan support this outcome. The 767 million medium projection assumes that China's total fertility rate will *increase* from 1.18 children per woman in 2022 to 1.48 children per woman in 2100. Current trends make this scenario vanishingly unlikely.

“Network commonwealths can accomplish most of the good that global governance promises, without the dangers of a universal and homogenous state. It is a new sort of organization built on what is itself a new emerging cultural pattern, namely ‘network civilizations.’ A network civilization is a group of nations sharing language, customs, history, legal systems, religions and other significant values – most specifically trust characteristics.”

James C. Bennett, *The Anglosphere Challenge* (2004)

Chapter 10

SV Networks: Global Governance Without a Hierarchy

This chapter proposes harmonizing the governance of diverse and even non-contiguous nation-states or very large aggregations that even include one or more empire-states or a region-states and any number of nation-states. This will require a language rationalization policy of 2 MT Bilingualism. It could, but need not, be built on the existing Commonwealth of Nations (Commonwealth). It could also be built on the BRICS+ or from a region-state. The EU and AU, *Eurafrica*,¹⁰⁷ could create an SV network, as could the EU and Latin America.

The fifty-two current members of the Commonwealth circle the planet and are diverse in every dimension. India, has 1.3 billion citizens. At the other end of the spectrum, Tuvalu has about 10,000. The largest by

¹⁰⁷ A successor to *Chimerica*.

area is Canada, at nearly 10 million square kilometers. Tuvalu, at only 26 square kilometers, again sets the lower boundary. Proficiency in English is equally varied. Data is not always comparable, but estimates range from nearly everyone, in several former settlement colonies, to single digits in at least two.

“... the challenge of the new era will be met by those solutions that take existing institutions and alter them enough to meet new demands but no more, merely because such is the least costly solution.”

James C. Bennett, *The Anglosphere Challenge* (2004)

10.1 The Commonwealth: Potentially a Global Majority

The modern Commonwealth was born on April 28, 1949, when a Commonwealth Ministers' Conference deleted the word British from the Commonwealth's name. The ministers also removed the requirement that members must be British dominions. The precipitating cause for these change was the the imminent birth of the Republic of India.

Subsequently, membership requirements were further loosened. The Edinburgh Declaration in 1997 opened membership to any sovereign country with a direct constitutional link to an existing member. At the same time, an *ad hoc* exception was made to admit the former Portuguese colony of Mozambique. In 2009, an exception was made for Rwanda. It is now at least implied that applicants can be considered on a case by case basis without strictly adhering to membership requirements.

With membership criteria detached from history, the Commonwealth is no longer an exercise in nostalgia. But what should it become? What can it become? If it chooses, the Commonwealth can be a dominant global network.

From Elite Bilingualism to Complementary Bilingualism. English will remain the world's dominant *lingua franca* in the near future. To take full advantage of this linguistic advantage, the Commonwealth only needs to change its *de facto* policy of elite English bilingualism into a *de jure*

policy of 2 MT (English) Bilingualism. The Commonwealth already uses English to promote a global culture of economic and political freedom that knits together dozens of countries in a voluntary self-help network. It simply needs to become a more robust and ambitious version of itself.¹⁰⁸

Expanding the Commonwealth. In an expanding Commonwealth, all current members would be “grandfathered,” and new admission criteria for applicants could include a flexible requirement for some degree of English proficiency. Even with a relatively high proficiency threshold, which may not be necessary or optimal for other reasons, there could be many important additions to the Commonwealth. A high priority, for example, might be to encourage both the USA and the Republic of Ireland to become Commonwealth members.

From continental Europe, potential members would include many of the Nordic and Germanic countries. Germany has almost 50 million English speakers, of varied competence, constituting about 70 percent of its population. Austria has a similar percentage. Sweden, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands are even higher. These new European members of the Commonwealth would create a substantial overlap with the EU, expanding the Commonwealth’s network effects.

All of the individual members of the EU and the AU, if they adopted a policy of English based 2 MT Bilingualism, could be added as members. Similarly, any otherwise qualified nation-state that adopted a *de jure* policy of 2 MT Bilingualism could be admitted to provisional membership.

The invitation list would also include the Philippines, where English language proficiency is equivalent to that of the more English proficient EU members. This would greatly increase the overlap with the ASEAN. In Africa, using a majority as the proficiency criteria would add Liberia (89%) and Nigeria (≈50%). This would increase the already substantial

¹⁰⁸ Chapter 11 discussed a designed English dialect called Common(wealth) English as a way to avoid elite bilingualism. Given the experience of Europe, discussed in Chapter 9, unmodified English is probably not the optimal choice.

overlap with the AU. In Latin America, English proficiency is low but, on an *ad hoc* basis, the Commonwealth could consider Argentina, which has the regions greatest English capacity and is the South American country where the interest in learning English is strongest.

Current Commonwealth members have a total population of 2.3 billion, which is almost 30% of the world population of ≈ 8 billion. Could the Commonwealth quickly grow to represent most of the world's population? Potential candidates, using a 50% Anglophone threshold, would increase the Commonwealth's population as follows: USA ≈ 326.8 million, Nigeria ≈ 240 million, Philippines ≈ 106.5 million, Germany ≈ 82.3 million, Netherlands ≈ 17.1 million, Sweden ≈ 10.0 million, Jordan ≈ 9.9 million, Austria ≈ 8.8 million, Denmark ≈ 5.8 million, Norway ≈ 5.3 million, Ireland ≈ 4.8 million, Liberia ≈ 4.8 million, Croatia ≈ 4.2 million, and Latvia ≈ 1.9 million.

The current 2.3 billion Commonwealth citizens, combined with the population of these potential new members (.82 billion) is a total of 3.1 billion or 39% of the world population. Getting to 50% would not be too difficult. In fact, it could be accomplished almost immediately by simply reducing the language proficiency criteria to the required percentage. Using the average of all Commonwealth member countries as the threshold will likely suffice, within a generation, to make Commonwealth membership available to countries representing most of the world's population.

Even before the global majority threshold is reached, the prestige and agency of the Commonwealth will be immense. Given that the UN is often immobilized by the conflicting interest of the members of its anachronistic Security Council, the Commonwealth could become the preeminent international organization, unless and until the UN is reformed as discussed in Chapter 12.

Incentivizing Applications. The original six members of what became the EU had a transformative impact on Europe. The transformation was accomplished through the inducement of membership. Potential members, many of whom were either former dictatorships (Spain and Portugal) or

former satellites of the Soviet Union, were willing and often eager to undertake major governance reforms in order to qualify for membership. Changes of this order of magnitude have, in the past, only been accomplished by major wars. Yet Europe's transformation was accomplished with the simple inducement of EU membership. There is no apparent reason why the inducement of Commonwealth membership cannot be similarly transformative on a global level.

By remaining inter governmental, the Commonwealth can avoid many of the problems that currently trouble the EU. The motto of the Commonwealth can simply be: *No Commonwealth Member Left Behind*. The goal is a multilateral order that does not rely on just the USA. As the USA is reducing its global responsibilities, the Commonwealth can fill a growing vacuum that must be filled. If the USA is a member, it could be a major help in the common effort to support global order without over reliance on any single polity.

“A society of states exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that conceives themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.”

Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (1995)

10.2 A Commonwealth Law Institute

Since at least the Code of Hammurabi (circa 1754 BC), the importance of legal rules in government operations and economic systems has been noted and appreciated. A global commonwealth, including but not limited to the Commonwealth, can benefit from voluntary legal convergence among its members in statutory law making.

A successful system of drafting model legislation across multiple jurisdictions was established in the USA in 1892. It is the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws or, less formally,

the Uniform Law Commission (ULC). The nonprofit ULC has about 350 commissioners, organized into panels that focus on specific areas of the law. Commissioners are appointed by each of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealths of Guam and Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The Commissioners are lawyers with a variety of interests and expertise. Many are current or past legislators, judges, and legal scholars. They collaboratively produce model legislation for consideration in each of the fifty-four members' jurisdictions.

The ULC's budget comes from the state and territorial governments that appoint the commissioners. It is supplemented by grants from foundations and the federal government. A modest budget is sufficient, since the volunteer commissioners donate millions of dollars worth of time and expertise each year.

Once a uniform law is drafted, each jurisdiction decides whether or not to enact it and, if so, whether and how to amend the model legislation to reflect local preferences and needs. ULC drafting reduces the burden on legislatures and uniformity reduces the compliance costs for multi jurisdiction businesses. The ULC has drafted 119 model laws and every jurisdiction has enacted some of them. ULC proposals are rarely controversial, but always useful to at least some members.

Harmonizing the applicable law is particularly important for commercial transactions because these often involve multiple jurisdictions. A product can be manufactured in one jurisdiction, warehoused in a second, sold in a third and delivered to the ultimate consumer in a fourth.

The most important of the uniform laws, from this perspective, was the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The UCC covers sales, leases, negotiable instruments, bank deposits and collections, funds transfers, letters of credit, bulk sales and transfers, warehouse receipts, bills of lading and other title documents, investment securities and secured transactions. It has been enacted in all of the member jurisdictions. A commonwealth UCC would quickly become the global standard and global commerce would benefit tremendously.

Each jurisdiction enacts, with modifications, and interprets the law for itself, but has the benefit of being able to see how similar and often identical provisions are applied in other jurisdictions. Over time, the analyses in the better reasoned decisions are adopted more widely and are embodied in contracts. Nobody has to reinvent the wheel, but everybody can try to improve it.

American Law Institute (ALI). The American Law Institute (ALI) was founded in 1923 “to promote the clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration of justice, and to encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal work.” It has a membership of about 3000 judges, legal scholars, and lawyers, who produce three types of publications: Restatements, Model Codes, and Principles. It also facilitates continuing legal education in multiple jurisdictions. ALI *model* codes are similar to the ULC *uniform* laws, but the ALI is not a government run program and, sometimes, has a different perspective or priorities than the ULC.

The ALI *Restatements* are comprehensive reviews of important areas of the law. They are not proposals for change, but references for understanding the current state of the law in discreet areas. They are primarily used by Judges and lawyers, but also by legislators.

ALI *Model Codes*, like the uniform laws of the ULC, are proposals for legislatures. In fact, the ALI and ULC jointly drafted the previously discussed UCC and continue to work together on its updates. Another model code, the ALI model Penal Code (1962) has been influential in harmonizing penal laws across the states and territories.

The ALI *Principles* are book length discussions of specific areas of the law, including international law. Unlike the Restatements, they are aspirational. As examples, there are two ALI publications on transnational law: *The Principles of Transnational Insolvency*, a joint effort with the International Insolvency Institute (III), and *The Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure*, a joint effort with the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT). Similar projects would be useful for the Commonwealth and could become global standards.

The ALI also has a continuing legal education (CLE) group. Many of the academics, lawyers and judges who participate in the ALI projects are also active in continuing legal education through CLE programs. These CLE groups produce educational material, such as its *Trial Manual 6 for the Defense of Criminal Cases* (2017).

A Commonwealth Law Institute. Combining the functions of the ALI and ULC into a single Commonwealth Law Institute would be a way to provide templates for modernization and harmonization across jurisdictions. A model that has worked well for 153 years in 54 partially sovereign jurisdictions in the USA, could also be useful across a larger number of sovereign jurisdictions in a commonwealth.

“In truth, neither of the factors that led to the rise of the rules-based trade order exist anymore.”

Peter E. Harrell, Georgetown Institute of
International Economic Law, January 26, 2026

10.3 A Commonwealth Trade Organization

The World Trade Organization (WTO), established in 1995 as the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was envisioned as the institutional backbone of a global trading system. Its purpose was to promote trade liberalization, enforce rules of trade conduct, and provide a platform for dispute resolution. The establishment of the WTO in 1995 was hailed as a landmark achievement. Building on the success of GATT, the WTO expanded its reach to include services (under GATS), intellectual property (TRIPS), and a formal dispute settlement system with binding enforcement. It brought together 164 members representing over 98% of global trade. The institution promised a rule-based order where even the smallest economies could challenge the most powerful through an impartial judicial determinations.

For nearly two decades, the WTO played a central role in shaping global economic relations. However, in the 21st century, the organization

experienced a marked decline in influence. The failure of the Doha Development Round, paralysis in its dispute settlement mechanism, and increasing geopolitical rivalry have contributed to this erosion. In its wake, regional trade agreements, multi-lateral forums, and bilateral arrangements emerged to fill the void.

The decline of the WTO cannot be attributed to a single factor, but rather to the convergence of systemic, geopolitical, and institutional dynamics that have progressively undermined its effectiveness and legitimacy. Chief among these are: (1) the paralysis of the dispute settlement mechanism, (2) the failure of the Doha Round, (3) tensions between developed and developing nations, and (4) strategic competition between major powers, especially the United States and China.

Doha: The End of Optimism. Launched in 2001, the Doha Development Round was meant to address the imbalances in global trade that disadvantaged developing countries. Its goals included reducing agricultural subsidies in rich countries, improving market access for developing nations, and creating more equitable trade terms.

The negotiations quickly became deadlocked. Developed countries were unwilling to give up protections for their agricultural sectors, while developing countries resisted demands for deeper liberalization in services and industrial goods. India, Brazil, and China emerged as powerful voices challenging the traditional dominance of the United States and European Union. By the mid-2010s, the round had effectively collapsed. The failure of Doha marked a shift in perception: multilateral negotiations under the WTO framework were seen as too unwieldy and politically costly to deliver results.

A persistent fault line within the WTO has been the divide between the Global North and South. Developing countries have long argued that the WTO system privileges industrialized economies by locking in existing asymmetries. While less industrialized members were promised “special and differential treatment,” in practice they received limited benefits from liberalization.

This has led to calls for reforming the WTO to better reflect current economic realities, including the rise of emerging markets and the need to accommodate development goals such as food security and industrialization. However, efforts to reform the organization have repeatedly stalled, reinforcing perceptions of institutional inertia and bias.

Another significant factor in the WTO's decline is the rivalry between the USA and China. The USA has accused China of using WTO membership to gain access to global markets while failing to adhere to free-market principles—especially in areas such as state-owned enterprises, subsidies, and forced technology transfers. Under both the Trump and Biden administrations, the U.S. adopted a more confrontational trade policy, imposing tariffs on Chinese goods and pursuing unilateral enforcement mechanisms.

Polarization has made consensus at the WTO nearly impossible. The institution depends on mutual trust, but that trust has eroded as major powers increasingly bypass the WTO in favor of bilateral or regional trade arrangements.

Commonwealth Trade Organization. A commonwealth, particularly if it includes a majority of the world's nation-states, could supplement or replace the stalled WTO with a CTO. Because members would have internal obligations that go beyond those of WTO members, the CTO could succeed where the WTO has failed – at least in some cases. As the CTO establishes precedents, the non-CTO states will be likely to adopt them in the WTO. The smaller and better integrated CTO will help the WTO overcome its dysfunctions.

Dispute Resolution Failure. To protect investors from arbitrary government action, trade agreements generally include Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions. There are hundreds of trade agreements in which disputes are referred to arbitration panels. After decades of experience, dissatisfaction is widespread because arbitration panels are unpredictable. The lack of agreement on how to efficiently and fairly resolve disputes between investors and governments is a major impediment to

the creation and ratification of new trade agreements. A commonwealth, using a combined statutory and common law approach can make arbitration outcomes more predictable.

The value of a dispute resolution process is not limited to the cases that it decides. A much greater value is possible with the precedents that are established. Precedents allow everyone to know how to act and what to expect from others. This both prevents disputes and, if a dispute arises, reduces the difficulty of reaching a settlement. This is where the common law approach shines, as its appeals process harmonizes differences in the interpretation and application of rules. The common law is particularly useful because it requires reasoned analysis of the interdependence of the law and the facts. It is also cumulative, producing a comprehensive guide for both governments and businesses.

Commonwealth Dispute Resolution. A commonwealth dispute settlement process, combining statutory and common law, would result in greater consistency and predictability. More importantly, it would educate the investment community on their rights and responsibilities, so fewer disputes would arise. Designing and implementing such a system, for investor-state disputes between commonwealth members, would be a substantial service to members and promote intra commonwealth investment. Once proved successful, it could be opened to cases involving disputes between Commonwealth members and non-members who consent to the use of the process.

“The promotion of democracy and the pursuit of hegemony are too coiled to distinguish.”

Patrick Porter, *The False Promise of Liberal Order* (2020)

10.4 Pacifying the Democratic Peace Theory

This section is not a critique of democracy or of the democratic peace theory (DPT). It is a criticism of the use of the DPT to exacerbate geopolitical divisions and conflict. This misuse is a perversion of its Kantian

roots. The DPT is descriptive: democracies are said to be less likely to fight one another than to fight with nondemocratic polities. It is not prescriptive.

When DPT is turned from a descriptive theory (“democracies rarely fight democracies”) into a prescriptive geopolitical strategy (“democracies must organize against autocracies”), it makes global collective action harder. It becomes a political sorting mechanism. The Biden administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy explicitly described a strategic competition over the future of the international order, promised to “lead with our values,” and contrasted the U.S. vision with that of actors who “do not share our vision for a world that is free, open, prosperous, and secure.”

Such framing can impede essential collective action. Climate change, pandemics, trade stability, migration, food security, nuclear risk, and sea-lane security all require cooperation among states with diverse regime ideologies. If the world is divided into “free” and “unfree” polities in existential conflict for dominance, global collective action is harder to achieve and sustain. Climate policy becomes entangled in ideological rivalry. Public-health cooperation gets bound up in competition. Trade becomes a game of rule evasion, not truly rule-governed. Arms control becomes harder because the most consequential counter parties are often precisely the states being cast as systemic ideological adversaries. Yet the most consequential arms-control achievements, including the INF Treaty and the START process, were necessarily negotiated across profound differences in regime type, rather than within an ideological club.

“We have been extraordinarily lucky so far. Today humanity is just one misunderstanding, one miscalculation away from nuclear annihilation.”

Antonio Gutierrez, UN Secretary-General (August 1, 2022).

Multinational Institutionalism Peace Theory (MIPT). Peace is more likely when states are members of voluntary, rule-based, multinational institutions that: (1) recognize the equality of members, (2) provide procedures for voice, bargaining, review, and dispute settlement, (3) create repeated interaction and reputation costs, (4) permit issue-specific

cooperation across regime differences, and (5) shift legitimacy from domestic regime identity to institutional conduct.

Institutions are democratic at the international level when they are rule-governed and voluntary associations. The UN Charter rests on the equality of voluntary members. The WTO agreement allows members to withdraw. The EU's treaties provide both a legal basis to join and a voluntary, unilateral mechanism to leave.

The key is that the relevant question is no longer "Is this state democratic?" but "How democratic, participatory, and rule-bound is the institution through which these states interact?" That preserves the DPT intuition that procedures for accountability reduce violence, while relocating its prescriptivism from the nation-state to the multinational institution.

The prescriptive use of the DPT ascribes domestic regime type as the sole source of peace, but many peaceful outcomes in the real world must be produced by institutions that included autocracies, monarchies, hybrid regimes, and one-party systems. The pacific effect comes not from ideological similarity but from institutionalized expectations: consultation, monitoring, reciprocity, transparency, exit rules, and agreed dispute resolution. The institution, not the regime label, becomes the peace-producing mechanism. MIPT does not condone autocracy, it accepts reality. Democracies may still prefer one another, but they should also build institutions in which diverse ideologies cooperate.

Some institutions are only thinly democratic and formal consent can hide material inequality. Powerful states often dominate agendas, funding, enforcement, and interpretation. Voluntariness alone does not create democracy, but proto-democratic or minimally democratic institutions, insofar as they rest on consent, membership, procedure, and reciprocal obligation are the necessary starting point. The task is to deepen those features with a more balanced distribution of international agency. Region-state aggregations of nation-states will permit a more level field. MIPT combined with Region-State aggregations of nation-states will redistribute international agency in a way that is both more equitable and more effective.

Part V

A More Balanced and Equitable Global Order

“Without official recognition, the fate of the best system (of language rationalization) is precarious, with it, any scheme that is not totally unworkable would do well enough.”

Albert Léon Guérard, *A Short History of the International Language Movement* (1921)

Chapter 11

The Common Language: Any Reasonable Choice Will Work

The world does not need a perfect language. There is no such thing as a perfect language. The world needs a shared language and, if a few important criteria are met, any reasonable choice will be fine.

11.1 Choosing Matters More Than the Choice

This chapter introduces several options. The author expresses no opinion on which is the best or whether there are other options that would be better. That is a task for those with the authority and responsibility within any given polity.

Ideally, the choice will be exogenous, at least to the extent that it is not the *natural* language of a large and powerful polity. Any designed language will meet this criteria. While this is a significant consideration, it is not a deal breaker.

Any language, including any designed language will be heavily influenced by proximity to a particular language family. That is unavoidable. Design a language that is equal distance from all language families is

probably impossible and, even if somehow deemed accomplished, would produce a language that was more difficult to learn than any natural language and far, far more difficult than any design ever imagined.

A key criteria will be the size and geographic distribution of the speakers of the most proximate language, its linguistic siblings and its language family. In this respect, the Romance languages of the Indo-European language family have the best metrics.

The UN: Ideal But Not Essential. The ultimate goal must be a global community of communication with a robust common identity. So, ideally, the UN will initiate global 2 MT Bilingualism by adding a seventh official language to the current six official languages – explicitly for that purpose. Doing so would result in a consistent choice by the AU, EU and India. It would be likely to stimulate conforming choices by the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, the Association of South East Asian Nations, and members of BRICS+. As schools in the Anglo Sphere began offering the UN's seventh language as part of their curriculum and students voted with their enrollment, even the most recalcitrant Anglophone countries would realize that resistance was futile and the benefits irresistible.

The third and fourth purposes of the UN as set forth in Article 1 of its charter, are:

- 3) To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, ...
- 4) To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Both purposes will be advanced by global language rationalization. Thus, 2 MT Bilingualism should be a top UN priority. The UN is the best organization to make the choice of a global common language. The choice should be made by the UN General Assembly designating the seventh

official language, either explicitly or implicitly, as its candidate for global 2 MT Bilingualism.

“At the same time, as the inhabitants of a world that technology is making smaller and population growth is making more crowded, we must acknowledge the need for direct communication.”

Humphrey Tonkin, Ed. *Language Problems and Language Planning* (2001)

The seventh language would also be used as a universal pivot language for UN translations and documents in the seventh language would be the official text for resolving ambiguities among translations. The UN’s seventh language will, immediately, become the most important second language for students in every country. Not a foreign or elite language, it will be a second MT that admits all to membership in an inclusive global community.

The author does not intend to limit the discussion and does not favor any choice. This chapter looks at the viability of the current global *lingua franca*, English, and an easier – but equally useful – designed English dialect called Common English (Commonwealth English) and three alternatives to English.

Any of the four would work, as would many others. Latin Americans and Iberian Europeans may prefer Americano. Africans and Francophones may prefer Afrancaise. Anglophones may like Common English. The UN General Assembly, which I hope will act quickly, might (or might not) like Esperanto. I don’t care – just pick one. But, in doing so, keep in mind that the largest family of languages, by a factor of two, is the Indo-European family. That is an important advantage. But, for the sake of equity and efficiency, the preference of the non-European countries should be given extra weight. Any final decision must be relatively easy for everyone.

It is interesting to consider a few of the many options for the common language. But, as the decision must be made by governments with

the requisite authority and responsibility, the following discussion is only to stimulate the reader's imagination.

11.2 Elite Closure: The Case Against Natural English¹⁰⁹

English is the global *lingua franca*, but this has created elite bilingualism. Elite bilingualism is the incomplete form of complementary bilingualism. If English is chosen as the common language in a policy of 2 MT Bilingualism, elite English bilingualism will lose its elite identity. We will have English 2 MT Bilingualism. In order for global order obtain the benefits, English would simply need to be explicitly selected by at least one very large and non-Anglophone polity, such as the EU or the AU.

The EU has implicitly chosen elite English plurilingualism for its community's language rationalization, based on the pragmatic choices made by millions of European students. Almost all students in the EU study English.

This semi-formal policy of English plurilingualism does not have the same impact (not even close) that an explicit policy of 2 MT Bilingualism would have. English based 2 MT Bilingualism would be much more beneficial and successful. However, it is still significant that the EU's *de facto* policy of elite English plurilingualism failed (§9.1.1, *supra.*). So, before considering other options, the reasons for the EU's language rationalization policy's failure should be considered.

11.2.1 The Ephemeral Advantages of Elite English Bilingualism. That the language of an average sized country situated off of the West Coast of Europe became a global *lingua franca* is not due to any characteristics that make English particularly suited to the role. Rather, it was because the British successfully established settlement colonies that displaced

¹⁰⁹ There is no *standard* English, due to the lack of an English academy. All of the natural varieties have the same degree of difficulty, at least approximately, in contrast to a hypothetical designed English that is discussed in the following section.

the indigenous populations in the vast expanses of North America and Australia.¹¹⁰

Great Britain's settlement colonies had the dual blessing of a common language and geographic distance from Eurasia during two "world wars" in the first half of the 20th Century. When Eurasia was decimated a second time in World War II, economic and military leadership shifted from Great Britain to its former settlement colonies. At the end of World War II, the USA alone produced almost half of the world's manufactured goods. Even with the inevitable decline in the percentage of the world's GDP produced by Anglophones, as Eurasia recovered, there was no decline in the use of English as a *lingua franca*. Improvements in communication and transportation technology¹¹¹ increased the utility of *lingua franca* English for the global elite and elite organizations like multinational corporations.

English's Three Apparent Advantages. The Anglophone community is the only language network with both tremendous size (1.35 billion) and global breadth.¹¹² On this basis, many people assume that it is the inevitable choice for global linguistic congruence. Before considering the reasons not to choose English, it is important to understand the reasons that favor English and the limits of these reasons.

Network Externalities. If having more users increases the utility of a network, people prefer a larger network over a smaller one. People join Facebook (META) because there are already hundreds of millions of

¹¹⁰ Canada, the USA, Australia and New Zealand have over 7 times the population of England and are over 200 times as large. Although much of Canada is too cold for substantial settlements and much of Australia is too hot, their relatively empty expanses contain abundant resources.

¹¹¹ Our world is changing rapidly due to technological evolution that we seem unable control. An analogy is the hapless apprentice in *The Sorcerer's Apprentice*, a poem by Goethe (1797), wherein the apprentice unleashes forces that he cannot control.

¹¹² Putonghua is roughly as large, but it is highly concentrated within China and the Chinese diaspora. It is also a member of a language family that is only half as large as the Indo-European language family that includes English.

users. Positive network externalities create a “bandwagon” effect. English has the best network externalities.

Path Dependence. Once a practice is established, it is easier to conform than to change the standard. A classic example is the QWERTY layout of the English language keyboard. The arrangement of keys looks oddly random, but the layout was designed to make it hard to type fast. At a time when manual typewriters were prone to physical jamming, speed was not an unmitigated virtue. Now, even though manual typewriters are obsolete and physical jamming is not a problem, the QWERTY keyboard is still the standard. After many millions of keyboard users internalized the QWERTY arrangement, the cost of retraining them was not justified by a small gain in typing speed.¹¹³ For elite communication, such as its use in multinational corporations, path dependence makes elite English bilingualism attractive.

Probability Sensitivity. People will not learn a language unless there is a reasonable probability that its subsequent use will justify the effort. Without such a probability there is insufficient motivation to learn a language. Globally, people expect to be able to use English more frequently and more widely (intensive and extensive) than any other foreign language. So, probability sensitivity encourages learning English as a *foreign* language and using it as a *lingua franca*.

The three preceding advantages sound impressive, but only until you realize that all three of these advantages also applied to the Russian language in Eastern Europe prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall and dissolution of the USSR. As earlier noted, the teaching of Russian dropped by half in one generation and by 95% in areas outside of the former USSR. If

¹¹³ An alternative theory is that the typewriter keyboard’s layout was designed for its early adopters. Telegraph operators used the typewriter to quickly translate morse code. The motives of slowing the typing process (avoid jamming of keys) or speeding it up (for telegraph operators) are inconsistent, but in either case it is an example of path dependence once a standard is established.

a language other than English is chosen for global 2 MT Bilingualism, use of *lingua franca* English will suffer a similar or even greater reduction.¹¹⁴

Also, the three reasons for the popularity of *lingua franca* English will all transfer to any language chosen for 2 MT Bilingualism. In addition, as discussed earlier, technology will assume much of the role now played by *lingua franca* English. The world needs linguistic congruence with a neutral language that can support for a global identity that helps us to overcome the divisions that impede global collective action.

Over 85% of the world's population does not speak any English and less than 5% are native speakers of English. A universally exogenous and easily learned choice would be better for 95% of the world's population and all future generations. Chosen by a large polity, such as the UN, the G 77 (135), BRICS+, either or both of the non-Anglophone empire-states (China and Russia) or a future region-state (EU, AU) any reasonable language choice can displace English in popularity (network externality) and reverse the English advantage in network externality, path dependence and probability sensitivity. In any event, the utility of learning a *lingua franca* – as opposed to a second MT identity language – will decline as rapidly as translation technology improves.

Having seen how ephemeral the three English advantages actually are, it is time to look at its disadvantages. The principal disadvantages are: 1) *laissez* unfair bilingualism due to the creation of a linguistic caste system, that establishes elite bilingualism and biases the global economy towards neoliberal economics that both produces excessive inequality, and inhibits effective action on global climate change, and 2) *laissez* fail bilingualism due to the difficulty of learning English, especially relative to designed alternatives.

11.2.2 *Laissez Unfair: A Linguistic Caste System.* It is a great advantage to be able to use your native language. It is unfair when someone

¹¹⁴ The reduction in Russian occurred in the absence of an affirmative language rationalization policy to displace it as a *lingua franca*. English may suffer an even more dramatic decline after the adoption of 2 MT Bilingualism with an easily learned language.

else's language is used by default. One of the best expressions of this unfairness came from a Swiss psychologist who worked as a translator at the UN from 1956 to 1961 and later for the World Health Organization (WHO). He characterized the elite bilingualism of *lingua franca* English as a linguistic caste system.¹¹⁵

“An English-speaking physicist has been able to devote to physics the many hours that his colleagues from other cultures have had to devote to the painful and slow acquisition of English, but he is unaware of his privilege. When you are a member of the upper caste, you take your advantages for granted.... Not only have people outside the upper caste been forced to devote many, many hours to the study of the upper caste's language, moreover when they have to negotiate or discuss with somebody belonging to this upper caste they are at a disadvantage: their opponent can avail himself of a richness of vocabulary and a feeling of security in language use that they will forever be lacking. Their opponent has a mastery of the language weapon, they have not.”¹¹⁶

Unwarranted privilege can be so subtle or indirect that people are unaware of it. For example, news that is delivered in a local language may well have been curated by a news agency that is owned or operated by Anglophones. Any Anglo Sphere biases will be invisible to the ultimate consumers of the content. To overcome unwarranted privileges, language rationalization should use a universally exogenous language so that it does not favor any community by creating a linguistic “upper caste.

Absolute equity is impossible. Even a designed language cannot be equidistant from each of the world's many language families. Given the size of the Indo-European language family, especially if second language speakers are included, it makes sense to select or design a language with its major elements from this family.

¹¹⁵ C. Piron, *Le défi des langues* (1994).

¹¹⁶ A successful policy of 2 MT Bilingualism with any language will, of course, replace all linguistic caste systems – of which there are many.

Another problem created by the selection of a major *lingua franca*, especially English, is the indirect introduction of unexamined bias into a broad range of academic inquiry. This is especially, but not exclusively, a problem in the social sciences. For example, because of the dominance of English in academic publishing, most academic work in the social sciences is conducted in English. The research is often conducted using native English speakers. In fact it often uses college students on university campuses in the Anglo Sphere. This phenomena is referred to as the WEIRD (Western Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic) bias of academic research. A universally exogenous common language would help academics escape from the WEIRD trap – which is a manifestation of the Anglophone caste system.

“Speaking English makes people open to Britain’s cultural achievements, social values and business aims.”

The British Council, *English 2000* (1995)

For the AU, there is a compelling reason to exclude English. It is an official language in twenty-four of Africa’s fifty-five nation-states. Privileging Africa’s Anglophones would be resisted by Francophones and Lusophones (Portuguese). It would, in fact, be resisted by all Africans other than Anglophones. The same degree of resistance would arise if the choice were the official and un-rationalized “natural” French, Spanish, Portuguese or Arabic. Only 2 MT Bilingualism with an easily learned language, in a policy of 2 MT Bilingualism, will allow Africa to equitably preserve its diversity and become a continental community.

11.2.3 *Laissez Unfair: Global Corporations vs Community Interests.* English is the elite *lingua franca* of global capital. Capitalism can be successful for individuals and corporations, while simultaneously being detrimental to communities – an example of the fallacy of composition. Can neoliberal capitalism’s excesses be effectively constrained in a world where the Anglophone elite is unfairly privileged? At a minimum, it will be more difficult.

“... the massive degree of complexity that a language winds up clotted with if left alone is hopelessly unnecessary.”

John McWhorter, *What Language Is* (2011)

11.2.4 Laissez Fail: The Difficulty of Learning English. Anyone who has studied a foreign language knows that learning a natural language is extremely difficult. The result of a language policy that is based on the learning of a foreign language usually results in elite bilingualism. It is essential for 2 MT Bilingualism to use an easily learned language. Ideally the choice should be even easier to learn than the trade languages used in Tanzania (KiSwahili) and Indonesia (Bahasa Indonesia).

While English can be characterized as a global trade language, it lacks the most beneficial aspect of a true trade language – the loss of unnecessary complexity and adornment.¹¹⁷ An easily learned (designed) language, in combination with a language rationalization policy of 2 MT Bilingualism will best meet the three requirements for success: (1) designed for ease of *acquisition*, (2) 2 MT congruence allows regular use without foreign travel, for easier *maintenance*, and (3) 2 MT (intra family) *transmission* is optimally efficient and cost effective.

“Why should language have forms that are just cussed exceptions to a rule? What are they good for, besides giving children a way to make cute errors, providing material for humorous verse, and making life miserable for foreign language students?

Steven Pinker *Words and Rules: The Ingredients of Language* (1999)

Phonemes and Graphemes. To understand the difficulty of learning English, a good place to start is with a related pair of problems: unpredictable English phonemes (sounds) and graphemes (spelling). They are

¹¹⁷ As noted earlier, English did lose some complexity due to Viking invasions of Anglo-Saxon England. However, it gained complexity by combining a Germanic and a Romance language. In addition, the Great Vowel Shift, from 1400 to 1700, made English much less phonetic.

two sides of a coin. In an easily learned language, there would be a strong correspondence between phonemes and graphemes. Correspondence allows students to predict the sound of a word from its written form and to know the spelling of a word from its sound. English, in this respect, is much further from the ideal than most languages. Much more phonic languages include Spanish, Dutch, German, Swedish, Russian, Arabic and Korean. There is nothing unnatural about a highly phonic language.

“Most of the opposition to simplified spelling is due to the fact that having taken the time and toil to master our atrociously inconsistent spelling, people have a vague fear that if a phonetic system were adopted, children, the ignorant classes and persons of poor memories would be able to spell just as well as they without one quarter the trouble of learning. Not that they are conscious of this childish and unworthy attitude, for usually they are not, but the motive is operative none the less.”

Henry Hazlitt, *Thinking as a Science* (1916)¹¹⁸

In English, for example, the same sound (ē), can be written in 11 different ways: he, see, sea, Caesar, seize, believe, peeple, amoeba, key, sily, or marine. A different phoneme (ō) appears 13 different ways: go, sew, oh, mauve, yeoman, roam, foe, brooch, shoulder, flow, bureau, borough, or owe. This chaos is not just a problem with vowel sounds, the same consonant phoneme (/ch/) is spelled five different ways in cello, church, bich, adventure, and question. Another consonant phoneme (/s/) is the same in these seven spellings: mess, cell, pieces, psychology, science, schism and isthmus.

If you know the spelling of a word from reading it and want to express the word in speech, you have the reverse problem. One letter in English can represent multiple sounds. For example, the letter “a” has different sounds in these nine words: ant, ball, father, many, paper, parent, cattle, Swan, and village. It is not only a problem with vowels. Each letter “c” in the words “Pacific Ocean” is pronounced differently.

¹¹⁸ Hazlitt is describing a domestic version of what Claude Piron, in an international context, characterizes as a caste system.

“Unfortunately, even the most diligent students [in China] with the most responsible teachers often cannot communicate effectively with the target population after 10 years of studying English.”

Keith P. Campbell and Zhao Yong, *The Dilemma of English Language Instruction in the People's Republic of China*. TESOL Journal, Summer 1993

Lexical Problems. Many words in English that *sound the same* are spelled differently and have different meanings. These are some examples: “to, too, and two,” “knew and new,” “flour and flower,” “see and sea,” “whole and hole,” “sell and cell.” Other words in English are *spelled the same*, but pronounced differently and have different meanings. Examples include: close, desert, present, lead, refuse, object, wind and minute. In other cases *both the spelling and the sound of a word are identical*, but the meanings are different: *park* – a public play area (noun) or to bring a vehicle to a stop and leave it (verb). *Bat* – a piece of sports equipment or an animal, and *crane* – a bird or a piece of construction equipment.

English also has an abundance of letters that are not pronounced. Some examples are: *b* (*dumb, thumb, subtle*), *c* (*indict, scene, science*), *g* (*foreign, sign, gnat*), *h* (*honest, heir, ghost*), *k* (*knee, knight, know*), *l* (*calm, half, could, should*), *p* (*psychology, pneumonia, receipt*), *t* (*listen, often, whistle*) and *w* (*answer, sword, write, whole*). There are also many pointless double consonants: **letter**, **spell** and **savvy** are three examples.

Grammatical Problems. English is not only weird lexically. It's also weird grammatically. One easily grasped example is the irregular plural endings for some English nouns. Plurals are usually formed by adding the letter “s” as in day-days, but this is often not true: man-men, mouse-mice, child-children, deer-deer, and tooth-teeth are only a few of the many irregular plurals. All natural languages have idiosyncrasies. With English it is a matter of degree. These are just a sample.

As a result, English-speaking children spend a significant part of their elementary education learning how to spell their native language. It also takes longer to teach them to read. For non-native learners, this is

a nightmare. Speakers of languages outside of the Indo-European family have an especially difficult time learning English, unless like my niece and nephew in Japan they are raised in a bilingual household.

I am an Anglophone, but English should not be chosen for global complementary bilingualism unless and until it is deemed acceptable by non-Anglophones—that is equally true for any of the three empire-states’ languages or any of the European colonial languages. Codifying the privileges of elite bilingualism would, at least in the short term, only widen the inequality between the selected languages’ native speakers and all other language communities.

A design that attempted to balance and blend elements from all of the world’s language families would be a horrific mess. Fundamental differences are too numerous and incompatible for there to be a coherent option that is equidistance from all language families. The only attempt at such equality, to the author’s knowledge, is a design called Sona. It’s designer was “inspired” by English, Arabic, Turkish, Chinese and Japanese. The author is not familiar with it and Seabright’s book is out of print.

“Modern English grammar is, in a word, weird.”

John McWhorter, *Our Magnificent Bastard Tongue: The Untold Story of English* (2008)

11.3 Common(wealth) English: Designed for Easier Acquisition

The problems associated with global language rationalization are solved if two simple criteria are applied in choosing the language for 2 MT Bilingualism. The choice should be *universally exogenous*¹¹⁹ and the chosen language should be as *easy to learn* as possible. Governments that

¹¹⁹ The author considers any suitably modified natural language to be universally exogenous. This expansive use of the term allows for a massive head start in establishing 2 MT Bilingualism. This head start may be critical to meeting the timeline dictated by our potentially existential global challenges.

appreciate both the need to make the task of learning as easy and inexpensive as possible and the need for a universally exogenous choice will choose a schematic (designed) language.

11.3.1 Reduced English Fails: Basic English and Globish. The problems of English are so great and well known that the strongest advocates of English hegemony have periodically tried to make it easier to learn and, therefore, a less elite *lingua franca*. The two best known attempts were reduced forms: Basic English and Globish.

Basic English. In the first half of the 20th Century, two men clearly saw the difficulty of learning English as an impediment to a larger global role. One of them was Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The second is less well known: Charles K. Ogden, the designer of Basic English. In an attempt to expand Anglophone privilege, Ogden designed Basic English in the 1920's as a reduced version of English. It had a vocabulary of only 850 words.¹²⁰ Basic English was intended to be both a tool to teach English and a more suitable candidate for the role of global language.

“The power to control language offers far better prizes than taking away people’s provinces or lands or grinding them down in exploitation. The empires of the future will be the empires of the mind.”

Winston Churchill, Harvard University, September 6, 1943

As a potential global language, it received substantial attention near the end of the Second World War. Prime Minister Churchill established a cabinet level committee on Basic English. His committee recommended that Basic English be used by British diplomats and the British Broadcasting Corporation. Unfortunately for Basic English, Churchill’s

¹²⁰ Combined with five combinatory rules, it was supposed to be equal to 20,000 words. Ogden was also an advocate of designed languages, in particular Interlingua. Like Esperanto, Interlingua is a good option for global 2 MT Bilingualism.

party lost control of Parliament in 1945 and the new Labor government abandoned his initiative.

Even if Basic English had received support from the subsequent Labor government, it would have failed to become a global language. Severely restricting the vocabulary impaired its expressive capacity without directly addressing many of English's difficulties. Basic English could adequately express mundane necessities, but lacked both precision and range.

George Orwell worked for the BBC for two years in 1941–1943,¹²¹ during the period of support for Basic English. He thought its lexical limits were conducive to propaganda and totalitarianism. He used this insight to create Newspeak, in his dystopian novel *1984*. A reduced lexical inventory makes complex thought and reasoning difficult and makes propaganda easier to promote.

Globish. Globish is another reduced English. It was created by Jean-Paul Nerrière in 2004. It had a larger lexical inventory than Basic English, but still only 1500 words. It used standard English grammar. There was an earlier attempt, also called Globish, by Madhukar Gogate in 1998. Other reduced versions of English include Special English and Specialized English.

11.3.2 Common(wealth) English: Regular Verbs and Phonetic. The biggest problem with learning English is the lack of correspondence between the written and spoken language. A designed English will need to be phonetic. A second problem, which can more easily be easily fixed, is irregular verbs. These are the low hanging fruit for designing any global dialect of a natural language. There is nothing preventing the creation of an easier to learn English, although it may be easier to fix a language which, unlike English, is not a hybrid between languages from

¹²¹ He referred to the BBC of the war years as “a mixture of whorehouse and lunatic asylum.” He called his tenure there “two wasted years.” War does strange things to government information systems.

two different branches (Germanic and Romance) of the Indo-European language family.¹²²

A Common(wealth) English Academy (CEA). English is a global *lingua franca* without standardization. If it is to be the basis for global 2 MT Bilingualism, it must do more to minimize its regional variation.¹²³ Divergence cannot be eliminated. Just as there is divergence between peninsular Spanish and Latin American Spanish (LAS), despite the existence of the Real Academia Española, or between peninsular Portuguese and Brazilian Portuguese (BP), despite the existence of the Brazilian Academy of Letters. Even with the creation of an English Academy, there will continue to be divergence. However the common interest in maximizing both communication and identity requires a serious effort to inhibit divergence.

An English Language Academy (ELA) should include representation from across the Anglo Sphere. Based on the current use of the English language, the initial organization could have as few as 13 members. This would be for efficiency and the board could expand later, as it redefined its requirements. This would be essential, if English or any derivative of English were adopted.

The Anglo Sphere members would be: the USA (≈330 million), India (≈255 million), Pakistan (≈225 million), Canada (≈40 million), Ghana (≈30 million), Singapore (≈30 million), Australia (≈25 million), Commonwealth Caribbean (≈18 million), South Africa (≈5 million), and an EU representative.

Other Benefits of Design. Current teachers of all languages have both a detailed knowledge of a specific language and the extensive training

¹²² To avoid unnecessary work, my own designs begin with French (Afrançaise) and the two Iberian cousins – Spanish and Portuguese (Americano).

¹²³ Because there is no academy that regulates the English language, there is no single English language. In addition to multiple British dialects and the dialects of its former settlement colonies, there is also Singlish (Singaporean English), Hinglish (Hindi English) and scores of other markedly diverse dialects from England's former colonies. New Englishes and dialects are even arising in countries that had more limited contact with Anglophone colonialism, such as Chinglish (Chinese English).

common to all language teachers. With an easily learned language, they can utilize their extensive teacher training after a short period of on-line learning of a highly schematic dialect. This is not the case with a natural language. Teacher retraining is important and, for designed languages, is much easier than for a natural language.

Two other significant benefits have been reported: 1) the lower meta-linguistic load of an easily learned language permits starting the process informally and at an earlier age, and 2) student's who perform poorly in learning a natural language achieve greater success by first learning an introductory – reference (propaedeutic) language. These are both important benefits.

Both efficiency and effectiveness will increase dramatically after the first generation. This differentiates 2 MT Bilingualism from foreign language plurilingualism, which must start over with each generation of students and often delays the academic exposure until after the critical age for learning a language.

The rest of this chapter looks at three designed alternatives to a designed English. One of them, Esperanto, has been around for 130 years, but never caught on. However, if it is selected for use in a policy of 2 MT bilingualism, that would quickly change.

The other two language designs, *Afrançaise* and *Americano*, were created by the author for two reasons: 1) either of them would be incredibly easy for a large and widely dispersed population to acquire, and 2) in order to show that a design can, with only a few changes, make any Romance language much, much easier to learn. *Afrançaise* was designed to take advantage of the large number of French speakers in the EU and AU. *Americano* was designed to take advantage of the large number of Spanish and Portuguese speakers in the EU and Latin America. The same process could be used with Italian or Romanian, but these have fewer and less widely dispersed native speakers.¹²⁴

¹²⁴ Romance languages are particularly appropriate because 1) they Indo-European languages and are, therefore, members of the largest language family, and 2) they

People who design languages get carried away and over-design. They fail to appreciate the value of having a large and dispersed population for whom the acquisition will require only a trivial effort. Afrançaise and Americano were designed to take maximum advantage of existing global languages.

“... the massive degree of complexity that a language winds up clotted with if left alone is hopelessly unnecessary.”

John McWhorter, *What Language Is* (2011)

11.4 Esperanto: Field Tested for Over a Century

Most people have heard of Esperanto, but very few speak it. There are no credible estimates, but even its ardent proponents do not claim significant numbers. There are probably fewer than two thousand native speakers. Yet Esperanto has persevered, if not prospered, for 130 years.

11.4.1 Why Esperanto Failed (So Far). The most important question for complementary bilingualism is the “why” question. Why should I learn another language? *That is why this essay is written to answer the “why” question and not the “which” question.* Esperantistoj answered the “why” question both idealistically and unconvincingly. As a result, Esperantistoj developed a reputation, largely deserved, as well meaning but overly idealistic dreamers.

Esperanto’s second major problem, related to the first in that it undermines the justification for undertaking the effort, was its lack of a geographic or political base. If you were to learn Esperanto, there was no place where you could use it.

The Unrealistic Promise of Peace. Esperanto’s designer, L.L. Zamenhof, and many of its original supporters believed that a universal language would have a pacific effect. In Zamenhof’s own words:

have discreet areas of difficulty for students. In a word – verbs. In four words – verbs and grammatical gender.

In Białystok the inhabitants were divided into four distinct elements: Russians, Poles, Germans, and Jews; each of these spoke their own language and looked on all the others as enemies. In such a town a sensitive nature feels more acutely than elsewhere the misery caused by language division and sees at every step that the diversity of languages is the first, or at least the most influential, basis for the separation of the human family into groups of enemies. I was brought up as an idealist; I was taught that all people were brothers, while outside in the street at every step I felt that there were no people, only Russians, Poles, Germans, Jews, and so on.

L. L. Zamenhof, in a letter to Nikolai Borovko, c. 1895

The first error of Esperanto's acolytes was to promise a peace dividend. While a common language facilitates cooperation, it does not guarantee peace. The pacific dream can be refuted with two words: "civil war." The Civil War in the USA, which occurred shortly before the creation of Esperanto, was the most destructive war in the country's history. The Spanish Civil War was particularly brutal. Revolutionary wars in Russia and China also refute the claim of a Pacific effect from a common language.¹²⁵

"If one choses to learn a natural language there are those tens or even hundreds of millions of native speakers with whom one can be sure one will acquire the capacity to communicate, a powerful incentive and a huge reservoir of opportunities. ... Whether the effort will redeem itself crucially depends on whether a sufficient number of other people (or governments) will be willing to make and keep making the deliberate effort of learning and using the same artificial language...."

Professor Philippe Van Parijs, *Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World* (2011)

The Absence of a Geographic Home. Esperantistoj (Esperanto speakers) did not want it to become another national language. So, they sought to have it recognized by the League of Nations (LON). They nearly

¹²⁵ Even if there is no *peace* dividend, there is a *collective action capacity* dividend. However, this is independent of the common language choice.

succeeded. The Iranian delegation, supported by a report from Nitobe Inazō, proposed the addition of Esperanto as an official language. The LON came close to agreeing, but France used its veto in the Security Council to prevent it. An effort to pass a recommendation to the member states that Esperanto be included in their schools' curriculum and make Esperanto a working language of the LON was similarly opposed by France. After the creation of the United Nations, Esperantistoj again sought official status for Esperanto but the results were the same. Interest in promoting Esperanto subsequently waned.

“Without official recognition, the fate of the best system (of language rationalization) is precarious, with it, any scheme that is not totally unworkable would do well enough.”

Albert Léon Guérard, *A Short History of the International Language Movement* (1921)

Mr. Guérard was right a century ago and his point is equally true today. That insight is why the matter of language selection *can* and *must* be reserved for those with the legal authority and responsibility for establishing a language rationalization policy.

11.4.2 Universally Exogenous and Relatively Easy. Esperanto should not be dismissed for its idealism. It can and should be allowed to compete with all of the other options, but only on an equal footing. Esperanto has been used in all conceivable ways from science to poetry. It has survived, if only barely, for 130 years. It would work well as the common language in a policy of 2 MT Bilingualism.

While it is Eurocentric, Esperanto is designed and so it would be universally exogenous. Its Eurocentric lack of equidistance from all language families will be true for any choice and the Indo-European language family is, by far, the largest and most widely used language family.

The almost inevitable privileging of the Indo-European language family makes it crucial that the selected language be as easy to learn as possible. Along with being universally exogenous, being easy to learn is the other key

requirement and any designed languages’ primary virtue. Perhaps multiple Indo-European contenders should be tested in diverse non-Indo-European language communities. It is important, for the sake of equity, that the virtue of being easy to learn is true outside of the candidate language’s family.

“Esperanto, as we know it today, is not the work of Zamenhof. It is a language which has developed on the foundation of Zamenhof’s project through a century of constant use by a very diverse people.”

Claude Piron, *Psychological Aspects of the World Language Problem and of Esperanto*. Talk given in Basil Switzerland on March 21, 1998

The Institute of Cybernetic Pedagogy (Germany) compared Esperanto, with three natural languages (English, German, and Italian) in terms of the study time required for French high-school students to obtain equivalent facility. It took approximately one-tenth as long for the French high-school students to achieve an equivalent level of Esperanto (150 hours) as English (1500 hours).¹²⁶ Given the limited time available for classroom instruction during the school year, students will be much more successful at learning Esperanto than English.¹²⁷

student’s language		target language	time required
French	→	German	2000 hours
French	→	English	1500 hours
French	→	Italian	1000 hours
French	→	Esperanto	150 hours

¹²⁶ For natural languages, the estimates vary widely from as low as one year to a decade or more. The former is for very basic communication, whereas the latter is for functional fluency. The degree of similarity with the learner’s native language makes a big difference.

¹²⁷ To the best of my knowledge, the time required to learn Esperanto has never been compared with the time required to learn any trade language. Trade languages are likely to be intermediate between natural languages and schematic languages. Interlingua, mentioned earlier, would have results very similar to Esperanto’s.

The results for Esperanto for the Francophone students were impressive. As both French and Italian are Romance languages, it took the French students less time to learn Italian than German. English, although a Germanic language, is heavily influenced by French and so it fell between German and Italian. The important figure is the huge difference between learning any of the natural languages and learning Esperanto.

“An average college senior or graduate in 20 hours of study will be able to understand printed and spoken Esperanto better than he understands French or German or Italian or Spanish after a hundred hours of study.”

Edward L. Thorndike, *Institute of Educational Research Language Learning Report*. Columbia University Teachers College (1933)

Spending billions teaching a *foreign* language with little to show for it is both inefficient and ineffective. An easier language will dramatically improve the cost/benefit ratio. Less money (efficient) and effort (efficient) will achieve much better results (effective). Globally, hundreds of millions of students study English. The results are discouraging. Outside of Europe, less than 1% of the students become fluent in English.¹²⁸ This is neither the fault of the teachers nor their students. Why fail with any natural language, when you can succeed with a designed language?

Esperanto has been studied since 1918. Generally, these studies have not been rigorously controlled and are not widely reported, largely because it is expensive to use students in a multiyear study and there was insufficient funding. Bias may also be a factor in some of the studies. The results, therefore, are somewhat anecdotal. Still, the results are consistent in finding that a designed language is much easier to learn than a natural language.

“It is worth noting that non-specialists language teachers coped well with teaching the Springboard to Languages [Esperanto] programme. The programme is intended to be usable by non-specialist language teachers, whose positive comments indicate that the teaching and learning

¹²⁸ C. Piron. *Communication Linguistique Etude comparative faite sur le terrain*, Language Problems and Language Planning 26(1), (2002).

materials provided enabled them to deliver Springboard lessons with confidence.”

K. Roehr, *The Springboard to Languages evaluation project: a summary report* (2012).

11.4.3 A Free (Propaedeutic) Language. In cybernetics (the study of communication and control in both animals and machines)¹²⁹ the word *propaedeutic* references an introductory experience. A schematic *propaedeutic* (introductory-reference) language increases the student’s understanding of their native language better than any other second language and also sets the stage for the efficient learning of a third language. Most of the time spent learning a propaedeutic language is recovered by a reduction in the time and effort required for learning other languages. In that sense, it is a free language – trilingualism for the price of bilingualism.

Professor Helmar Frank, at the University of Paderborn, studied the introductory-reference value of Esperanto by teaching it to students before they studied English. One group studied only English. A second group spent two years studying Esperanto and then started learning English. The English only group established a big lead during the first two years, because the other group only studied Esperanto. In years three and four, the Esperanto first students were catching up, but were still behind in acquiring English.

By the end of the 5th year, the Esperanto group had learned as much English in three years as the English only group learned in five years. After the sixth year, the Esperanto group tested higher in English skills – even though they had only four years of English study compared to the six years in the English only group. The reason for this result is that the learning of any language, but especially a schematic language, makes it easier to learn additional languages.

Esperanto’s Achilles Heel. Esperanto and its nearest rival Interlingua have an Achilles Heel – at least relative to either *Afrançaise* or *Americano*.

¹²⁹ One of the major components of artificial intelligence.

Either of these two potential choices would start with hundreds of millions of native speakers of French or of Spanish and Portuguese. Starting with hundreds of millions of semi-native speakers would both speed up the process of global 2 MT Bilingualism and increase the value of learning the common language, as it would be immediately useful on a global scale. If the EU, AU, Mercosur/Mercosul, or the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States acts first, officially establishing 2 MT Bilingualism with either of these languages, their decision will likely be adopted by the UN.

Afrançais, a designed dialect of French, is already understandable to anyone who speaks French. Thus, it starts with an existing community of over 320 million native speakers. Americano, a hybrid of Spanish and Portuguese, starts from a base of 850 million native speakers of its component Iberian languages. English has a base of 400 million native speakers, but comes with the baggage previously discussed.

11.5 Afrançaise: Three Simple Changes to a Global Language

An interesting possibilities would be for the EU and the AU to agree to choose the same language for 2 MT Bilingualism. Afrançaise was created specifically to facilitate cooperation between them. Africa and Europe could be the *Chimerica* of the 21st Century: *Eurafrica*. This would be a way to both increase economic development in Africa and reduce the pressure for economic migration to Europe.

If the EU and AU agree, Afrançaise will achieve more than simply helping both organizations achieve their regional goals. It will give the world 2 MT Bilingualism. The combined population of the AU (1.5 billion) and EU (0.450 billion) constitutes nearly 1/4 of the global total (23.5%). As a percentage of the global population, Africa alone is expected to grow from just under 20% to approximately 40% by 2100.

Much of the first two years of learning French is spent studying (1) the irregular verbs and (2) the complexities of verb conjugation. Removing the irregularities and simplifying conjugation makes learning *Afrançais* much easier. For people who know French, learning Afrançais takes very

little time and effort. For people who don't, it takes far less time and effort than learning standard French.

11.5.1 Element 1. Infinitive Roots for 100% Regular Verbs. The many irregular verbs in French are not consistently irregular, so students need to memorize: 1) which verbs are irregular, 2) in which conjugations – tense, aspect and mood (TAM) – the verbs are irregular and 3) their irregular forms. The irregular verbs are even more important and troublesome than their substantial number suggests, because they are many of the most commonly used verbs.¹³⁰ In *Afrançais*, all verbs are regular.

Afrançais makes all French verbs regular by using the infinitive form of the verb (the way words appear in a dictionary) as the root for conjugation. If the final letter of the infinitive form is a vowel (the -re verbs) the vowel is dropped. This allows only five vowels to suffice for all conjugation suffixes, as addressed in Element 2. Using the infinitive as the always regular root makes it easy to recognize verbs, both in written and oral use. Instant recognition of verbs is key to conversational fluency and reading.

11.5.2 Element 2. Just Five Endings: Easy Verb Conjugation. Verbs in French use 126 suffixes to show tense, aspect, mood, and *person*.¹³¹ Conjugation in *Afrançais* needs only 5 vowels to mark the verb's tense, aspect and mood (TAM), as it does not redundantly mark verbs for person.¹³²

The five *Afrançaise* endings are: 1) adding the letter “o” forms the present tense in the indicative mood, 2) adding the letter “u” forms the present

¹³⁰ There is an excellent explanation for this general linguistic phenomenon in *Words and Rules* by Stephen Pinker.

¹³¹ French marks verbs for nine types of person: je, tu, il, elle, on, nous, vous, ils and elles. Multiplied by the 14 TAM (9 x 14), the total is 126. (see following chart and box).

¹³² The 14 TAM are seven simple tenses (present indicative, imperfect indicative, passé simple, future, conditional, present subjunctive, and imperfect subjunctive) and seven compound tenses (passé composé indicative, past perfect indicative, passé antérieur, future perfect, conditional perfect, perfect subjunctive and past perfect subjunctive).

tense in the subjunctive mood, 3) adding the letter “a” forms the past tense in the indicative mood, 4) adding the letter “e” forms the future tense, 5) adding the letter “i” forms the conditional mood.¹³³ The compound tenses use the same five vowel endings as the simple tenses, applied to either *avoir* or *être*, so a student only needs to apply the five simple tense endings to the helping verbs to create the compound tenses.

simple tenses	Afrançais	compound tenses	Afrançais
present indicative	infinitive + o	passé compose	avo iro + participle
present subjunctive	infinitive + u	perfect subjunctive	avo iru + participle
imperfect indicative	infinitive + a	past perfect indicative	avo ira + participle
future	infinitive + e	future perfect	avo ire + participle
conditional	infinitive + i	conditional perfect	avo iri + participle

Unlike standard French, *Afrançais* doesn’t mark the verb to show “person.” Standard French marks for person and also requires the use of subject pronouns. Since the subject pronouns are always used in French and will continue to be used in *Afrançais*, marking verbs to reflect person is redundant.¹³⁴ Spanish and Portuguese mark their verbs to show person but do not require the use of personal pronouns (pro-drop). *Afrançais* does

¹³³ In *Afrançais*, the imperative mood (command form) is expressed with the bare infinitive. As in English, the imperative is signaled by volume or emphasis: Stop! In French, the imperative mood is only used in the second person singular (tu), the first person plural (nous), and the second person plural (vous). It is excluded from the count because *Afrançaise* uses the present (indicative) endings – but excludes the subject pronoun, in order to distinguish the imperative from the present indicative.

¹³⁴ Verbs in Norwegian are not marked for person. Designed or schematic languages can combine the most rational approaches to each discrete issue from among the world’s thousands of languages. It is natural languages that are weird and arbitrary.

the reverse, it keeps the easily learned and remembered subject pronouns and drops the redundant marking of verbs for person.

The following chart shows the simplicity of verb conjugation in the *Afrançais* dialect with a specific example: *garder* (to guard) in the simple and compound tenses. The five endings (a, e, i o, u) represent a 96% reduction in the memorization that is required to learn standard French conjugation.

Combining the 96% reduction in conjugation ($5/126 = 4\%$) with not having to memorize the irregular verbs means that learning the *Afrançais* “designed dialect” of French requires a tiny fraction of the effort required for learning verbs in standard French. Instead of verbs causing most of the cognitive load on first and second year French language students, they will require only a few pages, a little studying and some practice.

TAM (Tense, Aspect and Mood)

French verbs, as with many languages, mark verbs with suffixes that show the tense, aspect, and mood of the sentence. Voice (active or passive) is shown with the use of a helping verb. Evidentiality and universality are marked in some languages, but not French (or English.)

Indo-European languages, like French and English, often combine tense, aspect and mood (eg. present indicative). In addition, not all possible combinations of TAM are used. In fact, most possibilities are not used or useful.

Tense: Tense marks a sentence for time (past, present or future).

Aspect: Aspect marks a sentence for habitual action, progressive action, imperfect (incomplete) action and perfective (completed). French only marks verbs for imperfect and perfect aspects.

Mood: Mood marks a sentence for indicative (factual or question), subjunctive (contra factual, wishful, or imagined), conditional (validity dependent on a condition), or imperative (command or directive).

Notes Regarding the Following Chart

Note 1: Two simple tenses are not included in the following chart:

Passé Simple: In standard French, the *passé simple* is little use. In *Afrançais*, it is replaced by the *passé compose*.

Imperfect Subjunctive: The imperfect, or past, subjunctive is only used in a subordinate clause when the subject of the two clauses differs. It can be avoided by using the infinitive and the same person or, in impersonal expressions, the indirect pronoun. It is dropped in *Afrançais*.

Note 2: Two compound tenses are not included in the following chart:

Passé Antérieur: In standard French, the *Passé Anterior* is the literary equivalent of the past perfect. *Afrançais* just uses the past perfect.

Past Perfect Subjunctive: In standard French, the Past Perfect Subjunctive is a literary tense equivalent to the past subjunctive. *Afrançais* just uses the past subjunctive.

Note 3: Pronunciation of verbs:

The accent for verbs always falls on the last vowel, to facilitate comprehension, so accent marks are unnecessary.

Comparing Standard French Verb Conjugation With *Afrançais* (*Garder* = To Keep Watch, to Guard)

French Simple Tenses	Afrançais	French Compound Tenses	Afrançais
Present (Indicative) garde gardons gardes gardez garde gardent	gardero <u>o</u>	Passé Compose (Indicative) ai gardé avons gardé as gardé avez gardé a gardé ont gardé	avoir <u>o</u> guarder
Imperfect (Indicative) gardais gardions gardais gardiez gardait gardaient	gardera <u>a</u>	Past Perfect (Indicative) avais gardé avions gardé avais gardé aviez gardé avait gardé avaient gardé	avoir <u>a</u> guarder
Passé Simple gardai gardâmes gardas gardâtes garda gardèrent	see above note	Passé Anterior eus gardé eûmes gardé eus gardé eûtes gardé eut gardé eurent gardé	see above note
Future garderai garderons garderas garderez gardera garderont	gardere <u>e</u>	Future Perfect aurai gardé aurons gardé auras gardé aurez gardé aura gardé auront gardé	avoir <u>e</u> guarder
Conditional garderais garderions garderais garderiez garderait garderaient	garderi <u>i</u>	Conditional Perfect aurais gardé aurions gardé aurais gardé auriez gardé aurait gardé auraient gardé	avoir <u>i</u> guarder
Present (Subjunctive) garde gardions gardes gardiez garde gardent	garderu <u>u</u>	Perfect (Subjunctive) aie gardé ayons gardé aies gardé ayez gardé ait gardé aient gardé	avoir <u>u</u> guarder
Imperfect (Subjunctive) gardasse gardassions gardasses gardassiez gardât gardassent	see above note	Past Perfect (Subjunctive) eusse gardé eussions gardé eusses gardé eussiez gardé eût gardé eussent gardé	see above note

11.5.3 Element 3. No Grammatical Gender. The term “gender” comes from the Latin “genus,” meaning “type, class, sort or kind.” In linguistics, gender does not mean natural (sexual) gender. Natural gender marking is when a word changes to reflect a real biological distinction. For example, English reflects natural gender in the third person singular subject pronoun with “he” or “she.” In contrast, grammatical gender in modern European languages is the *now* arbitrary and pointless marking of nouns and their adjectives with pseudo-gender markings that no longer have a grammatical function.¹³⁵ Grammatical gender creates two problems for students: 1) learning the gender for each noun and 2) remembering to show agreement between nouns and their modifiers.

Most European languages – including the Romance and Germanic languages, but not English, – have retained vestigial but meaningless grammatical gender. It clearly isn’t necessary.¹³⁶ In the Romance languages, grammatical gender assigns nouns to either a masculine or feminine class.¹³⁷ The Germanic languages, excluding English, include a third class, called “neuter.” There’s no logic in these pseudo gender assignments. For example:

1. In Spanish, “bikini” is a masculine noun (el *bikini*).
2. “Nose” is masculine in Portuguese (o *nariz*), but feminine in Spanish (la *nariz*).
3. German silverware requires three genders: the knife (das *messer*), the fork (der *gabel*) and the spoon (die *loffel*)?
4. In French, the word for beard (la *barbe*) is feminine. A woman’s breast is masculine (le *sein*), but a man’s chest is feminine (la *poitrine*).

¹³⁵ Only a minority of the world’s languages use grammatical gender (noun classification) and some languages do not even have pronominal (he-she) gender (eg. Hungarian, Estonian and Finnish).

¹³⁶ Gender, in many other languages, retains a grammatical function. For example, KiSwahili has over a dozen noun categories (genders) with grammatical functions. The prefix Ki, as an example, is used to mark a class of nouns that includes languages.

¹³⁷ A neuter form is used in some romance languages, sparingly, for abstract concepts derived from adjectives. Thus, in Spanish, we see lo buena/ lo malo. French has no neuter, but has epicene (used for both sexes) words which lack gender marking.

- 5. In German, Mädcehn (girl) is neuter, not feminine. Diminutive German nouns end in ‘chen’ and are neuter.
- 6. In some languages, grammatical gender differs based on the natural gender of the speaker.

De-gendered Pronouns, Articles and Adjectives

	Standard French	Afrançais Dialect
third person subject pronouns	il, elle (natural gender) ils, elles	il, elle (natural gender) ils
definite articles	le, la	le
indefinite articles	un, une	un
adjectives	grand, grande	grand

The list of illogical and arbitrary pseudo-gender categorizations could go on for many pages. What does all this false gender represent? Nothing. They are merely artifacts from a distant Indo-European past.¹³⁸

“Language mixture is not only ordinary, but harmless. A blend of two or more languages is not compromised in the way that a cross between a horse and a donkey is a sterile mule.”

John McWhorter, *What Language Is: And What It Isn't and What It Could Be* (2011)

11.6 Americano: A Hybrid Inter-Language

2 MT Bilingualism with the designed language called Americano will help the members of Mercosur/Mercosul and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CLACS) achieve their economic and

¹³⁸ There are a few French words where gender still has a semantic function. For example: *le vase* (the vase) and *la vase* (the mud). These can be dealt with, along with other minor details, in corpus planning.

political goals. *Americano* is a hybrid, an inter-language which uses Latin American Spanish (LAS) and Brazilian Portuguese (BP) as its source languages.¹³⁹ If you speak either of the source languages, you already understand *Americano*. Here is an example:

Según o nuevo testamento, apos o gran inundación, o primero ciudad será o reconstrucción de Babel. Otras fuentes lo llamaró Babilu, o nombre acadio para Babilonia. Sus ruinas seró encontraró em o Irak. Babel será um ciudad cosmopolita, a o gente de grandes distancias. A diferencia de o ciudades cosmopolitas de hoy, todo o mundo hablará o mismo idioma.

O dirigentes de Babel querera ambicioso, impresionante arquitectura e comenzará o construcción de um torre de altura que será suficiente para alcanzar o cielo. O torre no será para glorificar Dios, será para glorificar a hombre. Por sera vanidad, Dios infligirá um multitud de Babel de o lenguas. O consiguiente incapacidad para comunicarse crearadó tanta discordia que trabajará en la torre, se detendrá. Alejaradó de la gente de Babel. Pronto, o mundo será llenará de o comunidades con lenguas mutuamente ininteligibles e amargó antagonismos.

Americano: 2 MT Bilingualism for Latin America. *Americano* uses LAS lexical (content) words and BP grammatical words. There are five ways in which *Americano* is different from LAS and BP. The first three are carried over from *Afrançaise*.

1. Always Regular Verbs: Infinitive Roots. Like *Afrançaise*, there are no irregular verbs in *Americano*. It also uses the entire infinitive of the verb, including their -ar, -er or -ir ending, as the root. As the infinitive

¹³⁹ The LAS and BP terminology is somewhat misleading, as there are many dialects in Latin America and Brazil. The total population of native speakers of Spanish and Portuguese is 780 million, which is greater than the 400 million native speakers of English. While this is less than the combined population of the EU and the AU, it is greater than the 330 million speakers of French, 80 million of whom are native speakers. The difference largely reflects plurilingualism in Francophone Africa.

is the first form of a verb that students learn, using it as the root makes it easier to recognize in all conjugated forms (see the conjugation chart *infra.*). The student can focus on hearing or producing the final vowel that encodes conjugation. There are seven, two more than *Afrançaise*.

“And certainly the noisome irregular verbs ... are not necessary to making oneself understood, nor are they in any sense cultural – they are just cracks in the pavement exerted by millennium of trampling and sunshine.”

John McWhorter, *The Power of Babel* (2001)

2. Easy Verb Conjugation. Like *Afrançaise*, *Americano*’s verb conjugation is reduced by removing the inflection for person.¹⁴⁰ In other words, the suffixes are the same for first, second and third person in both the singular and plural. If you compare the following chart with the chart for *Afrançaise*, you will notice that the same endings are not attached to the same TAM. That both reflects differences between the TAM in the two languages and, more fundamentally, shows that the choice is arbitrary. In *Americano*, there are seven endings as compared to five in *Afrançaise*.¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰ Spanish and Portuguese are called “pro drop” languages, because redundancy in conjugation makes it possible to omit the pronoun. Not dropping the pronoun opens the door for the massive simplification of conjugation. In French the redundant personal pronouns are mandatory.

¹⁴¹ As a result, instead of just five vowel endings there are two additional endings with double vowels. These vowels are pronounced distinctly (hiatus) not together (diphthong). This makes it easier to identify the TAM.

Spanish Simple Tenses	Americano	Spanish Compound Tenses	Americano
Present Indicative como comemos comes coméis come comen	comeró	Present Perfect Indicative he comido hemos comido has comido habéis comido ha comido han comido	haberó comerado
Past Indicative comía comíamos comías comíais comía comían	comerá	Past Perfect Indicative había comido habíamos comido habías comido habíais comido había comido habían comido	haberá comerado
Preterite comí comimos comiste comisteis comió comieron	comeré	Preterite Perfect hube comido hubimos comido hubiste comido hubisteis comido hubo comido hubieron comido	haberí comerado
Future comeré comeremos comerás comeréis comerá comerán	comerí	Future Perfect habré comido habremos comido habrás comido habréis comido habrá comido habrán comido	haberé comerado
Conditional comería comeríamos comerías comeríais comería comerían	comerú	Conditional Perfect habría comido habríamos comido habrías comido habríais comido habría comido habrían comido	haberié comerado
Present Subjunctive coma comamos comas comais coma coman	comerío	Present Perfect Subjunctive haya comido hayamos comido hayas comido hayáis comido haya comido hayan comido	haberió comerado
Past Subjunctive comiera comiéramos comieras comierais comiera comieran comiese comiersemos comieses comiese comiese comiesen	comería	Past Perfect Subjunctive hubiera comido hubiéramos comido hubieras comido hubierais comido hubiera comido hubieran comido hubiese comido hubiésemos comido hubiese comido hubieseis comido hubiese comido hubiesen comido	habería comerado

3. Only Natural Gender. Like *Afrançaise*, *Americano* drops grammatical gender. Although both LAS and BP employ grammatical gender, in which all nouns are arbitrarily assigned a gender, there are many inconsistencies. For example, in BP the nose is a masculine word and the forehead is feminine. The nose and forehead in LAS are the reverse. Rather than trying to bring order to this chaos, and because it is so much easier for language learners, *Americano* and *Afrançaise* use only natural gender.

4. Vocabulary. In designing the hybrid *Americano*, I divided its vocabulary between its lexical (content) words, which are Spanish, and its grammatical (functional) words, which are Portuguese. About 90% of the words in these closely related languages are cognates or near cognates. They are close enough to be mutually understandable in the written languages.¹⁴² The difference, if any, is often a simple and predictable shift in a single letter or phoneme.

Unlike learning most new languages, if you speak LAS or BP, it will be hard to make a serious mistake when using *Americano*. If students occasionally substitute a LAS word for a BP word, or the other way around, they will not be misunderstood. Learners can relax, the efforts will always be close enough.

Lexical Words vs Grammatical Words. There are four categories of lexical words: nouns, adjectives, verbs and adverbs. These use LAS. Grammatical words also fall into four categories: articles, pronouns, prepositions and conjunctions. These four categories use BP.

Grammatical words are called a “closed” category, because it is stable. Additions, deletions and modifications are uncommon. In contrast, lexical words are an “open” category, with more frequent additions, deletions and modifications. For example, the creation of the internet added many new

¹⁴² In the spoken language, the difficulty is in the pronunciation. That is covered in the next point.

lexical words (web, bot, google) but few new grammatical words. Articles would be the gender neutral forms, as in *Afrançaise*.

While there are fewer grammatical words than lexical words, they occur with a high frequency. Also, knowing the meaning of grammatical words is more critical to understanding. While there are generally synonyms or alternate ways to convey the meaning of a lexical word and context often supplies clues, if you don't know a grammatical word you are often stuck. Thus, while the Spanish speaker has fewer new words to learn, there is a smaller margin of error. In any event, the prevalence of cognates means that the burden of learning vocabulary for both language communities is modest.

To achieve a more appropriate balance between the LAS and BP contributions, it may be desirable to transfer discreet groups of lexical words from the LAS category to the BP category. For example, the cardinal and ordinal numbers could use BP instead of LAS.

5. The Phonology (Sound) and Orthography (Spelling) of Americano.

Because the phonology of LAS is both simpler (fewer sounds) and more consistent with orthography (spelling matches sound) than BP, Americano uses the Spanish phonology and orthography when there is a conflict. One important reason for using Portuguese for grammatical words and Spanish for lexical words is that the former are generally short and typically use phonemes that are found in both languages. Thus, Americano has very regular phonology (sounds) and orthography (spelling). This is extremely helpful for students.

People who speak LAS have a harder time understanding BP than the reverse. In particular, Portuguese nasal vowels make learning Portuguese difficult for Spanish speakers. All nasal vowels will, therefore, default to Spanish phonology. This occurs naturally through the division between the lexical (content) words, and the grammatical (function or structural) words.

It will be easy for all Latin Americans and Iberians to learn Americano, because Americano is an intermediate form of both languages. It will

be easier to learn Americano than for Spanish and Portuguese speakers to learn each others languages (reciprocal bilingualism). In fact, because Americano is also regularized and somewhat schematic, the effort required will be substantially less than half of that required for reciprocal bilingualism. It will be both cheaper to implement and produce a better outcome. This is an argument for skipping reciprocal bilingualism and going straight to 2 MT Bilingualism.

For the speakers of indigenous languages, such as Quechua (≈ 9 million), Guarani (≈ 6 million), Mayan (≈ 6 million), and Nahuatl (≈ 2 million), complementary bilingualism is essential. Instead of having to learn three languages (indigenous, Spanish and Portuguese) they will only need to learn two (indigenous and Americano).

“Our world is in big trouble. Divides are growing deeper. Inequalities are growing wider. Challenges are spreading farther.”


UN Sec. General Antonio Guterres, Opening of the
77th General Assembly (September 20, 2022)

Chapter 12

The UN: Our Global Survival Vehicle

Three times, after traumatic wars, multiple states (empire-states and nation-states) attempted to establish collective security. It took the prolonged chaos of the Napoleonic Wars to persuade European rulers to create the Concert of Europe. It took World War I for the world to create the League of Nations. It took World War II for the world to create the UN.

Major Power Conflicts and the Collective Security Responses



We cannot postpone the next evolutionary step in institutional reform until after World War III. We can and must reform the current UN *antebellum*. The next comparably traumatic military conflict will not be followed by the establishment of a new institution for collective security. It is likely to be followed by the collapse of all modern civilizations.

The approaching centennial of the UN's foundation, slightly more than two decades away, is an appropriate timeline for its updating. It may be our last chance to build an efficient and effective SV for our global community of common fate.

The world has changed dramatically, since the original charter of the UN became effective on the 24th of October 1945, but the UN does not reflect most of those changes. When the UN was founded, there were 29 members. In the following decades, UN membership increased to 193. Thus, few of today's members had a role in its formation. Its legitimacy will be enhanced by an updating of its charter by all current members. This could be something like a global constitutional convention or, more likely, it could simply replace existing UN anachronisms through discrete reforms. If the *status quo* is maintained beyond the UN's 2045 Centennial, the UN will lose authority and legitimacy.

The creation of a global community, with a global language rationalization policy of 2 MT Bilingualism is as critical for our global SV as for the aggregations of nation-states to increase their international agency. Ideally, the UN will act quickly in designating a policy of 2 MT Bilingualism and establish a process for choosing the language, which will become its seventh official language, the sole pivot language for translations, and the official text for all disputes over interpretation.

"The emerging global system is one in which three nuclear armed leaders insulated from dissent, pursue risky gambits... A world in which the most consequential decisions rest on the whims of man who have systematically discarded anyone willing to tell them no."

S. Gunitsky and S. Sinanoglu, *The Personalist Global Order*, Foreign Affairs January 26, 2026

12.1 Updating the Security Council

In a world dominated by three increasingly autarkic empire-states, the UN is marginalized. While this is not a new reality, in the 21st Century the diminishing agency of the nation-states should motivate them to attempt to make the UN more representative and democratic (democratic at the UN level, but ideologically agnostic at the nation-state level). After 80 years, the severe limits of the current model and its inadequacy in the face of the rapidly increasing need for equitable and global collective action makes the institution, as currently structured, increasingly anachronistic.

De-Institutionalizing 19th Century Colonialism. The collapse of colonialism in the second half of the 20th Century accounts for much of the increase in UN membership. While colonialism has been repudiated, Great Britain and France are permanent members of the Security Council only because they were colonial powers at the end of the Second World War. This institutionalization of colonial privilege needs to be corrected. Until then, the fight against colonialism is unfinished.

My suggestion for ending the anachronistic colonialism in the Security Council has seven elements. These seven elements are *interim* changes that will only be effective until the UN's 2045 centennial. They will, however, increase the legitimacy of an interim effort to bring the UN Charter into conformance with the needs of the 21st Century:

1) India replaces Great Britain as a permanent member of the Security Council (The large former colony replaces the small former colonizer.),

2) Great Britain is given a new seat, but only until 2045. This seat is *ex officio*, with Great Britain responsible for representing the Commonwealth of Nations (ex India). In 2045, a seat for the Commonwealth may (or may not) be established as part of the centennial updating.

3) The seat held by France will be retained by France, until 2045, but with France now representing the EU. Similar to the Commonwealth seat, an EU seat may be established in the Centennial updating.

4) A new seat will be designated for the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Until the 2045 Centennial updating, it will be held by Brazil, *ex officio*. After 2045, as with the Commonwealth and EU seats, its future will be determined by a revised UN Charter.

5) A new seat will be designated for the AU, until 2045, if an agreement between the UN and the AU can be reached on its representative's selection process and *ex officio* role.

6) A new seat will be established for Dar al Islam, until 2045, if an agreement can be reached between the UN and a majority of the predominantly Muslim nation-states. The AU members which border the Mediterranean can choose to be part of either the AU or Dar al-Islam group.

7) A new seat will be established for the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), until 2045, if an agreement can be reached between the UN and ASEAN on its representative's selection and their *ex officio* role.

A Security Council so comprised, although not based on population, would represent more than 80% of the world's population. The number of non-permanent members could be reduced – so the number of security council members could be maintained or reduced, with all members having equal authority and responsibility – until 2045.

Population in Millions and as a Percentage of the
Global Population (2023)

polity	million	year	percentage
AU	1450	(2023)	≈ 17.5%
India	1430	(2023)	≈ 17.5%
China	1425	(2023)	≈ 17.5%
ASEAN	689	(2023)	≈ 8.5%
CELAC	665	(2023)	≈ 8.3%

polity	million	year	percentage
EU	448	(2023)	≈ 5.6%
USA	340	(2023)	≈ 4.2%
Russia	143	(2021)	≈ 1.8%
Total	6,410		≈ 80%

If the Security Council resists reform, the General Assembly can (and should) simply refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the colonialism infected Security Council, even if it must act outside the current but anachronistic UN charter. It could unilaterally designate the membership of an alternative Security Council. That would be a bold, even revolutionary move, but the fight against colonialism has always been revolutionary. The General Assembly would have the moral high ground and simply needs to appreciate that the fight against colonialism is incomplete. If the general assembly fights this residual colonialism with perseverance, they will win. History has already spoken on colonial privilege.

“The health and strength of a community depends on every citizen feeling of solidarity with other citizens, and on his willingness ... to shoulder his part of the burdens and responsibilities of the community. The same is of course true of humanity as a whole.”

Dag Hammarskjöld, U.N. Secretary-General May 4, 1959

12.2 Updating the General Assembly

In practice, the Assembly’s current functions fall into six main categories. First, it is a universal deliberative forum. It convenes the annual General Debate and provides a platform where small and medium states can speak with formal equality. Second, it is a norm-setting body. Major declarations and repeated resolutions help define international expectations even when they are not formally binding. Third, it is a budgetary authority: Article 17 gives it the power to consider and approve the UN budget and apportion expenses among members. Fourth, it is an electoral body,

choosing non-permanent Security Council members and filling seats in other UN organs and bodies. Fifth, it has an institutional design function through Article 22, which allows it to establish subsidiary organs. Sixth, it has a residual political role in peace and security through the “Uniting for Peace” framework, which allows it to convene when the Security Council is blocked, though without assuming Chapter VII enforcement powers.

The General Assembly already does more than is generally assumed. Still, it remains structurally weak in three ways. It is usually recommendatory rather than binding. Its one-state, one-vote structure maximizes sovereign equality but does not solve problems of scale, capability, or implementation. And its near-universal membership gives it legitimacy, but also makes it unwieldy as an operational decision-maker. The result is a body that is strong in voice and legitimacy, but weak in execution. Those limits are built into the present Charter design.

The key question is not whether the General Assembly should become a world parliament with full sovereign powers. That is neither politically likely nor clearly desirable. The better question is how to augment it so that global governance becomes more effective without creating a global government.

The first augmentation could be to redefine the relationship with a modified Security Council, *supra.*, evolving toward a bicameral or dual-track model. The General Assembly would represent states equally; the Security Council would represent, though imperfectly, populations.

A second augmentation could be to formalize the role of regional organizations inside General Assembly processes. Today, the Charter system recognizes regional arrangements (Chapter VIII), but the Assembly remains overwhelmingly state-centric. A strengthened model would grant accredited regional bodies a more structured role in agenda coordination, consolidated negotiation, and implementation reporting. Over time, this could reduce the decision-making burden created by nearly two hundred separate national delegations.

A third augmentation could be to use Article 22 to create standing technical and governance bodies for sectors where universal coordination

matters most: critical minerals, pandemic preparedness, food resilience, shipping chokepoints, AI standards, data transparency, or emergency supply chains. These limited-purpose, domain-specific institutions would have reporting duties, verification functions, and coordination roles.

A fourth augmentation could be to strengthen its information generating and disseminating role. Effective and accountable governance depends on shared data, data comparability, and data accuracy. The Assembly is well placed to sponsor global registries, reporting dashboards, compliance reviews, and independent statistical baselines in areas that are now fragmented. That could include trade dependency, supply-chain concentration, energy resilience, vaccine capacity, or environmental exposure. The Assembly would clarify facts, standardizing metrics, and making compliance visible.

A fifth augmentation could be a more systematic and decentralized use of the “Uniting for Peace” mechanism. The UN is not likely to be given the authority to enact laws that are binding on the member states, but the General Assembly could be used to propose model legislation for the consideration of all member states. This would be similar to the enactment of a global *aquis communautaire* – like the EU *aquis communautaire*, but on a voluntary basis. It would complement the more traditional system of treaties and, in some cases, could substitute for treaties. It would also be similar to the “law institute” model discussed in connection with a commonwealth network.

The UN would be especially useful for proposing model legislation to establish rules for international trade. Instead of bilateral rules negotiated between large economies and small economies, in which there are significant power disparities, the model legislation route would reflect a multilateral balance with much smaller inequities due to relative size. The rules could significantly reduce the cost of international transactions globally and assure that the collective benefits were shared more equitably.

A United Nations Uniform Law Commission (UNULC) would propose model legislation for the consideration of the General Assembly before transmittal to UN members. The General Assembly could establish a committee system that supervises the UNULC, holds hearings, commissions studies and makes its own suggestions for legal convergence.

State sovereignty would be preserved as the ultimate enactment would be by the nation-state.

“A History of mankind shows us the grand spectacle of the grouping of man in units of ever increasing size that live together in peace, and that are ready to go to war only with other groups outside of their own limits.”

Franz Boas, *An Anthropologist’s View of War* (1912)

12.3 Coordinating Global Collective Action

Because the world order is both splintering and at risk of re-polarization, there is a value in the UN providing both coordination and augmentation in at least three areas: global financial infrastructure, global security, and global pandemic response.

Domain	Function	Outcome
Economic	Capital allocation	Equitable Economic Development
Security	Delegation and Oversight	Greater Security
Health	Biological security	Equity, Efficiency & Effectiveness

12.3.1 Combining Global Financial Infrastructure. The institutional architecture that largely governed global finance, development lending, and economic coordination among non-communist polities, from the end of the Second World War until the 21st Century, was designed for a world that no longer exists. The postwar system—often called the Bretton Woods order—reflected a geopolitical environment dominated by the United States and its Western allies. In the 21st Century emerging economies wield growing economic power, new financial institutions are being created, and alternative coalitions such as the BRICS+ are constructing alternative mechanisms for development financing and monetary cooperation.

Bretton Woods institutions retain financial depth but face declining legitimacy outside the West. BRICS+ institutions offer greater political inclusivity but limited scale and integration. Parallel systems create inefficiencies, competition, and geopolitical fragmentation. A merger may be very useful.

This would not abolish existing institutions but would transform competition into complementarity. A coordinated system would: (1) increase efficiency of capital allocation, (2) reduce political fragmentation, and (3) enable coordinated responses to global crises (debt, climate, supply chains). In effect, the UN would become the clearinghouse of global economic infrastructure, analogous to how central banks coordinate domestic economies.

A useful metaphor is railway construction. In the nineteenth century many countries built railways using incompatible track gauges. Trains built for one system could not operate on another, creating logistical inefficiencies. Eventually most countries standardized their gauges to facilitate cross-border transportation. The global economy now faces a similar challenge. Bretton Woods and BRICS+ institutions represent two networks designed to carry the same economic traffic—capital flows, development financing, and financial stabilization—but built with different institutional tracks.

12.3.2 The Security Council's Peace Paralysis. The UN Charter grants the Security Council primary responsibility for international peace and security. Its five permanent members—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—possess veto power over substantive resolutions.

The consequences are often paralysis that transforms collective security into contingent security. When the interests of a permanent member are engaged, action becomes unlikely. The war in Ukraine illustrates this dynamic: Russia's position within the Security Council prevents decisive UN action against its own conduct. Similarly, U.S. vetoes have repeatedly constrained resolutions related to conflicts in the Middle East. In such cases, the UN does not fail accidentally; it fails by design.

UN peacekeeping missions depend on Security Council mandates, which are shaped by compromise among the permanent members. This results in mandates that are often ambiguous, under-resourced, or politically constrained. Peacekeeping thus becomes reactive and limited rather than preventative and effective. It is a system designed to prevent great-power war, but ill-suited to managing the diffuse, regional conflicts that characterize the 21st century.

“Foreign policy is in danger of turning into a subdivision of domestic politics instead of an exercise in shaping the future.”

H. Kissinger, *World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History* (2014)

The Case for Supporting Regional Security Architectures. Instead of starting at the Security Council, treating regional organizations as subordinate instruments, the UN should elevate regional forces to the status of primary security providers within their respective regions.

The UN Charter explicitly recognizes a role for regional arrangements in maintaining peace and security. However, in practice, these arrangements remain dependent on Security Council authorization and support, limiting their autonomy and effectiveness. A regionalized model of security offers several advantages: 1) proximity and contextual knowledge, 2) incentive alignment, 3) continuity of engagement, and 4) political legitimacy

Regional organizations possess deeper understanding of political, cultural, and historical dynamics. This allows for more nuanced conflict prevention, mediation, and resolution. External actors often lack this contextual awareness, leading to misaligned interventions. Neighboring states have strong incentives to prevent conflict spillover, including refugee flows, economic disruption, and transnational insecurity. These incentives create a natural basis for collective action that is often stronger than that of distant global powers.

Regional organizations are better positioned to sustain long-term engagement, including post-conflict reconstruction and institution-building.

Unlike UN missions, which are often time-limited and externally driven, regional actors remain embedded in the geopolitical environment.

In addition, regional interventions are more likely to be perceived as legitimate, particularly when they involve culturally and politically proximate actors. This can enhance compliance and reduce resistance.

“The ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) was officially formed in 1999... The ESF has been crucial in ending several conflicts in the region and in stabilizing states in transition... Southern and East African states later created their own forces in 2007 and 2022 respectively.”

Shola Lawal, Al Jazeera, March 2, 2026

Global Peace Funding: From *Ad Hoc* Intervention to Building Regional Infrastructure. The UN currently allocates billions of dollars annually to peacekeeping operations. While these missions provide important services—such as civilian protection and monitoring—they are often reactive, addressing conflicts after they have escalated and hardened.

A more effective approach would reallocate at least a portion of these resources toward building regional security infrastructure. In the African context, this would involve the reallocation and increase of funding to: 1) expand the AU Peace Fund, 2) enhance the operational readiness of the African Standby Force, 3) invest in logistics, airlift, and communications capabilities, 4) strengthen early warning and intelligence systems, 5) support mediation and diplomatic capacity, and 6) train military and civilian personnel.

Such investments would transform regional organizations from dependent actors into first responder security providers. This will reduce the need for large-scale UN interventions, creating a more sustainable and preventive security system.

Combining regional ownership with UN oversight, financing conditions, and transparency requirements—can mitigate local dysfunction while increasing local agency. Regional organizations serve as primary security providers. The UN acts as a financier, and auditor. Global norms are maintained through oversight rather than direct control. Capacity building replaces episodic intervention is the core strategy.

The goal is not to marginalize the UN, but to transform its role. In doing so, global security becomes not the hostage of an increasingly rare great-power consensus, but the result of regional capacity—supported, but not dominated, by the international community.

“Recalling that COVID-19 swept through almost every country in just four months and led to the deaths of some 28 million people is to recall the speed and scale up of a new pathogen.”

World Health Organization Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response, November 28, 2025

12.3.3 Supporting Regional Vaccination Infrastructure. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed a critical weakness in global governance: the absence of a coherent, operational system for vaccinations. Institutions such as the World Health Organization and initiatives like COVAX demonstrated both the potential and the limitations of the current global co-operation. The UN should as with the traditional security architecture just discussed, fund a regional vaccination system with three functions.

(1) Production: Regional manufacturing hubs (e.g., Africa, South Asia, Latin America), technology transfer agreements and a licensing framework, and strategic stockpiles of critical inputs.

(2) Distribution: Pre-negotiated allocation formulas based on population, risk, and outbreak severity, transparent governance mechanisms to prevent hoarding, and integration with early warning systems.

(3) Last-Mile Delivery: Investment in cold-chain logistics, digital tracking systems for doses and recipients, training of healthcare personnel

WHO would provides technical standards and coordination. Regional organizations (e.g., African Union) would manage implementation. The UN would provides financing, oversight, and integration. This transforms pandemic response from: reactive to preventive, from ad hoc to institutional, and from inequitable to structured and transparent. Health security becomes a core pillar of global stability, not an afterthought.

Future pandemics are certain, only their arrival date is unknown. We must learn from the COVID-19 pandemic. Vaccines were developed in record time, leveraging decades of prior research and global collaboration. From a purely technical perspective, the pandemic demonstrated that humanity possesses the knowledge and capability to respond effectively to existential biological threats.

However, the distribution of those vaccines followed a dramatically different trajectory. Rather than reflecting the global nature of the scientific effort, vaccine allocation adhered to national boundaries and economic hierarchies. Wealthy states secured early access through bilateral agreements, effectively pre-purchasing large portions of global supply. Meanwhile, lower-income countries—despite participating in multilateral initiatives—faced significant delays.

This divergence highlights a structural asymmetry: science operates in an increasingly integrated global epistemic community, whereas governance remains anchored in sovereign, competitive political units. The result is a system in which collective benefits are generated globally but distributed unevenly.

“... the adoption of an international language is the greatest gift with which we could collectively endow our children and their descendants. We need it now, but they will need it infinitely more than we do.”

Mario Pei, *One Language for the World* (1958)

Chapter 13

Conclusion: A Virtuous Circle

In closing, I ask the reader to be optimistic – pessimism is often a self-fulfilling prophecy – and imagine that the UN endorses 2 MT Bilingualism and also chooses a suitable language, using this choice as its seventh official language, as its universal pivot language for translations, and as the official version for dispute resolutions.

There would be an immediate and profound public response. Universities and secondary schools all around the world would add the language to their curriculum. On-line courses and learning apps would appear almost overnight. Millions of individuals would show their support by starting to learn the language. A virtuous circle would emerge. Region-states and nation-states would quickly adopt the UN choice for their own language rationalization needs. First millions, then tens of millions, and finally billions of people would actively choose to learn the language in order to help build a global community and establish a global identity that encouraged global collective action.

“The hallmark of wisdom is asking, What effects will the decision I make today have on future generations? On the health of the planet?”

Jane Goodall, *Book of Hope: A Survival Guide for Trying Times* (2021)

Critically, no new government appropriations would be required. 2 MT Bilingualism will cost less than is currently wasted in the teaching foreign languages. 2 MT Bilingualism would be wildly popular in a single generation and fully established in the second generation. That such “low hanging fruit” exists is a blessing. Failure to harvest it is a terrible waste of human potential.

“The best time to plant a tree is twenty years ago. The second best time is now.”

African Proverb

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